The State and the Co-Operative Movement in the Bombay Presidency 1880-1930. by Catanach, Ian James
T H E  S T A T E  A N D  T H E  C O - O P E R A T I V E  
M O V E M E N T  I N  T H E  B O M B A Y  
P R E S I D E N C Y ,  1 8 8 0  - 1 9 3 0
By
IAN JAMES CATANACH 
School of Oriental and African Studies
A thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010448
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
2A B S T R A C T
The Deccan Riots of 1875 were believed to have been 
brought about by the large scale transfer of land, through 
foreclosure, from the cultivating to the money-lending 
classes. As a remedy, Sir William Wedderburn suggested the 
establishment of State-backed capitalistic agricultural 
banks, But the India Office felt that his scheme would 
require too much State intervention. The Indian Co-operative
Societies Act reflects a more positive attitude to the role 
of the State, although in 1904 it was hoped that the 
societies which were to be set up by official Registrars* 
would eventually become entirely independent. Local manage­
ment and thrift were emphasized. The alternative scheme of 
agricultural banks remained under consideration, however.
The Government of India appear to have dismissed it only when 
the Egyptian Agricultural Bank did not succeed; what became 
the non-official Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank was 
originally intended to be an agricultural bank.
The fostering of democracy through village co-opera­
tives was especially stressed in Bombay, Also, Indian hono­
rary Organizers1, and a *Co-operative Institute1, were given 
an important role in the movement, although much of the in­
initiative remained with the Registrar and his staff. By the 
later twenties, however, the attempt to foster democracy at 
village level through co-operatives appeared to have largely 
faileds villages in Bombay were not *little Republics*. The
3honorary workers, many of them now nationalists, were becom­
ing dilettante in their attitudes to co-operation, too. 
Control therefore increasingly passed into the hands of the 
State. But at the purely economic level there had been some 
success in Bombay, The well-managed Provincial Bank was in 
some areas satisfactorily fulfilling the ryots* credit and 
marketing needs, although its system of branches, each 
having dependent societies, was perhaps not completely 
co-operative *
The thesis has been largely based on documents 
found in the office of the Bombay Registrar, and elsewhere 
in India.
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5P R E P A C E
This thesis originated in an interest in the co­
operative movement in the India of today. Because I am by 
training an historian I was soon led to enquire into the 
problems which the Indian co-operative movement has faced in 
the past. Gradually, an almost completely new field of 
investigation revealed itself. For, in the story of the 
relationships between the British dominated Governments and 
the co-operative movement which they fostered amongst the 
people of India,there is reflected, in miniature, many of 
the changing attitudes towards state intervention in economic 
matters during half a century of India1s more recent past.
So this thesis is to some extent an essay in economic and 
administrative history. But it is also very much a study of 
personal relationships. The interaction of fstatef and 'co­
operative movement1 before Independence meant fundamentally 
the interaction of personalities, some well known and some 
virtually unknown. It meant the interaction of British 
and Indian officials, and Indian and occasionally British 
non-officials, on a level of intimacy rarely reached in 
other fields at this time, even in 'local self-government'♦
Because of the need to set limits to my investiga­
tions, and because I have a belief in the value of local and 
regional studies in history, I decided to concentrate on 
agricultural co-operatives in the Bombay Presidency, and on 
the period from 1904 to 1930. I do not discuss developments
6in Sind. Conditions there were much closer to those of the 
Punjab than to those of what was called 'the Presidency- 
proper1. 1930 was chosen as a terminal point partly for 
reasons of availability of documents, and partly because 
that date represents, approximately, the onset of the full 
force of the economic depression, and the end of an era in 
Indian economic history. Some attention has been given to 
developments before the passing of the first Co-operative 
Societies Act in 1904, particularly in Bombay, because of 
the bearing these had on later policy.
It would be wrong to dismiss as unimportant the 
work which has been done on this subject before. The brief 
historical chapters in Dr. K.N. Naik's The Co-operative Move­
ment in the Bombay State have been described by a retired 
Indian Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Shri V.S. Bhide, 
as Overcharged with emotion' in their 'patriotic eagerness 
to castigate a foreign regime1. But the historical 
chapters in the book which Dr. Naik edited on the occasion 
of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the movement 
in Bombay, are more moderate in tone, and contain some useful
pinformation. The Bombay Government also published a volume 
to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the movement. N.V. 
Nayak's Fifty Years of Co-operation in the Bombay State is 
a painstaking study, which, however, concentrates on the
1. K.N. Naik, The Co-operative Movement in the Bombay State, 
Bombay, 1953* reviewed by V.S. Bhide in Bombay 6o-opera- 
tive Quarterly. July 1953, pp.33-38.
2. K.N. Naii, ed., Fifty Years of Co-operations Golden 
Jubilee Souvenir, Bombay, 1954.
period after the depression of the thirties."*" In fact, 
none of these "books deals with the period "before 1930 at 
any length, and none contains a discussion of the vital 
period prior to 1904. The authors of these "books have made 
little use of much of the material which was put at my dis­
posal "by the Bombay Government during my visit to India. 
Inevitably, perhaps, they do not feel the need to explain 
the social background of the co-operative movement? it is 
already largely known to these authors and their readers 
simply because they are Indian. On the whole they are not 
interested in personalities.
To some extent the nature of the thesis has been 
conditioned by the availability of documents. The Bombay 
Government, (I am speaking of the Government of the undivid­
ed Bombay of 1958-59), generously undertook to give me ‘all 
reasonable facilities1 to study the records kept at the 
Office of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Poona, 
for the period 1904-1930. They very reasonably added the 
proviso that fit may not be possible to make available to
i
you the confidential documents in the Department. Actually,
very few restrictions were placed on my studies. Those
papers which I was not allowed to see generally related in
some way to the national movement, or to the influence on
the co-operative movement of. caste animosities and of
government policy on caste. In one case I was not given
1. /N.V. RayakJ?’, Pifty Years of Co-operation in the Bombay 
State, Bombay, 1957.
8access to certain papers, because they had a direct hearing 
on legislation then under preparation. Of the records kept 
in the Bombay Secretariat Records Office I have been per­
mitted to study, though not always to make full notes on, 
those relating to the co-operative movement up to the year 
1914# The Rational Archives of: India made available rele­
vant non-aonfidential records of 1914 and the preceding 
years. After I had returned to England the Punjab Records 
Office kindly sent me a typescript of some Government of 
India records of 1914 now in their possession.
The access to records which I was granted could 
obviously be only to those which have survived. Por reasons 
which are explained in detail in the Bibliography, the 
period prior to about 1920 is better represented in the 
Poona records than the following decade. Por the years 
after 1920 I have been able to rely to some extent on the 
records of the Bombay State Co-operative Bank. But, because 
of. lack of material, I have been able to develop a few points 
in the final chapters perhaps slightly less fully than I 
might otherwise have wished.
I have been treated with the greatest fairness, and 
friendliness in all my dealings: with officials in India, in 
records offices and in the field; I could not have wished 
for greater co-operation.
In England I have worked on records kept in the old 
India Office Library of the Commonwealth Relations Office,
9the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel Archives, and the Horace Plunkett Foundation, 
London. I should like to thank the staffs of these insti­
tutions for their assistance.
A large number of people individually come to mind 
as I consider the making of this thesis. I have given a list 
at the end of the thesis of those who have been of particular 
assistance. But I must express here my deep appreciation 
of the help given me in India by Shri B.C. Cariappa, I.A.S., 
Deputy Secretary to the (then) Government of Bombay in the 
Industries and Co-operation Department, Dr. A.U. Shaikh,
I.A.S., Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Professor 
D.R. Gadgil, Director of the Gokhale Institute of Politics 
and Economics, Poona, and Dr. R.G. Kakade, a member of the 
Servants of India Society. Without the co-operation of 
Shri Cariappa, in particular, the writing of this thesis 
would have been almost impossible.
Of those who figure in the thesis, and whom I have 
interviewed, I should especially like to mention Sir Robert 
Ewbauk, who was Registrar between 1911 and 1920. He has 
given me sympathetic advice on many points, and I have 
discussed his long period as Registrar with him in some 
detail. I have also had several most helpful discussions 
with Shri Vaikunth L. Mehta, who was for many years the 
Managing Director of what is now the Bombay State Co-opera­
tive Bank and who is still the leading non-official in the
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co-operative movement in Bombay, I, of course, am respon­
sible for opinions expressed in the thesis, 'The events 
covered in this book1, writes Dr. Gopal in the Preface to 
his study of Lord Irwin*s Viceroyalty, *are now as much a 
part of history as, say, the Norman Conquest. Contemporan­
eity is a matter of mood as well as of time*.1 I should 
like to think that I could make the same claim on behalf of 
the events aovered in my thesis. Yet actually meeting some 
of the men about whom one is writing perhaps increases the 
risk of partiality in an historian. Meeting those whose 
decisions one may on occasion have to criticize certainly 
teaches one humility. In writing this thesis I have often 
been reminded of Professor Butterfield's complaint that he 
has known many students who could easily find fault with the
diplomacy of Bismarck, but who themselves were quite incapa-
2ble of wheedling sixpence out of a college porter. I hope 
I have not treated anyone completely unjustly.
My studies have been carried out during my tenure 
of the Gordon Watson Scholarship, awarded by the University 
of New Zealand. I am indebted to the University for being 
thus permitted to spend three most profitable years in India 
and in this country.
My supervisor, Dr. K.A. Ballhatchet, has spent much
1. S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931.(1957).
2. Herbert Butterfield, 'The Dangers of History', in 
History and Human Relations, p.169.
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time on my problems and my manuscript; I am most grateful 
to him for his sympathetic guidance. Mrs. Margaret Morris 
has very capahly typed the final version of the thesis. My 




C H A N G I N G -  A T T I T U D E S  
Is A G R I C U L T U R A L  B A N K S
The aourse of the ‘Deccan Riots* of May 1875 has
never "been fully traced. Until Indian peasant history finds
its Lefehvre we will probably have little more to go upon
than the Report of the governmental. Committee which investi-
1
gated the riots, and the evidence gathered by that Committee.
Fortunately, the Committee*s Report was a model for its time.
It appears that hostility against the money-lenders
had been growing in the Deccan in the years preceding the
riots. The first outbreak of actual rioting took place in
the village of Supa, in the Bhimthadi taluka. There, the
houses and the shops of the Marwaris were ‘gutted of every-
2thing that the rioters could find*, and one house was 
burnt to the ground. Twenty four hours later there was a 
similar disturbance in another village, fourteen miles away. 
Police and army units arrived in time to avert a good many 
of the outbreaks which, it was claimed,, were threatened in 
the days following the first disturbances. In all, only 
about thirty villages in the two districts of Poona and 
Ahmadnagar were affected.
Yet the authorities admitted that they found great
1. Report of the Committee on the Riots in Poona and 
Ahmednagar, 1875* The Committee was often referred to as 
the *Deccan Riots Commission1, and its report as the 
•Deccan Riots Report1, by which it will be referred to 
hereafter in this thesis.
2. Ibid., p.3.
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difficulty in obtaining evidence against the rioterst !the
whole country appears to be in league against the money
lenders', wrote the Collector of Poona.^ The object of the
riots in almost all the villages had been simply to obtain
and destroy the written bonds held by the money-lenders. The
wrath of the villagers had been directed chiefly against the
Marwari and Gujur saukars, foreigners to the Deccan. The
Maharashtrian Brahman money-lenders, far fewer in numbers,
2were usually left alone. One of the most pathetic of the 
ideas which the Committee found to be prevalent at the time 
of the riots was the notion that Government - sometimes the 
Queen in person - was going to do something for them, that 
Government was on their side.
The nature of the riots themselves, undertaken as 
they were in a spirit of righteousness, and directed as they 
were against a specific object - the money-lenders1 bonds - 
convinced the Committee that there was a serious grievance 
in the Deccan: 'the condition of the villagers through /JovL’tJ' 
the whole affected area was such that even had Supa not taken 
the initiative, some other place would doubtless have done 
so'.4 A detailed analysis of the causes of the riots was 
obviously called for.
1. Collr. Poona to Police Commr., S.D. No.736 of 20 May 1875, 
quoted Deccan Riots Kept., Appx. C., p.2.
2. Deccan Riots Rept., p.5.
3. Ibid., p.105. Cf. Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the 
Drench Revolution, transl. R.R.Palmer"J (Vintage Books edn., 
New York, 1957),p.125•
4. Deccan Riots Rept., p.3.
11
East of Poona lies the great famine belt, an area 
which suffers from very frequent failure or partial failure 
of crops. The chances of obtaining a ‘reasonably good* crop 
in this area, it was later calculated, are only -about fifty 
four in a hundred; the chances of failure are about twenty in 
a hundred."*' If only because of the unreliability of the mon­
soon, for centuries before the British arrived the ryots had 
been in debt and the interest rates of the money-lenders, 
uncertain about the time of repayment of their loans, had been
very high. Chaplin, the first Commissioner in the Deccan, had
2commented on the situation. There seems little doubt, how­
ever, that the British upset the traditional pattern of money- 
lending. Land had rarely been taken as security for a loan 
before they arrived? for one thing, only mirasdar occupants 
had any ‘transferable1 rights to land. The traditional 
method of dunning a recalcitrant debtor was to sit dharna at 
his door. Even as late as 1840 the land had little marketable 
value and few sales of land were made.^ But the settlement of
1. See Evidence of Dr. Harold Mann, Royal Commission on 
Agriculture in India, (1926). Mins", of lEv., Vol.II, pt.i, 
p7l6 (vi). By a ‘reasonably good' crop was meant one having 
‘over 60 per cent, of the goodness of 1915-16'. 1915-16 has 
been generally accepted as being a good, though not abnorm­
ally good, year. ‘Goodness' of crops was calculated by a 
test which Dr. Mann devised, and which was based on statis­
tics of the area planted in staple crops and the anna 
valuation of each crop. See also Mann, Rainfall and famine; 
A Study of Rainfall in the Bombay Deccan, 1865-193passim.
2.--W.Chaplin, Report of 1822, quoted Deccan Riots Rept., p.25 
and Appx. C., p. 268.
3. See Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in 
India, (G. of I.,1895), p.19.
4. Ibid.
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1835 and the following years conferred unrestricted rights of 
transfer of land on occupants of all classes. Land could now 
he taken in mortgage, and, what was more, could he recovered 
through the new British courts of law. The chief architect of 
the 1 Survey Settlement1, George Wingate, saw this provision as 
a means of getting rid cf uneconomic cultivators and of sub­
stituting for them 1 traders, pensioners and other parties
1
having capital.1 Yet Wingate, who has recently heen summed 
up as 'one of J.S. Mill's most unquestioning disciples', dis­
played the hesitancies of his master on the question of 
whether cultivation by wealthy landholders on large farms was
necessarily more economic than cultivation by small peasant
2farmers. Certainly, when Wingate saw that the grant of rights 
of transfer to all classes was leading to an increasing use 
of the system of mortgage, and the frequent transfer of lands 
taken in mortgage from the small peasants to the money-lenders, 
he was ready to say that it had never been oontemplated that 
the land transferred as a result of the provisions of the new 
settlement should go to the saukars.
A fundamental factor in the Deccan situation was the
4
lack of an indigenous money-lending class. There is some 
evidence, too, that since the provisions of the Survey
1. Joint Report of H.E.Goldsmid and G.Wingate, 17 October 1840, 
quoted Note on Land Transfer... t loc.cit.
2. Eric Stokes. The English Utilitarians and India, p.127*
3. Wingate to Govt., No.296 of 3 September 1852, quoted 
Deccan Riots Rept., Appx. A., p.oO.
4. See N.V.Sovani, 'Economic Conditions in Maharashtra*, in 
Journal of the University of Poona, Humanities Section,
No.9, 1958, p.Il6.
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Settlement had come into force there had been an influx of 
money-lenders of the more unscrupulous variety. 'The prosper­
ity of the ryot is no longer necessary to the prosperity of 
the money-lender1, complained the Deccan Riots Committee.^ It 
was no longer necessary to keep a man on the land in order to 
obtain repayment of onefs loans.
The American Civil War temporarily clouded the
situation in the sixties. Prices rose, not only of the wheat
2
and the cotton which England obtained from India, but also,
3
to some extent, of the more staple crcps of bajri and jowari. 
On the strength of their sudden prosperity, and in order to 
grow the crops for which there was a new demand, the ryots of
the Deccan borrowed on mortgage more extensively than they
had ever done before.
With the sharp contraction of prices after the res­
toration of normal conditions many of the ryots found them­
selves in an almost impossible situation. The Deccan Riots 
Committee could make only rough estimates of the amount of 
land which was transferred from agriculturists to non-agri­
culturists during this period. Their conclusions had to be
based on a number of instances selected somewhat at random in
the districts affected by the riots because no accurate 
record was kept of transfers of land to non-agriculturists.
1. Deccan Riots Rept., p.45.
2. Ibid., pp.47 ff.
3. A graph showing the fluctuations in the prices of these 
products at Sholapur, 1821-1875, is in R.D. Choksey, 
Economic Life in the Bombay Deccan, (1818-1939), p.30.
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However, the Committee felt that indirect evidence was 
afforded by the growth in the number of suits for possession 
of land under mortgage bonds. For instance, in 1854 there 
were ten suits at Talegaon, in Poona District, for the pos­
session of mortgaged land; in 1872 there were 193, 143 of 
these suits being against cultivators. In the villages 
actually investigated by the Committee in the Ahmadnagar 
District it was found that about an eighth of the ocaupan- 
cies were held by saukars, and that the saukars had ac­
quired the occupancies within the past twenty years, and for 
the most part within the last ten years,^
The condition of the ryots in the other regions of 
the Bombay Presidency was undoubtedly not as serious as it was. 
in the Deccan, Gujarat, Khandesh and the Karnatak were rapidly 
becoming cash crop - particularly export crop - areas. But the
'new system of trade by rail and wire', as it was aptly des-
2
cribed at the time, did not necessarily lead to increased 
prosperity for all. A class of unskilled labourers, owning 
little or no land, and sometimes travelling quite considerable 
distances by rail in search of seasonal work, was being brought 
into existence.^ And although this field of Indian history 
aould no doubt be as controversial as Professor Tawney's six­
teenth century England, it seems reasonably fair to say that
1. Deccan Riots Rept., p.59*
2. Gaze11eer of tlae Bombay Presidency, Vol.XII, Khandesh, 
11880), p.194.
3. See R.D.Bell, Asst. Collr. Khandesh, quoted in Bom.L.Rev. 
Admin.Rept.. 1905-06, pt.ii, p.15, and evidence of
Dr. Harold Mann, R.(j. on Agric., Mins, of Ev,, Vol.II. 
pt.i. p.9.
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at the other end of the scale in the cash crop areas a new
class of rentiers, made up of men who no longer worked in the
fields themselves, was tending to develop.**"
While the Deccan Riots Committee were not directly
concerned with conditions in areas of the Presidency outside
the Deccan, they felt it necessary to quote in some detail in
an Appendix the opinions which Collectors in these areas had
expressed in their administration reports of 1873-74.
The soil of Gujarat, particularly in the south, is
remarkably fertile and rainfall is reasonably reliable. The
districts of Surat, Broach and Kaira, in particular, had been
found to be extremely suitable for the growth of cotton. Yet
Surat had been greatly affected by the rise and fall in prices.
The people, the Collector reported, had been intoxicated by
prosperity*. Now, the 1 general condition of the people1 was
2*far from prosperous*. The Collector of Broach spoke in 
almost the sajne ' terms.^ Khandesh is a transition tract between 
Gujarat and the Deccan, hilly and inhabited by aboriginal 
Bhils in parts, but fertile and capable of growing good cotton 
in the valley of the Tapti. Yet the Collector of Khandesh 
had claimed in 1874 that the condition of the people was *far 
from satisfactory*, and that it would ^ require great care and
1. See G. Keatinge, Agricultural Progress in Western India,
p.147. See also, Gazetteer of tHegombay Presidency. Vol.IX, 
pt.i. Gujarat Populations Hindus, (I§6l), p.152.
2. Collr. Surat, Admin. Rept., l873~74, quoted Deccan Riots 
Rept., Appx. A, p.45.
3. Collr. Broach, ibid., p.47.
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judicious, management to relieve them. The Karnatak is, on 
the whole, another fertile and reasonably well watered region. 1 
Cotton cultivation was beginning to develop here, too. The 
District of Dharwar was reported by its Collector to be 
■thriving*. Yet he too inveighed against the !moneyed interest* 
which had !soon found: the weak part* of the settlement of 
G-oldsmid and Wingate. He specially mentioned *the most ruinous 
system of "Kore tenancy, M under which the ryot cultivates the
2
land and hands over to his creditor the bulk of the produce.*
The Deccan Riots Committee showed that there were 
basically two methods of tackling the problem as they conceived 
it. One was to aompete with the money-lender in the provision 
of credit; the other was to put legal checks on his activities. 
Both methods demanded action by the State.
As far as actual competition with the saukar was
(concerned, the Committee were somewhat shy of going beyond
the age-old provision of government financial assistance to
the ryots - takkavi - in times of need. They looked into the
possibility of government banks in the rural areas for the 
provision of credit to the ryots, but came to the conclusion 
that they would be of little use, since most of the ryots* 
transactions were in kind^  rather than in cash.^ They assumed
1. Collr. Khandesh, ibid., p.35#
2. Collr. Dharwar, ibid.) p.42.
3. Deccan Riots Rept., p.71.
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that such banks could not deal in kind. In an Appendix they 
quoted without comment the correspondence which had ensued 
when the suggestion of government banks had first been put 
forward, in 1858, by H.E.Jacomb, then an Assistant Collector 
in Ahmadnagar District.The Bombay Government of the time 
had agreed that such banks ought to be encouraged, but they 
had added that it was 'not likely that the Home Government 
would countenance any scheme, which, although deserving 
encouragement on its merits, ought, according to acknowledged 
principles, to be left entirely to private enterprise. It 
will be held in England that, as every man is at liberty to 
lend money at whatever he can get for it, such unlimited
competition must keep down the excessive gains of the Soukars
2and Marwaris.'
'Acknowledged principles' still played a part in the
thinking of many in 1875# Yet the Deccan Riots Committee
were willing to put legal limits on money-lenders* activities*
As a result of their report - though only after Sir Richard
Temple's Government of Bombay-' and two successive Conservative
4Secretaries of State had put pressure on an unwilling
1. H.E.Jacomb, Asst. Collr. Ahmadnagar, to Collr. Ahmadnagar,
No*13 of 6 December 1858 and No.2 of 29 January 1859,
quoted Deccan Riots Rept., Appx. A, pp.112-128.
2. Acting Sec., Bom. R,D., to Commr.S.D. No.932 of 8 March 
1860, ibid., pp.108-109.
3. See Minute of Sir Richard Temple, 30 August 1878, quoted
S.C.Ray, Agricultural Indebtedness in India and its 
Remedies, "being Selections from Official Documents, Appx.I.
4. Salisbury and Cranbrook. See Sec. of State to Govr., Bombay
No.4 (Legislative) of 26 December 1878, quoted Ray,
op.cit., Appx.II.
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Government of India - the Deocan Agriculturists5 Relief Act 
came into force in 1879. This Act gave the Courts power to go 
into the history of a deht and to revise decrees from the 
point of view of equity and with the object of avoiding as 
fas as possible the sale to non-agriculturists of land held 
by agriculturists. The aim, the Bombay representative,
T.C.Hope, told the Legislative Council, was 'to keep the 
money-lender in his place, to encourage and support him in all 
useful functions, but to restrain him. ..from becoming an enemy 
and oppressor of the poor.
The State, then, was to intervene to give both sides
a fair chance. This idea represents, in fact, the real
o
theories of the classical political economists. Over the 
next few decades there was to be a struggle in the minds of 
many in India between the garbled version of political economy 
on which they had been brought up and the more positive con­
ception of the role of the State in economic life which the 
situation in India seemed to demand. The influence of the 
ideas of T.H.Green became increasingly apparent in India in 
the closing years of the nineteenth century, especially as 
the men whom Greenfs disciple, Arnold Toynbee, tutored at 
Balliol in his classes for entrants to the Indian Civil
1. Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor- 
General of India assembled for the purpose of making laws 
and regulations, 17 July 1879, p. 134. (Such Proceedings 
hereafter quoted as Imperial Legislative Council Proceedings
2. See Lionel Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in 
English Classical Political Economy, London, 1992, passim. 
See also J. Bartlet' Brebner, 'Laissez-faire and State 
Intervention in Nineteenth Century Britain1, in Journal of 
Economic History, Supplement VIII, 1948.
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Service, moved into positions of authority. A close friend 
of Toynbee, James Wilson, was a Secretary to the Government 
of India in the Revenue and Agriculture Department during 
Curzon's formative ViceroyaltyIn the closing years of the 
nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth, the 
influence of Green1s positive hut liberal interpretation of 
the role of the State was just as important as those more
authoritarian aspects of the Utilitarian legacy to which Pro-
2fessor Stokes has drawn attention.
The new emphasis in English political economy was 
not lost on the small hut influential group of Indian intell­
ectuals whose centre was Poona. Agarkar, agnostic and social 
reformer, Ranade, a High Court judge and a student of econ­
omics, and later Gokhale, Ranade*s disciple, dedicated to the 
service of his country, though seeing Indian politics, as 
K. Natarajan has said, as 'the task specially and exclusively 
of the educated classes'-^  - men such as these participated 
just as much in the changing outlook on economic questions as 
did their British rulers. 'The State', Ranade wrote in 1892, 
'is now more and more recognized as the National Organ for 
taking care of National needs in all matters in which individ­
ual and co-operative efforts are not likely to he so effective
1. Por Toynhee's influence, see Benjamin Jowett, Memoir of 
Toynhee, in Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial 
Revolution in England, London^ 1884.
2. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India. See also John 
Roach, 'Liberalism and the Victorian Intelligentsia', in 
Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol.13. No.1.(1957) pp.53-81.
3. K. Natarajan, Gopal Krishna Gokhale; The Man and his 
Message, p. 15. See also PM.Limaye, The History of the 
I)eccan Education Society. (1880-1934).
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and economic as National effort**^ The outlook on society of 
organizations like the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha and later the 
Deccan Sabha, and the Deccan Education Society, helped to pro­
vide a sympathetic basis for attempts to ameliorate the ryotfs 
lot. The future in this field to some extent lay in the part­
nership of liberal-minded elements from both races, Indian 
and British,
An opportunity for collaboration between the two
races was provided in 1882 by the scheme for 1 agricultural
banks* promoted by Ranade and Sir William Wedderburn, later
to to be one of the founders of the Indian National Congress,
but then District Judge at Poona. It was a notable scheme. But
there is no justification for Mr. S.K.Ratcliffe1s claim, which
has been repeated by later writers, that the scheme proposed
2
banks *on the co-operative principle*. Certainly Wedderburn 
was not unaware of the existence of co-operative banks of the 
Raiffeisen type in Germany,^ but in his scheme there was to 
be no attempt to put the banks under the local control of the 
ryots themselves, or to raise at least some of the capital 
from the ryots. The scheme, therefore, cannot be called ‘co­
operative*, though it forms an important part of the back­
1. M.G.Ranade, ‘Indian Political Economy1, in Essays in Indian 
Economics, p.32.
2. S.K.Ratcliffe, Sir William Wedderburn and the Indian Refone 
Movement, p.37. See also Philip Woodruff, The Men Who 
Ruled Indias The Guardians, p.162, and S.Gopal,
The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, I8o0-l884, p. 188.
3. See Wedderburn, Agricultural Banks for India, p.13.
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ground to the co-operative movement.
With the coming into force of the Deccan Agricultur­
ists1 Relief Act, Wedderburn claimed, the saukar was finding 
it increasingly difficult to bring successful suits against 
agriculturist debtors. In these circumstances the saukar, 
according to Wedderburn, would 'gladly1 sell his claim to an 
agricultural bank, leaving the bank to recover the amount by 
annual instalments which would be so small as to make the 
ryot 'at once solvent', but which would be a profitable propo 
sition for the highly capitalized bank."*" Wedderburn claimed 
that the saukars in Purandhar taluka in Poona District, had
pagreed to his scheme. It was one for complete 'debt redemp­
tion*. Wedderburn's aim was not simply to supply the ryots 
with the short-term credit needed for meeting the seasonal 
costs of cultivation? he also hoped to provide for long-term 
land improvement and the repayment of long standing - some­
times ancestral - debts.
The Bank's 'promoters' included S.H.Chiplunkar, the 
Secretary of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, and various others 
described as 'Poona capitalists'. The Maharashtrian names 
of the majority of these show that the immigrant money-lender 
element was not allowed to predominate. But Wedderburn had 
notions of trying to introduce English capital, and speeches
1. Ibid., p.l.
2. Chairman, Poona Committee for the Establishment of Agricul 
tural Banks, to Wedderburn, 9 January 1883, Copy of Corres 
pondence respecting Agricultural Banks in India, p.33.
P.P. 1887 (340)? Ixii7 643.
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which he made in London and Manchester on the subject during
his home leave of 1883 even attracted the favourable notice
of The Times. Bright, the old radical warrior, chaired a
meeting on the question held at Exeter Hall. He was probably-
persuaded to do so by James Caird, a radical member of the
o
Famine Commission of 1878-1879, who had met Wedderburn in 
India, and who, for a number of years after that, was an im­
portant man behind the scenes in the generous, if occasionally 
slightly muddled, support which Wedderburn1s schemes received 
in England.
Government1 s main role in the scheme which Wedderburn 
put forward was to provide for the recovery of the bank*s 
debts at the same time as the assessment was collected. But if 
the scheme was a success it was hoped that Government would 
provide funds for the large-scale liquidation of the ryots* 
debts. Such notions, the Collector of Broach expostulated, 
were *the outcome of an unpractical mind*, of 1would-be bene­
volent interference with the plainest principles of political 
economy*.^ But Ripon*s government, particularly Baring, were
1. Ibid., p.12.
2. James Caird% Scottish farmer; took part in Free Trade 
agitation; commissioned by Peel to inquire into agricultur­
al state of Ireland, 1846; Liberal-Conservative M.P.1857-59; 
Liberal M.P.,1859-69; Enclosure Commissioner, 1869-82; 
Member, Indian Famine Commission, 1878-79; K.C.B., 1882; 
P.C., 1889.
Caird introduced Wedderburn to Bright in May 1881.(Caird 
Papers, India, Home Misc. Series, I.O.L., Vol.796, No.453.)
3. Report by James Caird, Esq.. C.B.; with Correspondence, p.4^  
P.P. 1880 (2732); liii, 137.
4. Collr. Broach to Commr. N.L„ No.3053 of 21 July 1884, 
quoted Copy of Correspondence respecting Agricultural 
Banks, p.53*
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strongly behind Wedderburn*s scheme, although Baring joined 
with others in pointing out a possible objection to it.1
Caird had been told of this particular objection as
early as 1878. It was that Government ought not to be
associated in any way with the collection of a bank’s dues;
by being so associated it would run the risk of being looked
2upon as the ryot*s oppressor. It was this objection which 
proved decisive at the India Office. The Secretary of State 
rejected the scheme in February 1883, and again in October 
1884.4
The radical interest in England kept up the pressure, 
eventually, in 1887, succeeding in having the papers relating 
to the scheme laid on the table of the House. But it was 
then stated that no further action was to be taken in the 
matter.
As a by-product of the discussion of Wedderburn*s 
scheme, however, came what seems to be the first suggestion
1. See Extract from Survey and Settlement Commr., Bom., to
G. of B. No.2481 of 13 December 1882, ibid., p.31. See also 
Gopal, op.cit., p.188, n.4. Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer? 
Service in Royal Artillery from 1856; Private Sec. to Lord 
Northbrook, 1872-76; Commr. Egyptian Public Debt; 1877-79$ 
Finance Member, India, 1880-1883$ Agent and Consul-General, 
Egypt, 1883-1907.
2. Unheaded note marked *Private and Confidential, 5/10/78*, 
signed *J.P.’/Major James Puckle, ex-Mysore State Service, 
from whom there are other letters in the collection?/
Caird Papers, No.97.
3. Sec. of State to Viceroy, Despatch No.8.(Legislative) of 
15 February 1883, quoted Copy of Correspondence, p.3.
4. Sec. of State to Viceroy, Despatch No.95 (Rev.) of 
23 October 1884, ibid., p.55.
5. Hansard * s Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. 319, 
p.922, (18 August 1887)
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for the introduction in India of organizations at all approx­
imating co-operative societies in their structure. It was put 
forward by Charles Gonne, the Chief Secretary of Bombay,"^  as 
an alternative to Wedderburnfs scheme. G-onne does not display 
any knowledge of the experiments then taking place in Europe, 
yet the resemblances are in some ways remarkable. Under G-onne*s 
scheme advances would be made by Government. There was to be 
no attempt to encourage deposits from those who would ulti­
mately benefit from the scheme. Nevertheless, the important 
idea of responsibility and management at the local level was 
introduced. Advances were to be made not on the security of 
land, but on *the personal security of all the assessment
payers of the village community to which the applicant be- 
2longs.* A acmmittee, or 'Panahayat* as G-onne believed it 
could be called, was to be elected in every village to repre­
sent the community in the matter of responsibility for 
advances. It was to employ a Secretary, who might be one of 
its members, and who was to receive a percentage on advances. 
The committee was to scrutinise every application for an 
advance, and, if satisfied, endorse the application and send 
it for payment to the nearest government treasury. *The
1. Charles Gonne % Appointed Bom., from Haileybury, 18531 
Asst. Collr., 1854; Judge, 1861; Sec., G-. of B. Judicial 
and Political Depts., 1864; Chief Sec., 1879; Member of 
Council, Bom., 1884; retd., 1885.
2. C. Gonne, fNote on the Working of the Deccan Agricultur­
ists1 Relief Act, 1879*, August 1883, Papers relating to 
the Deccan Agriculturists* Relief Act during the years 
1875-§4, S„R7, Gl of I., Home Dept., No.cccxlii, Vol.I, 
pTTOT
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managing body would be intimately acquainted with the affairs 
of clients, and clients would be influenced by a watchful 
public opinion to be faithful to their obligations.Although 
Gonne probably did not realise the fact, this is 'co-opera­
tive1 theory in its purest form.
Gonne!s claim that 'traditions of village co-opera­
tion in past times' would support his scheme is particularly 
2interesting. The most notable form, in the Bombay Presi­
dency, of what is often called 'indigenous co-operation1 was 
known as irjik. Under this system the ryots joined together 
to perform harvesting operations*-^  In Nasik and Khandesh 
agriculturists combined to carry out elementary irrigation 
operations.^ " Yet it is difficult to see more than surface 
connections between such institutions and the organizations 
which Gonne proposed. Irjik and the like Were fundamentally 
part of an earlier type of economy; Gonne's proposed insti­
tutions were concerned basically with the new cash economy.
No action was taken on Gonne's scheme; indeed, it 
seems never to have been noticed again. The problem of agri­
cultural indebtedness and the alienation of land to non­
agriculturalists remained, however. The Government of India 
had to content itself at this time with passing two acts,
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.417.
3. The author is indebted to Dr. Irawati Karve for informa­
tion on irjik.
4. See A.H.A. Simcox, Collr. Nasik, 'Note on Deccan Irriga­
tion', Easter Day, 1921. (Poona, found in an untitled 
file of miscellaneous papers of interest, preserved by 
Shri Chiplunkar, one-time Record Keeper.)
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which, it was hoped, would lead to a more elastic procedure 
in the distribution of takkavi. The Land Improvement Loans 
Act of 1883 permitted local governments to make long term 
loans to cultivators for such purposes as the construction of 
minor irrigation works. Little effort was made in succeeding 
years, however, to tell the ryot of the facilities that were 
available, or to suggest to him possible schemes of improve­
ment.'1' The Agriculturists1 Loans Act of 1884 merely re-stated 
and slightly simplified the procedure for the grant of short 
term loans to agriculturists during periods of famine and 
at other times of distress.
A Commission was appointed in 1891 to examine the 
working of the Deccan Agriculturists* Relief Act. It came to 
the conclusion that 'a large and increasing area is still
2
being transferred from the cultivating to the trading classes', 
though again no accurate figures could be quoted. The Commis­
sion could only suggest a few minor changes in the Act, how­
ever. The modesty of its recommendations brought a notable 
declaration from Lord Lansdowne, the then Viceroy: *1 desire 
...to place on record my opinion that legislation of this 
kind will only touch the fringe of agricultural indebtedness 
....It is to my mind impossible to read the mass of evidence
1. See, e.g., Report of the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry 
Committee, 1929~3&t Vol»I» P«b4*
2. Report of the Commission appointed to Enquire into the 
Working of the Deccan Agriculturists1 Relief Act, 
T I ^ T - W r ' p T l s ;  ------- ----------------------------------
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which, has come to us from Bombay, from the Central Provinces, 
from the Punjab and even from parts of Bengal, without coming 
to the conclusion that remedies of an entirely different 
kind are indispensable if the evil is to be held in check*.'®' 
In 1895 the Government of India informed the Secretary of 
State that the whole question of agricultural indebtedness, 
fthan which none more difficult or more important has of 
late years arisen in connection with our internal administra­
tion, 1 was receiving their serious attention. •Meanwhile*, 
they added, •public opinion is ripening on the subject5 the 
oonviction that something more than mere palliative measures 
is required is no longer confined to officials, but is shared 
by some of the most advanced representatives of native
opinion, and it is advisable that action should not be
> 2 
unnecessarily delayed.1
1. Lansdowne, Note on the Report of the Deccan Commission, 
3 January 1894, quoted G. of I. Selection from Papers on 
Indebtedness and Land Transfer, /189Ij /> p. 131*
2. Viceroy to Sec. of State, Despatch No.20 ^L.Rev.)
27 March 1895. (I.O.L.,Rev. Letters from India, 1895).
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C H A N G I N G  A T T I T U D E S  
II: C O - O P E R A T I O N
The Governor of Madras in 1892 was Lord Wenlock, 
one of those Victorian aristocrats of liberal outlook who, 
in a rather curious way, were strongly attracted to the 
British ouo-operative movement. (Ripon had been another, in 
his youthful ‘Christian Socialist1 days.) Here, they felt, 
was a type of socialism that preached benevolence and 
brotherhood rather than class war. Wenlock had set up a co­
operative society in his own village before going out to 
India. On his return he formed an association for the 
organization of agricultural co-operatives in England, 
similar to Horace Plunkett*s Irish Agricultural Organization 
Society.1 It was Wenlock who was responsible for placing 
Frederick Nicholson, a Madras Civilian, on special duty to 
study ‘the possibility of introducing Land and Agricultural 
Banks into the Madras Presidency.1 Nicholson went to 
Europe to see developments there, and returned to write a 
report, the burden of which was, in his own words, ‘Find 
Raiffeisen.‘2
1. Henry Wolff, Co-operation in India, (1919 edn.), p.44, 
note.
2. F.A.Nicholson, Report Regarding the Possibility of 
Introducing Land and Agricultural Banks into the Madras 
Presidency7 Vol.I, 1891?, reprinted 1915 5 Vol.II, 1897. 
Frederick Augustus Nicholsons Asst. Collr., Madras, 18695 
Collr., 1889? Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1897, 
1900? Member, Madras Board of Revenue, 1899? Member, 
Famine Commission, 1901; K.C.I.E., 19035 retd. 1904.
Raiffeisen was the burgomaster of the village of 
Heddesdorf, near Neuweid, in Germany. He was not wealthy, but 
he was inspired by a spirit of Christian philanthropy* From 
the time of the 1848 famine he had experimented with various 
forms of co-operative association amongst the villagers, 
designed to eliminate the middleman and the money-lender, but 
it was not until 1864 that the loan society which became a 
model for many others was set up. From about 1879 Raiffeisenfs 
ao-operative ideas began to spread fairly rapidly in Germany, 
Italy, and the Austrian Empire.
The Raiffeisen societies were fundamentally self- 
governing associations of borrowers, who all, or practically 
all, subscribed a share of the capital of the society, and who 
made use of the further capital attracted to the society 
through the combined credit of the members. Their area of 
operations was limited as a rule to a single village; members, 
it was claimed, thus knew the faults and good points of every 
potential borrower; administration was gratuitous, by an 
elected committee, only the clerical work being paid for; the 
liability of members was unlimited; the amount of share 
capital an individual could hold was usually limited so as to 
avoid a dividend-seeking spirit, any profits over a certain 
sum being allocated to a reserve fund; loans had to be uti­
lized for productive purposes. The aim of the societies, 
according to Nicholson, was to supply ‘confidence, courage, 
the spirit of thrift, of self-help*, to a peasantry that was
33
'enfeebled, suspicious and dispirited1 * The societies, he
said, provided 'an education in many of the finer social and
2eaonomic faculties'; they 'not merely popularized hut dem- 
ocratized credit'.
Such was the system which Nicholson proposed to 
transfer from the Rhineland villages to the Madras Presidency. 
He was emphatic that he did not want to establish state hanks 
- 'an unheard of experiment in State socialism'. But the 
functions of the State would he considerable with regard to 
co-operative societies. It would 'suggest and favour' their 
establishment, it would provide efficient supervision, and it
might grant 'some moderate loans either as working or as mere
A
starting funds.'
Nicholson's report is written in an impressive though 
somewhat repetitive style. By the time it was presented Lord 
Wenlock had left Madras. The government of his successor 
opposed Nicholson's schemes with a vehemence that was at 
times almost abusive. Mr. Nicholson's '408 closely printed 
quarto pages', they said, showed an 'absence of definiteness 
in conception....The extremely undesirable conditions which 
are reported to prevail in Bombay and other provinces not so 
favoured, or' (the Madras Board of Revenue added patronisingly* 
'not so well administered as Madras', did not obtain in their





territories. 1 There is far too much loose talk about the 
indebtedness of our ryots*. The professional money-lender was 
*not oppressive*. *Happily* the Government of India were not 
likely to favour such a *race for ruin* as would be brought
i
about by the establishment of co-operative societies.
But in the late nineties the initiative in the 
economic sphere was swinging from the two southern Presiden­
cies, from Madras and from Bombay - which, it will be remem­
bered, had been largely responsible for the Deccan Agricultur­
ists* Relief Act - to the Punjab and the North-West Provinces, 
and to Curzon*s Government of India.
Copies of Nicholson*s report began circulating
amongst certain officials in the Punjab and the North-West
2Provinces at the turn of the century. E.D. Mac lagan at
Multan and T.J. Crosthwaite J at Dera Ismail Khan in the 
Punjab made a few very tentative experiments in the organiza­
tion of associations somewhat approximating those contemplated
1. Madras Board of Revenue Resolution No.412 of 4 November 
1896, encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.7407 of 26 November 1900. 
(Poona, ADM. S.O. 7*)
2. Edward Maclagans Asst. Commr. Punjab, 1886; Offg. U.Sec.,
G. of I.,R.& A. Dept., 1890; Dep. Commr., Punjab, 1896; 
Offg. Ch. Sec., Punjab, 1906; Sec., G. of I., R. & A.
Dept., 1910; President, Cttee. on Co-operation, 1914-15; 
Govr. Punjab, 1919-24; K.C.S.I., 1921.
3. T.J.Crosthwaitet An array officer, working, in the Frontier 
tradition, in civil administration. He was a brother of
H.R.Crosthwaite, a member of the uncovenanted civil service, 
who was for a time Registrar of Co-operative Societies in 
the Central Provinces. See H.R.Crosthwaite, ‘Recollections 
and Reflections* in Bombay Co-operative Quarterly, June 191' 
pp.15-16. (The title of this periodical is hereafter 
abbrieviated in footnotes to B.C.Q.)
by Nicholson. Crosthwaite oollected capital, in the first
1 2 instance, in the form of grain. H.E.L.P. Lupernex, a
Civilian in the North-West Provinces, became extremely enthus 
iastic about 'village banks', as he called them. He was sup­
ported in his efforts by Macdonnell, the Lieutenant- Governor 
of the Provinces.^ Macdonnell saw the support for such
banks as coming from 'Rajas and zemindarsthey were to be
5
largely philanthropic organizations.
Lupernex, after a rather brief look at Italian co­
operative societies during a home leave, produced a book on 
the whole subject of fostering co-operative societies, to
g
which he gave the title People's Banks for Northern India.
Its purpose was frankly propagandist. Lupernex's first pre­
mise was contained in the well known passage from Metcalfe, 
which he quoted? 'The Village Communities are little Republic 
having nearly everything they want within themselves, and 
almost independent of any foreign relations.1 The essential 
characteristics of the village community, Lupernex claimed,
1. The Indian Agriculturist, 1 July 1901. The Indian Agri­
culturist was a Calcutta economic monthly of liberal views 
It would appear to be an important source of material for 
anyone writing an economic history of this period.
2. H.E.L.P. Lupernex? Asst. Collr. NrW.Provinces, 1889; Asst. 
Commr. and Jt. Magistrate, 1897; district judge, 19015 
retd. 1913•
3. According to Curzon, Macdonnell was 'by far the most cap­
able administrator that we have....in this pigmy-ridden 
country'. Curzon to Hamilton, 22 April 1901. (l*0.L., 
Hamilton Papers, Vol.XX.)
4. The Indian Agriculturist, 2 September 1901.
5. THe Indian Agriculturist, 1 November 1901.
6. HTEupernex, People's Banks for Northern India. A Handbook 
to the Organization of Credit on a Co-operative Basis.
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were 'brotherhood* and 'joint responsibility', its 'democratic 
character', its system of public accounts, its strict rules 
about the admission of strangers, its opposition to the idea 
of individual profit, and the gratuitous nature of the 
services rendered by the members of the community.^ All 
these, Dupernex said, were also essential features of co­
operative societies. It was therefore possible to think of
'grafting on to' the village community 'the new growth of co-
2operative credit'.
However, Dupernex believed that, in order to obtain 
capital for village societies, 'people's banks' should first 
be started amongst the middle dass people of the district 
towns. 'To occupy the vacant ground immediately next that al­
ready taken up by the joint-stock bank and from that point to 
work gradually downwards is the system which, if slow in its 
progress, is the likeliest in the long run to attain the 
desired end.
Although Dupernex's book created some impression, 
Niaholson's report probably remained the formative influence. 
One of those in England who were interested in the subject 
and who had read Nicholson's report was, of course, Sir 
William Wedderburn. By some means he learnt that several 
members of the Government of India were also interested in
1. Ibid., pp.63-70.
2. Ibid., p. 78.
3. Ibid., p. 111.
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Nicholson*s report. Wedderburn was now o Member of Parliament. 
In March 1900 he asked the Secretary of State what steps were 
being taken by the Government of India on the subject of 
*land banks1, as it had been broached by Nicholson. Lord 
George Hamilton replied that the subject was already under 
consideration, and that he expected to receive the Government 
of India*s views 'during the coming season.
This was the first public, indication that a definite 
scheme for fostering co-operatives was being considered at 
Simla.
Some time after the Secretary of State made his 
announcement he received a letter from Henry Wolff, the Chair­
man of the International Co-operative Alliance, expressing 
strong interest in the scheme. Wolff was primarily a journa­
list and publicist rather than a practical co-operator, some­
what sententiously sure of himself and of his theories. He
never visited India, though in later years he was to produce
2a book about co-operation in that country. Wolff was to 
exercise an influence over the development of co-operation in 
India which was possibly out of proportion to his real 
stature* Yet at the beginning, when officials were still 
floundering in their efforts to grasp the fundamentals of co­
operation, his influence on the whole was very helpful.
1. Hansard. Pourth Series, Vol.81, p.697* (29 March 1900)
2. Henry Wolff, Co-operation in India.
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Sir Charles Bernard^ sen1: Wolff a copy of 
Nicholson's report and the Madras Board of Revenue’s review 
of it. Wolff, in his reply, said that he was theoretically 
opposed to any form of State subventions. However, ’money 
must be found in some way* and^'so long as the danger of the 
loan being turned into a gift can be guarded againsthe did 
not see the harm of an advance from Government funds in order 
to set things in motion. But central banks for the provision 
of finance, either joint stock companies or the property of 
all the societies should be formed as soon as possible. He 
was totally against Nicholson’s idea of placing village co­
operative societies under the Indian Joint Stock Companies 
Act; such a procedure would be legally clumsy, expensive for 
societies, and, because of the implicit emphasis on profits 
in such an Act, ’directly adverse to co-operation.* Co­
operative societies in India should be placed under an act 
somewhat akin to the British Industrial and Provident Soc­
ieties Act. Supervision of the working of co-operative 
societies, preferably by a ’supervising council’ within each 
society, or if this was impossible by a ’central authority’, 
faould not be too stringent’, Wolff claimed, 'so long as you
1. Charles Edward Bernard; Asst. Commr; Bengal, 1858; Settle­
ment Officer, Nagpur, 1864; Commr., Nagpur, 1869; Sec.
Sir Richard Temple, 1877; Sec., G. of I., R.& A.Dept.,1881; 
Sec., R.D., India Office, 1888.
Wolff called Bernard ’the true author1 of co-operation in 
India. ,December 1930, p.127.) This view, however,
probably chiefly reflects the fact that Bernard was the 
first high official connected with India to take an 
interest in Wolff's ideas.
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1
do not actually interfere in the management1.
The Secretary of State, writing to the Government of 
India, was a good deal more hopeful than the Madras Board of 
Revenue ahout the prospects of co-operative societies;
'probably it will be possible to adopt earlier and more ex­
tended measures than are proposed in the orders of the
2Madras Government.1
The Government of India had already acted. It had 
sent Nicholson's report and Dupernex's book to Local Govern­
ments for brief consideration in October 1900, The Government 
of. Bombay were not at all enthusiastic. They saw 'little or 
no indication of such mutual trust among members of rural 
communities in this Presidency as would make co-operative 
credit possible.'*^  In December, after an informal meeting of 
a Committee in Calcutta - Nicholson and Dupernex were 
amongst those at this meeting - the appointment of a Select 
Committee to study the question fully was announced and 
further opinions were requested from Local Governments.^ "
This time the Government of Bombay consulted the men 
out in the districts. Their opinions are important, both be­
cause of the reasonably accurate reflection they give of 
administrative opinion in the Presidency, and because of the
1. Wolff to Sec. of State, 26 June 1900, encl. Sec. of State 
to Viceroy, Despatch No.19 (Rev.) of 8 February 1901.
(I.O.L., Rev. Letters to India, 1901.)
2. Despatch cited.
3. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.7407 of 26 November 1900.(Poona, ADM.S.0.7.)
4. G. of I., R. & A. Dept, to Local Govts., Nos.258 - 262 - 
326-12 of 30 January 1901. (Poona, file cited).
picture they give of conditions in their districts as they
thought they would affect the establishment of co-operative
societies. Time was to prove some of their prophecies of
success or failure to be correct, and some of them to be based
on misunderstandings.
The Collector of Ahmadnagar believed that conditions
in the Deccan were vastly different from those in Dupernex's
North-West Provinces. There was in the Deccan no class of
large landholders who might take up positions of leadership
in co-operative societies, gratuitous service was completely
unknown in the villages, and joint responsibility beyond the
limits of the family group was something that it would be
difficult for the Maratha kunbi to understand."^ The Survey
Commissioner felt that a few societies of a sort could no
doubt be started among the patidars of Gujarat, and in the
Karnatak, But he considered the people in these comparative-
2ly prosperous areas could well take care of themselves. The 
Commissioner, Southern Division, wondered if co-operative 
societies could do much to help men already in debt. Such
3
people, he feared, formed a large proportion of the population 
The Collector of Nasik, writing in a genially cynical strain 
not uncommon at the time, thought that perpetual failure in
1. Collr. Ahmadnagar to Commr. C.D., N0.R898 of 25 March 1901, 
encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.4073 of 30 May 1904. (Poona, file 
cited.)
2. Survey Commr. to Chief Sec. No.A. - 1071 of 2 April 1901, 
encl. Bom.G.R. cited.
3. Commr. S.D. to Chief Sec, No.1273 of 14 April 1901, encl. 
Bom. G.R. cited.
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the sphere of co-operative societies could be deduced from 
what he saw as the complete failure of Indian local self- 
government.'1'
Only James McNeill, the Acting Collector of Poona, 
wrote both reasonably optimistically and in detail about the 
prospects of co-operative societies. He thought that the 
wealthier areas of his district probably offered the best 
scope for the development of societies. The two main diffi­
culties would be that of securing a capable managing body and 
that of enforcing prompt repayment of loans. He did not think 
it would be impossible to find philanthropically minded land­
owners and vakils in taluka towns who would help with leader­
ship. To enable prompt recovery it might be necessary to allow 
debts to societies to be recovered as arrears of land 
revenue. The objection of the political inexpediency' of
such a policy 'would possibly have less weight now than
2twenty years ago.1
The replies to the Government of India's circular to 
the provincial governments, and the notes supplied by Henry 
Wolff, were considered by the Select Committee which met 
sixteen times in Simla in June and July 1901. Many of the 
members of the informal Calcutta committee of the previous
1. Collr. Nasik to Commr. S.D., No.5213 of 26 April 1901, 
encl. Bom. G.R. cited.
2. Collr. Poona to Commr. C.D., No.2877 of 28 March 1901, 
encl. Bom. G.R. cited.
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December were on this Committee. The Select Committee claimed 
in their Report that no hard and fast rules could be laid 
down for co-operative societies. They proposed, however, a 
bill *of a permissive character1, modelled on the English 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act, as Wolff had suggest­
ed. A bill was actually drafted by the Committee, but pre­
sumably it received a great deal of criticism in Simla, as 
it was withdrawn from the Report of the Committee after that 
Report had been printed.1
At about the same time as the Report of the Select 
Committee appeared the Report of the 1901 Pamine Commission 
was published. This Commission believed that in the Bombay 
Presidency one quarter of the cultivators had lost possession 
of their lands and less than one fifth were free from debt, 
(though they quoted few statistics to support their belief.) 
They warmed to their subjects 1 Commission® have sat and re­
ported; Acts of the Legislature have been passed and amended;
executive action of various sorts has been taken. But of all
2the result has been disappointment. 1 With Macdonnell as 
Chairman of the Commission and Nicholson as a member it was 
not surprising that the Commission should recommend very
1. See end of Report of the Select Committee on the Estab­
lishment of Co-operative Credit Societies in India, 1901»
2. Report of the Indian Pamine Commission. 1901» and Papers 
Relat ing The re t o, p .lQS . P.P.,1902 (876); lxx,545 . Thi s^  
was the part of the Report to which the Sec. of State paid 
particular attention. See Sec. of State to Viceroy, 
Despatch No.163 (Rev.) of 1 November 1901. (Macdonnell 
Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS. Eng. hist. a.11-12,
c. 356, folio 24.)
strongly the adoption of a system of 'mutual credit associa­
tions1. But the Commission did not follow Lupernex in advoca­
ting the formation of ao-operative hanks in district towns 
before the formation of village societies. And they did not 
wish to declare total war on the moneylender. 'It is not. in­
tended to frighten the village money-lender by permitting a 
village bank to enter into competition with him over the 
whole field of business.But at the same time, the societies 
were not to be the philanthropic organizations Macdonnell had 
at first oontemplated.
The Report of the Select Committee was sent to Local
2
Governments for further discussion towards the end of 1901.
By this time the Bombay Government and some of its Collectors 
were becoming tired of the matter. The Collector of Nasik 
protested even more vigorously against the very idea of co­
operative societies, particularly if the District Officer was 
to be responsible for the working out .of that idea. 'This 
oomplacent assumption that the conduct of experiments at the 
expense of the corpus vile of the District Officer is in 
accordance with the eternal fitness of things is no doubt a 
sign of the times'. Curzonian ideas in the economic realm 
were beginning to make themselves felt amongst the older
1. Pamine Commission Rept., pp.98-99.
2. G. of I., R. & A. Dept., to Local Govts., Nos. 2397 to 
2402 - 92-17 of 5 November 1901. (Poona, ADM. S.0.7.)
3. Collr. Nasik to Commr. C.D., No.17051 of 24 December 1901, 
encl. Bom, G.R.R.D. No.4073 of 30 May 1904.(Poona, file 
cited.)
generation of Civilians. Eventually - 'the subject is not of 
such urgency that it would have been legitimate for Govern­
ment... to put aside other work, much of which pertains to 
famine relief, in order to devote their undivided attention 
to it' - the Government of Bombay came to light with an 
alternative scheme for the supply of agricultural credit. 
Legislation should be undertaken to extend the law relating 
to Government takkavi to loans made, under government super­
vision, by private persons or 'associations for productive 
purposes.fl This scheme appears, in fact, to have been 
little more than a rather hastily revised version of Wedder­
burn1 s scheme of the eighties.
Wedderburn himself, now concerned with agitation on 
behalf of the Indian Pamine Union, may not have fully real­
ized the differences between his own earlier proposals and 
Nicholson*s scheme. He wrote in the Indian Agriculturist that 
he hoped the proposed pioneer enterprises would be given 'all 
reasonable State support, whether legislative administrative
or financial' - and promptly launched into a description of
2his own long-rejected scheme.
Dinshaw Wacha, the President of the Indian National 
Congress for 1901, had a much clearer notion of the differ­
ences between agricultural banks and co-operative societies. 
'The Sowcar, I mean the honest usurer, is not likely to view
1. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.5574- of 12 August 1902.
2. The Indian Agriculturist, 1 Pebruary 1901, p.44.
his rival with anything like friendliness or favour*, he told 
the Congress. The Saukar was essential to the rural economy; 
after all, 'without his aid it would become impossible that 
the crores of land revenue could be so punctually gathered 
from year to year.1 Wacha was inclined to prefer a scheme such 
as that of the Egyptian Agricultural Bank. Privately, he 
wrote to Baring, who now, as Lord Cromer, was the de facto 
ruler of Egypt and intent on putting into practice the ideas 
which the less free conditions of India had prevented him 
from experimenting with. Cromer replied that 'Co-operative
Credit Societies in the East are all nonsense. Anyone who
2knows the natives knows they will never co-operate.*
The Bombay section of the Congress was at this time 
opposing in the Provincial Legislative Council a bill, on 
lines of the Punjab Land Alienation Act, which would strictly 
control the transfer of land from agriculturists to non-agri­
culturists. Acting from various motives, most Congressmen, 
under the leadership of Pherozeshah Mehta, complained bitter­
ly that such legislation would be an unwarranted interference 
by the State with the property rights of the citizen. Gokhale, 
however, announced that he would support the Bill if he were 
convinced that it would bring about any real relief. *What
1. Report of the Seventeenth Indian National Congress held
at Calcutta on the 26th 27th and 28th December 1901t~p747.
For the Egyptian Bank see below, Chaptdr IV.
2. Quoted in 'Agricultural Banks in India* (originally con­
tributed as an article to the Indian Journal of Economics, 
January 1916), Speeches and Writings of Sir Dinshaw 
Edulji Wachat p.363.
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the ryot wants is m o n e y . ’Agricultural hanks’ were his sol­
ution at this time ; he was soon to incline towards co-operat-
2ive societies, however.
The reactions to the publication of the report of 
the Select Committee were so very mixed that the Government 
of India took some time to decide what its next step should 
he. By 1903 many people were becoming restless at the Govern­
ment of India's seeming inaction on the subject of co-opera­
tive societies. Questions were asked in the British parlia- 
ment. If another year were lost, the Government of India 
wrote to the Secretary of State in September 1903, ’public 
opinion will be distrustful of our intention to make serious
4
progress in the matter. * Yet there was much to be discussed 
before legislation could be brought down. When the Report of 
the second Select Committee on the Bill was finally presented 
in March 1904, Denzil Ibbetson, the sponsoring Member, had to 
admit that there was ’hardly a provision of any significance 
in the Bill which some of our advisers do not regard as of
1. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Bombay. 
assembled for the Purpose of Making Laws and Regulations. 
Vol.39, p.345, 123 August 190'i.)
2. Imperial Legislative Council Proceedings, 1903-1904,
pp.396-401, (23 m y 1904. )
3. Hansard, Fourth Series, Vol.99, p.1200, (16 August 1901);
VoTTTIO, p.690, (3 July 1903.)
4. Viceroy to Sec, of State, Despatch No.44 (Rev.) of 3 Sept
ember 1903. (I.0.L.)(Rev. Letters from India, 1903.)
5. Denzil Ibbetson: Asst. Commr. and Settlement Officer, 
Punjab, 1870; Asst. Superintendent, Census, 1881; Dep. 
Commr., 1885; Member, Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act 
Commission, 1891; Sec., G. of I., R. & A. Dept., 1894; 
Member, Viceroy's Council, 1899; K.C.S.I., 1903;
Lieut.-Govr., Punjab, 1905 and 1907.
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capital importance, and others condemn as a fatal defect.
The Bill was finally passed on 25 March 1904.
In the West, co-operatives had grown up with a good 
deal of spontaneity, and normally without the help of the 
State. In fact the British co-operative movement had had to 
struggle merely to obtain the privileges of legal registration 
notably the right, as a body corporate, to sue members and 
officers. But the co-operative form of business organization 
was essentially foreign to India, The Indian ryot, it was 
obvious, was too poor and too ignorant to put it into practice 
on his own. Co-operation would therefore have to be actively 
fostered from above. In the Indian situation,it was believed, 
the only body suitable for this task was the State. What was 
required, then, was something more than the merely !permissive 
Act which had been contemplated both by Henry Wolff, with only 
his English and European experience behind him, and even by 
the 1901 Select Committee. But, as Ibbetson1s admission showed 
those who held power in 1904 were still by no means unanimous 
on the exact degree of State intervention required to set up 
ao-operative societies.
The Registrar of Friendly Societies in England,
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, merely had
to legally register co-operative societies, (and other similar
associations), and to warn against any dangerous tendencies
1. Imperial Legislative Council Proceedings, 1903~04, p• 29,
(4 March 1904)
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in their working. It gradually came to “be felt that in India 
a Registrars duties should include the actual organization 
of societies. At first, however, it was proposed simply to 
add to the duties of the Collector - to appoint him as 
1Registrar1 for his district.1 This is what had occasioned 
the Collector of Nasik's outburst. Ideas changed before 1904. 
The notable Resolution which was published at the same time 
as the Act said that while the Collector and other Revenue 
officers could be of much help in the organization of socie­
ties, the Government of India attached 'much importance to 
the appointment of a special officer in each province to 
guide and control the societies, especially in the early days 
of the movement1. Each Local Government should appoint a 
Registrar, 'who should be selected for his special qualifica­
tions, and should, for the first few years at least, be con­
stantly visiting societies and watching their progress....
Upon the selection of this officer the success of the experi­
ment will very largely depend.' The Government of India
believed, however, that gradually !the fostering care of the
Registrar1 would be less required until his duties became
2!purely official.1 In deciding to ask the provincial govern­
ments to appoint a special officer for co-operative work the
Government of India made a choice which was to influence the
1. Select Gttee. Rept., 1901, p.5*.
2. inaia, u-.R. ,R.& A. Dept.(L.Rev.) No.1-63-3 of 29 April 1904
published in Bombay Government Gazette, pt.i. 12 May 1904. 
The remainder of this section is based on this vital reso­
lution 5 quotations are from it unless it is otherwise 
stated in the footnotes.
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whole development of co-operation in India and, in fact, in 
many other Asian and African countries which have since 
copied the Indian model. The official Registrar, working out 
overall policy and intervening frequently in co-operative 
affairs, was to be no mere temporary phenomenon.
It was proposed to concentrate on the encouragement 
of societies for the supply of agricultural credit. It had 
been originally intended to limit membership to men of small 
means; membership was now thrown open to all, though precau­
tions ought to be taken, the G-overnment of India believed, 
against the Act's provisions being made use of 'by persons 
for whom they were not intended. ' As the Pamine Commission 
had intended, there was to be no declaration of war on the 
money-lender. Indeed Ibbetson, the driving force behind the 
operation of the Act in the first few years, hoped that 
'money-lenders would in the end help the movement. They have 
often been unjustly abused as a class.(This latter senti­
ment was in cuonsonance with the views which he had expressed 
much earlier in life in his Settlement Report - which was
1* Proceedings of the Conference of Registrars of Co-opera­
tive Societies held on the 25th September 1966 and the 
following days, p.9. Cf.Report of the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture in India,1928, p.417s 'It has never been the 
policy of the State to impose restrictions on the financ­
ing of agricultural operations by private individuals. 
Such restrictions as have been imposed have all been des­
igned to deal with agricultural indebtedness; if they 
affect the village moneylender, it is solely owing to the 
accident that he combines the financing of agriculture 
with usurious moneylending, which alone the restrictions 
are designed to control,'
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really one of the first full scale anthropological investiga­
tions in India - on the Panipat Tahsil and Karnal Parganah. 
Co-operative societies were intended to make small, short­
term loans for ’productive purposes*, The implication, as 
with the Pamine Commission’s proposal, was that the money­
lender was to be left to handle long-term business and loans 
for the ever present and ever increasing expense of marriages 
and social life generally.
Unless the Local Government specially ruled other­
wise, the liability of rural societies was to be unlimited; 
this, it was considered, would promote careful and watchful 
habits amongst the members of the village societies* Deposits 
from members and non-members were to be encouraged % there was 
a strong feeling amongst many that there was plenty of capital 
in the villages of India, which needed only to be prised out 
of its hiding-places. The object was to stimulate the Victor­
ian virtues of ’thrift and self-help*. It was only when these 
virtues had been displayed, when, in fact, some deposits had 
been collected by a society, that Government would consider 
making it a loan, on a rupee-to-rupee basis, up to a maximum 
of Rs.2000. Such loans would not be granted automatically. 
They were to be given primarily as ’an earnest of the reality 
of the interest taken by Government in the movement* 5 it was 
not intended to grant loans to new societies indefinitely.
It was hoped that urban societies, ’lending with the approval
1. See D.C.J.Ibbetson, Report on the Revision of Settlement 
of the Panipat Tahsil and Karnal Parganah of the Karnal 
District, lo72-l8&8~, pp.110-111.
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of the Registrar to rural societies1, would soon come into 
being. In these provisions, the various influences of Henry 
Wolff and Dupernex were obvious.
Societies were not to be permitted to make advances 
against standing cropss ’no form of security would be more 
unsuitable1. Competition in this particular preserve of the 
money-lender was therefore not intended, either. Transactions 
could be conducted in grain, however, as in Crosthwaite’s 
experimental societies. After a great deal of argument it had 
been decided that loans against the security of jewellery 
should be allowed only in very special circumstances. The 
question of mortgages on land was ’even more difficult1. On 
the one hand it was obviously desirable that a cultivator 
should be able to substitute a mortgage upon reasonable terms 
for one that was on exorbitant terms5 on the other hand, 
•personal credit* was felt to be the basis of the short term 
loan system which was contemplated. Mortgages in India often 
led to court cases; it was 'above all things desirable1 that 
societies should 'keep out of the law courts'. The final con­
clusion was that loans on mortgage should as a general rule be 
permitted, but Local Governments should be given extensive 
powers to prohibit or restrict such loans.
The Act was intended to be characterized by 'simpli­
city and elasticity1. Local Governments and Registrars were 
given a wide range of discretionary powers. It was hoped that 
the movement would 'neither suffer from the absence of that
official guidance without which a successful start cannot be 
hoped for in this country, nor be prevented by too much 
supervision and too many restrictions from attaining its 
full development.'
So ran the long and carefully worded Resolution 
which was sent to provincial governments and publicized 
widely throughout India.
The Co-operative Credit Societies Act of 1904 must 
be seen as fundamentally the result of significant changes in 
thought and attitude over a long period, changes which merely 
culminated in the legislative activity of Curzon's viceroyal­
ty. Yet, even after these years of thought, men in India 
were very conscious that they were embarking on an experiment 
with a type of organization entirely new to the East. In the 
early days, the Royal Commission on Agriculture had to admit
in 1928, 'the leaders of the blind were themselves often
1
amongst the afflicted. ' And in 1904 there were many, in
Bombay and in other parts of the country, who thought that
the whole idea of co-operation in India was sheer folly.
Dupernex himself told the International Co-operative Alliance
meeting in Budapest in 1904 that the general opinion in India
2was that co-operation would never succeed there. There was 
certainly an almost complete lack of knowledge of co-operation
1. R.C. on Agric. Rept., p. 444.
2. See ri.RoCrostihwaite, 'Recollections and Reflections', 
in B.C.Q., June 1917, p.16.
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in the districts of India. As an early Bombay Registrar said, 
perceptively, 'the truth is - we were talking of "Agricultur­
al Banks" and we have been landed with "Co-operative 
Societies"
But the G-overnment of Bombay, which had so recently
scoffed at the very idea, was prepared to acquiesce, if only
temporarily, in such !signs of the times1 as the Co-operative
Societies Act. Its Gazette of 14 July 1904 announced the
appointment of 'Mr. J. McNeill, I.C.S., to be Registrar of
2Co-operative Societies, Bombay Presidency.?
1. C.S.Campbell to G. of 3*, (through Director of Agriculture) 
No.1464 of 17 October 1907. (Poona, Decentralisation.)
2. Bom.G.R.R.D. No.5269 of 11 July 1904, published in 
Bombay Government Gazette, pt.i. 14 July 1904, p.962.
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h i
I I 0 P I O N E E R S
(1904 - 1911)
James McNeill, it will be remembered, had been the
only Collector in 1901 to write both fully and favourably on
the prospects of co-operative societies. Like a good many
others in the Indian Civil Service, McNeill was an Irishman.
Largely through the influence of his brother John (Eoin)
McNeill, Professor of Irish History at Lublin and for a time
a Sinn Peiner, he was eventually to be drawn from the Indian
Civil Service and into Irish politics. He finished his career
as G-overnor-General of the Irish Pree State from 1928 until
1932, finally being removed from office by de Valera.^ It was
his connection with Ireland which drew him into co-operative
work at the beginning of the century. An annual report of the
Irish Agricultural Organization Society, the organizing body
for Irish co-operatives, had been amongst the papers circul-
2ated to Collectors in Bombay in 1901. McNeill must have no­
ticed this. Realizing that co-operative societies were coming 
in India whether the Bombay Government liked it or not, he 
utilized part of his leave in 1901-02 to learn something oft 
the societies which had been set up in his homeland. He
1. Mary C. Bromage, Le Valera and the March of a Nation, 
London, 1956, p.242. McNeill's career after he left the
I.C.S. was as. follows: Chairman, Dublin County Council, 
1922; High Commissioner in London, 1923-28; Governor- 
General, 1928—32. His brother Eoin became a supporter 
of Cosgrave ; this was obviously the real reason for 
James McNeill's removal from office in 1932.
2. Encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.2110 of 29 March 1901.
(Poona, ADM. S.0.7.)
visited Horace Plunkett, the 'apostle' of Irish agricultural 
co-operation, and, becoming caught up in the prevailing en­
thusiasm, helped in the work of the Organization Society."*" 
Writing to Plunkett in 1931 and 1932 he maintained that there 
was an 'unbroken thread1 between his early interest in the 
ao-operative movement in Ireland, his work in helping to 
found the movement in India and the credit given to him for
this, and his position at the Viceregal lodge, which he
2
obviously held so proudly. It seems rather pathetic that, 
in fact, by this time he was no longer trusted by a great 
many Irishmen, and probably also not trusted by many 
Englishmen.
1. McNeill to Sir Horace Plunkett, 24 November 1931, 8 January 
1932, Plunkett Papers, (Horace Plunkett Poundation, London). 
The Plunkett papers give some interesting sidelights on 
McNeill's career; e.g. in 1917, when his brother was in 
jail, he wrote tc Plunkett 'I still have no wish to engage 
in political controversy, but I owe it to my brother and to 
my own convictions go omit nothing which may secure his re­
lease.' (7 June 1917)# In 1930 Plunkett visited McNeill in 
the Viceregal Lodges 'There was an I.O.A.S. meeting. Then 
lunch, tall hat, Horse Show w. Their Exs. andLord Thornton, 
sitting in the Vice-re gal Box. Being stared at, & what 
memories'. (Plunkett's diary,/no date givenj7’, quoted 
Margaret Digby,Horace Plunkett, an Anglo-American Irishman, 
p.278.) Other letters express McNeill's despair at the 
growth of religious intolerance and of 'ignorant laziness' 
in Ireland.
2. McNeill, letters cited. Writing to Plunkett, 24 November 
1931, he said that as a result of their meeting in 1901-02, 
'the Indian Government asked you, too late, to help them
with your advice. The then Private Secretary of the Viceroy 
(Hardinge) was my personal friend.' Hardinge was certainly
not Viceroy at the time of the passing of the Co-operative
Societies Act, if this time is meant. Under Hardinge,
however, McNeill was undoubtedly in favour - 'an able 
Indian Civil Servant*. (Hardinge, My Indian Years,
1910-1916, p.73.)
But in 1904, as a humane liberal, on very sympathetic 
terms with leading Indians,^  as an avowed optimist about the 
chances of success of co-operative societies in Bombay, he, 
with his Irish experience, was the obvious man to appoint as 
Registrar.
In appointing McNeill the Bombay Government showed, 
that, in spite of its previous disagreements with the Govern­
ment of India, it was now prepared to give co-operative soc­
ieties a reasonably fair trial. Of course, a good deal of 
scepticism remained, particularly amongst the men out in the
districts. And at fii'st it seemed as though this scepticism
2was going to be justified. McNeill's first Report makes 
rather dismal reading. He failed to start any societies at 
all during the season. Admittedly it was a bad season, and 
McNeill had taken up his position when the season had already 
begun, and basic loans had been obtained from the money­
lenders. Admittedly he had to spend much of his time at the 
beginning gathering a staff around him, obtaining office 
accommodation in Poona, and in drafting model by-laws and 
leaflets and having them translated. But McNeill seems to
1. It is significant, for instance, that he and Dr.Harold 
Mann were the only Europeans on the first Governing Board 
of the Ranade Industrial and Economic Institute. See 
pamphlet, The Ranade Industrial and Economic Institute, 
in the Se rvantsT of^ India~'Socie ty Library, Poona.
2. Annual Report relating to the Establishment of Co-opera­
tive dredit Societies in the Bombay Presidency during the 
year ending 31st March 1909. Hereafter, Bombay Co-opera- 
tive Annual Reports will be foot-noted simply as Rept.,19— 
the year given being that in which the period under 
review ended.
have realized fairly soon that the task before him was rather 
more difficult than he had thought when he wrote in 1901, as 
Acting Collector of Poona.
According to the grandson of an early ao-operator, 
McNeill, 'having lost all hopes of organizing any society1,'*' 
went down to Betigeri-Gadag, in Dharwar District in the 
Karnatak. There he met Canon C.S. Rivington, an Anglican 
missionary who seems to have instilled new hope in him. 
Eventually Rivington, together with an Indian friend, Shivaji 
Ramahandra Kulkarni, organized the first co-operative society 
in the Bombay Presidency, the 'Kanaginhal Agricultural Co­
operative Credit Society, Unltd.', in Gadag taluka. The patel 
of this village, Shiddangavda, was a man of influence, and
later helped in the organization of several other societies
2in the surrounding area. So it was by no means an experi­
ment by a little group of Christians. Rivington and Kulkarni 
were both to be important men in the co-operative movement in 
years to come. They had first worked together during the 
plague of 1896. Rivington came from the family which had been 
publishers to the Tractarians; he seems to have been a most 
devoted and humble man, respected by all communities. There 
were not many conversions in the Karnatak in his time; he /: 
felt, however, that his work for co-operative societies and
1. H.M.Kulkarni, 'A Peep into Pioneering Days - Shri Shivaji 
Ramchandra Kulkarni and Shri M. S.Kulkarni ', in B.C. Q. ,
July 1954, p*74.
2. Rept., 1906, p.4.
3. Information from the Yen. S.A. Mara, Hubli.
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in the Municipality was justified as a method of 1 showing our 
interest in our neighbours1; in this respect he seems to 
he a precursor of the more modern missionary outlook.
McNeill himself was posted on special duty as Acting 
Collector of Dharwar between the months of May and August 1905 
(early Registrars were liable to be regarded as reserve 
strength whose services could be called upon if necessary for 
ordinary revenue work.) V/hen at last he found time to write 
his report for the year ending 31 March 1905 he could say that 
eight societies had been registered in Dharwar District since 
the close of the official year; in five of these 'the work was
p
being carried on excellently.1 At the end of March 1906 
there were thirty one societies registered in the Presidency; 
of these, ten were working satisfactorily.^ But the Punjab 
Registrar had in the same year toured one district and had 
registered sixty five societies there alone.^ In some ways, 
he thought, 1encouraging thrift among the Punjabi peasants
5
might be likened to bringing aoal to Newcastle.1
It was aiear that some fundamental thinking had to 
be done on the question of co-operative societies in Bombay.
It is to McNeill's credit that he did a good; deal of this 
fundamental thinking. It did not bear fruit in- a succession
1. .Rivington, 'Report for the year ending 31 October 1909* 1 
(S.P. G-.Missionary Reports Received, 1909, Reference 31)
2. Rept., 1905« p.5.
3. Rept., 190£, P*2.
4. Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Credit Societ­
ies in. the Punjab for the year ending 31st March 1905, p«2*
5. Punjab Report, 1907, p*3*
of breezily written letters and reports, as did the thinking 
of his successor, C.S.Campbell. Nevertheless, it had some 
practical results.
McNeill very soon came to the conclusion that the 
Government of India's idea that at the beginning societies 
should not be hampered by too many rules was a false one as 
far as the Bombay Presidency was concerned. 'Village commun­
ities, so far from resenting restrictive rules, are timid 
about undertaking responsibility without directions as to its 
exercise.1'1' There should be no ambiguity about rights and 
duties, otherwise few would join the societies. And so de­
tailed model rules for societies were drafted, on the lines
of those McNeill had known in the Irish Agricultural Organiz-
2ation Society. India, of course, was not Ireland? this was 
not the first time, however, that it had been found that con­
ditions in the two countries could usefully be compared.^ The 
Government of Bombay were a little doubtful as to the correct­
ness of McNeill's policy with regard to model rulesnever­
theless his rules served as a good basis for some years.
McNeill also decided that it was of little use rely­
ing to any great extent on the Collector and his revenue 
officers in each district to organize societies. He felt from 
his own experience at Poona and at Dharwar that the collector
1. Rept., 1905* p.2.
2. Ibid.
3* Cf. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, p.122, n.2.
on the Irish Land Acts.
4. Bom., G.R.R.D. No.351 of 13 January 1906, on Rept., 1905*
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himself often had quite enough to do in getting through his. 
work in the law and order realm - though it might he added 
that there was probably a good deal of truth in the Govern­
ment of Bombay!s oblique comment on this attitudes 'It is 
frequently, if not generally, the officer who is keenest in
1
his ordinary work who finds time for interesting speaial work1.
But it was certain that the Registrar himself could not per-
aonally foster each society* 'Even when the people a
village^/ are anxious to have a society and are willing to
subscribe capital they expect to be gently pushed through
every step and to be given a little breathing time between
2successive steps.'
So McNeill evolved a system of 'Honorary Organizers' 
of Co-operative societies. Honorary organizers were to be 
non-officials who lived in the mofussil areas, usually men 
with some education and leisure and of some standing in their 
communities, who would volunteer, as a social service, not 
only to organize societies but also to keep a friendly eye on 
them once they had been started. They were to receive no pay, 
but were to be given a travelling allowance on a reasonably 
generous basis. In the villages, he claimed, 'their advice 
aomes not as an official proposal but as a friendly suggestion 
to listeners usually prepossessed in favour of the adviser.
The use of Indian honorary organizers in the ao-operative
1. Ibid.
2. Rept., 1903, p.4.
3. Rept., 1905, p.7*
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movement made Bombay in this respect practically unique 
amongst Indian provinces for some years. Wilberforce, the 
Punjab Registrar, saw little need for them."^  This was per­
haps not only for the reason that he was quite successful 
without them; there is evidence that the Punjab Government 
feared that once it released its paternalistic grip on co­
operative societies, which of course were in competition with
Hindu money-lenders, they could well become Muslim anti-Hindu
2organizations. In Bengal the honorary organizers were fre- 
quently Europeans there may have been semi-political fears 
behind this state of affairs, too.
The changing position of honorary organizers in the 
movement in Bombay, and the changes in the sorts of people who 
were asked to become organizers, together make up one of the 
most important and most interesting themes of co-operative 
history over the next twenty five years.
McNeillfs first three honorary organizers were all 
retired Deputy Collectors. It was difficult to obtain men of 
this type, however; several retired Deputy Collectors declined 
to help, not unreasonably. One of those who did offer his 
services, Motilal Chunilal, wrote: lI do not know of any
1. Proceedings of the Conference of Registrars of Co-operative 
Credit Societies held at Simla on the 25th September 1906 
and the following days, p.lO. The proceedings of Confer­
ences of Registrars~ are hereafter foot-noted as Regrs. 1 
Conf. Procs., 19— .
2. See note of P.J.Eagan, Offg. Financial Commr., Punjab,
21 October 1913, attached to Punjab Rept.,
3. See Report on the Working of t5e Co-operative Credit Socie­
ties in Bengal for the year 1906-1907/ p.26.
i
private gentleman who would sacrifice his time and forego his 
rest in old age to undertake a laborious work which also re­
quires a special study of the subject, another item of labour,, 1 
Motilal Chunilal suggested to McNeill that retired Mamlatdars 
might be willing to take up the work, in the hope, he added 
shrewdly, of being given some titular reward. McNeill had told 
him that honorary organizers should not be of lower tank1 
than retired Deputy Collectors.^ McNeill's successor as
Registrar was to spread his net wider in his search for non- 
♦
official helpers.
If Collectors wished to start co-operative societies
in their districts themselves, they would have to be prepared
to continue to give their active support long after societies
had been founded. It was apparent that continuous guidance
had not been given in some areas, particularly in Gujarat.
Motilal Chunilal found the five Xaira societies which he was
asked to visit first in a sad condition. 'At all these places
I was told by the people that these societies were started by
the advice of Government officers, but they did not expect
success, owing to want of funds and the displeasure of the 
2Saukars. ' The mere 'registration' of societies by an over- 
diligent Collector, keen on making an impression in the ever 
more statistically minded post-Curzon era, was of little use.
1. Motilal Chunilal, 'How can the assistance of non-officials 
be obtained?1, in Proceedings of the Co-operative Conference 
held in Bombay, December 13-18f 1§08, p. 37^  Hereafter the 
titles of the proceedings of such conferences are abbrevi­
ated in footnotes to Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., 19— *
2. Ibid., pp.32-33.
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The supply of funds - and their recovery from recal­
citrant debtorsi on these two subjects McNeill's thought was 
briefly but unambiguously expressed. The 1904 Government of 
India Resolution on co-operative societies had promised a 
loan to deserving societies, on a rupee-to-rupee basis, up 
to a maximum of Rs.2000. McNeill found that this sum was 
insufficient; the amount which villages could subscribe to 
qualify for this grant was 1 only a fraction* of the amount 
required to finance the year*s agricultural operations.
*1 think that if less importance be attached to stimulating 
thrift and effort and more to testing the capacity of 
village communities to manage funds raised on their joint 
credit the results of the first few years* working may be 
much more valuable.*1 Here, in fact, was a direct challenge 
to the philosophy behind the Co-operative Societies Act. The 
question of summary recovery came up at the Registrars' Con­
ference held at Simla at the end of September 1906. Should 
the societies have to go through the long processes of the 
Civil Courts in order to recover their debts? Charriar, the 
Madras Registrar, thought summary recovery would be 'needless, 
harmful in the long run and probably illegal. ' McNeill 
aountered by demanding the right of summary recovery as
p
'both necessary and desirable.'
In these utterances, both made just before he
1. McNeill to Govt., No.996 of 13 September 1906, encl. Bom.
G.R.R.D. No.11378 of 1 December 1906. (Poona, Spare Copies).
2. Regrs.r Conf. Procs., 1906. p.16.
relinquished his post as Registrar, McNeill was setting the
tone for much of the controversy that took place during the
career of his successor.
There was one further aspect of his work in which
McNeill was particularly interested. This was the redemption
of old debt. Wedderburn's idea had been totally to 'redeem1
the ryot's long standing debts, to lift the whole load of
debt from the ryot's shoulders. In Bombay the desire to do
something in this direction lingered on in men of generous
mind. Thus, although the Government of India had made it
clear that, at first, co-operative societies should try to
confine their activities to making short term loans for the
immediate expenses of cultivation,1 McNeill was soon issuing
a circular saying that 'Societies which have had a year's
experience and have gained some confidence in the management
of their affairs should seriously consider how they can help
2their members by redeeming cld debts of members'. McNeill 
was trying to follow in the steps of Wedderburn.
C.S.Campbell took up the position of Registrar in 
October 1906. He was a younger man than McNeill; since his
arrival in India in 1899 he had been Assistant Collector and 
Special Pamine Officer in Satara, working in the thiak of 
village life, and Assistant Collector and Personal Assistant
1. See India G.R., R.&.A. Dept., (L.Rev.) No.l - 63~3 of 
29 April 1904.
2. McNeill, Circular No.5 of 26 April 1906. (Poona, Original 
Circulars,I.)
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to the Collector in undivided Khandesh. He had not heen out of 
India since he had arrived, having spent four months* privi­
lege leave in Satara, possibly doing voluntary work of some 
sort.'*' He once wrote that he was twice asked whether he would 
like the post of Registrar, and on both occasions he had
refused it. fI was informed, hov/ever, later, that I was to
2study under and take over from Mr. McNeill. * This was not, 
it might seem, a particularly promising beginning. But 
Campbell*s attitude in this matter was not one of sullen com­
pliance. >1 entered a free billet; and began to identify 
myself with it. 1
Charlie Campbell was, one feels, one of the last ex­
amples of the Tom Hughes variety of 1 Muscular Christianity. 1 
A strong, utterly fearless man, he had a warm susceptible 
heart and was immensely moved by poverty and misery. He gave 
away a considerable portion of his salary as private benefac­
tions ; he was always to be S2en followed by a troop of small 
Indian boys, orphans, whom he was 1educating1.^  He brought to 
bear on the oo-operative movement what can only be described 
as a missionary spirit; indeed, it is not surprising to find 
that he, like McNeill, retired early from the I.C.S. - he to 
become a Christian missionary. Campbell was a superb linguist.
1. Campbell*s draft 1 Statement of Career* for the Decentralis­
ation Commission, 1907. (Poona, Decentralisation.)
2. Campbell's draft 'Memo on the position of the Registrar of 
Co-operative Societies.' (Poona, file cited. )
3. Ibid.
4-. Information from his nephew, Brigadier Lorne Campbell, V.C., 
Sir Robert Ewbank, Sir Stanley Reed, and Dr. Harold Mann.
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To quote the words of a fellow officers 'He could even speak 
^MarathiJ7, with the inflections of (say) Satara, Nasik or 
the Desh, and was faniliar with the shades of dialect of Tin- 
lettered rustics.
On the face of it, then, Campbell was an ideal man 
for the position of Registrar. But was he? In Campbell, one 
fears, pity was combined with a certain amount of gullibility. 
His undoubted brilliance was of the erratic variety. Single 
phrases or sentences from his writings read better than the 
strangely punctuated whole. His tremendous energy was com­
bined, as it sometimes is in the Christian of his type, with 
great personal sensitivity. He simply did not fit in with 
the more hard headed and the more thick skinned of his 
fellow officers.
But we must be thankful that the energy of the man, 
aoupled with his occasional prickliness, have left us with a 
mass of reports, memoranda and long plaintive letters which, 
put together, give us an extraordinarily valuable picture of 
the co-operative movement in its early days in Bombay.
At least two hundred days of Campbell's year were 
spent in touring. This was not the normal sort of touring 
which the District Officer indulged in; the whole Presidency
1. Letter to the author from Sir Robert Ewbahk.
was the Registrar's territory. 'The pace one has to go', 
Gjommented Campbell, 'is certainly telling, if not killing.
Such travel involved 'stays where expedient and possible; in
2village or city (or Railway Station!)1 Yet not all Campbell's 
touring difficulties need to have been faced. The fact was 
that virtually nothing was planned in advance. 'The 3 months 
during which I travelled round with him learning the job1, 
his successor R.B.Ewbank has written, 'were the most uncomfort­
able of my life....We used to arrive at some wayside station, 
waste an hour in getting transport for our very meagre kit, 
find the dak bungalow occupied, go and sleep in a bug infested 
chora (chavdi), make our supper on some baked beans out of a 
tin and so on. There was no necessity at all for all this, -
very bad for health and temper. But he just smiled and neither
3
complained nor tried to plan things properly. '
Campbell always combined his visit to a village co­
operative society with a visit to the local schools 'unfort­
unately school education and methods of teaching have often 
little in aommon with co-operative ideas', but still, educa­
tion, he believed, was a necessity if co-operation was to 
succeed on a wide scale.^ He preferred, in fact, to sum up 
his work 'in the general language of education; rather than in
1. Rept., 1907» p.l.
2. Campbell, Memo.A, Draft Evidence for Decentralisation 
Commission. (Poona, file cited.)
3. Letter to the author from Sir Robert Ewbank.
4. Rept., 1907. p.11.
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statistics and in figures of "finance".And indeed one
has to search quite extensively in his reports before one
2finds that there were about 300 societies, many of them not 
very sound, at the end of his period as Registrar, in 1911 f 
as aompared with thirty-one when he took up the position.^
The committee of a society, Campbell wrote, was 
1 generally composed of men who (so it would seem from a dis­
tance) have naturally fallen into their places....Committees 
or Panches (for such they may often literally be) exist ipso 
facto in the body of villagers assembled.' To the villager, 
'the process of popular election is hardly aomprehensible in 
theory, and superfluous in practice. As long, then, as we get 
honesty we need not press for technicalities and strict com­
pliance with Western formulas. 1^  Campbell worked with the 
leading men of the village considered in terms of caste, 
wealth and prestige. What might be called the fhinge group1 
between the government and the village people in the organiz­
ation of co-operative societies was not always the same as 
that between the government and village in the normal course 
of administration. 'The old Maratha proverb classes the 
Kulkarni with the Sonar and the Shimpi as one of those who 
take their perquisites on the way...,The better village 
officers, of course, are ready enough to help; but we must
Rept., 1910, p.25 cf. Rept.t 1907, p.l.
2. Campbell gave up the position at the end of November 1911. 
The figure for March 1911 was 252, (Rept., 1911.P.3), and,
for March 1912, 368, (Rept., 1912, p.20)
3. Rept., 1907. p.3.
4. Ibid., p.10.
reckon with all sorts of hosts? and in a village the Patil 
and Kulkarni assuredly are such. We are practically re­
introducing the "Panch" system and courting, in part, opposi­
tion from the Patil'.^ "
This is not to say that the kulkarni in the Deccan 
and the talati in Gujarat were not extensively used as secre­
taries. But sometimes the committee of a society was per­
suaded to appoint the local schoolmaster as secretary. As the 
children from all factions usually went to the school, it 
was in the schoolmaster's interest not to become connected 
with any one of these factions. On the whole, he was probably 
trusted by the villagers more than the kulkarni. The secre­
tary was usually paid. Sometimes, as in Satara, the only way 
of raising enough money so as to be able to employ a literate
secretary was to give such a person the oversight of several 
2societies.
'The General Body meets sometimes; but it is seldom 
m e t . T h e y  were, of course, usually out in the fields at the 
time of day the officer normally chose to make his visit.
Only by staying overnight in the village could the visiting 
government officer hope to make much contact with the members 
of a society. 'The Secretary and Chairman may suffice for 
ordinary questions,' wrote Campbell, 'and the books may
1. Regrs. 1 Conf. Procs., 1907» pp.30-31. Cf. Rept., 1907, p.8
2. Rept., 1910  ^p.4.
3. Campbell, 'Note on how far officials should take any part 
in organization or supervision', composed for Agriculture 
Department subordinates. (Poona, Subordination of Regr. 
to D.A.)
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reflect the Societies work and use.
Campbell drew a distinction between what he termed 
raristocratic? societies and what he termed 'democratic' 
societies.
In 'aristocratic* societies there were, generally,
'one or two big men of the village 1 who to a very large extent 
aontrolled the society. They supplied the capital5 the more 
they supplied the more the society obtained from Government 
under Campbell's system of almost automatic subsidies on a 
rupee to rupee basis up to the maximum laid down by Govern­
ment - Rs. 2000. The leaders themselves were usually non­
borrowers; ’all the lower villainage ZSicJ.. .being more or 
less of a dead level in their sight* naturally joined as soon 
as patronage was extended. The patrons became the leading 
committee members. Their policy was never questioned; they 
were re-elected from year to year. In these societies a sec­
retary was easily found; the accounts were well kept, at 
least formally.
*"Democratic" societies on the other hand,* wrote 
Campbell with obvious sympathy, 1 be gin sometimes very near or 
actually on the lowest round - minimum of members (ten), all 
borrov/ers (though solvent), no deposits, dependent on an out­
sider for writing accounts, entrance-fee absent (by preference) 
redemption of usurious old debts a first claim on the Society. 
Such little groups of little people, which come clamouring for
1. Ibid
71
recognition, are by no means confined in each case to a 
single castes but the members forming each are closely knit 
together....Honesty and honour seem natural to many of them, 
but their very equality of status and finance makes exercise 
of authority and discipline (by the "Panch") more difficult? 
and it requires a strong tfSecretary" from without to keep 
them business-like.
There were, of course, various intermediate stages 
between these two types. One or two interesting cases had 
occurred, Campbell reported in 1910, where societies had part­
ly changed their character. The original depositors had been 
required to guarantee, before the government subsidy was 
given, that they would leave their money in the society for 
five years. But the five years now being up, they had 'with­
drawn their deposits in a body....The ab initio chairman has
ceased to initiate, demagogues have entered the Select Commit-
2tee ...one of the equals may become an autocrat.1
'Pactions', which grew up in the village as a result 
of disputes over land or over a dowry, or over such matters 
as an offence against caste, frequently made themselves felt 
in co-operative societies. A single man - a saukar, a kulkarni 
or a patil - might be responsible for fostering dissension.
One of the most aommon problems was that of the small saukar.
A man who had money to deposit in a society ipso facto
1. Rept., 19109 p.9.
2. Ibid., p.10.
3. Rept., 1907. p.5.
presumably had money to lend."*' The agriculturist who was also
a money-lender could easily become a member of a society. In
one of Campbellfs societies two or three committee members
were creditors and opposed loans to their debtors to redeem 
2their debts. 'I think the proverbial Bania might be pre-
i.
ferred to the moneyed agriculturist', wrote Campbell.
A fair number of Campbell's urban societies were 
formed on the basis of membership from one particular caste. 
Most caste societies were for such poor and lowly people as 
weavers, sweepers and tanners, though a successful society of 
Saraswat Brahmans was formed in Bombay. In the villages, it 
was 'rather a matter of distinction to have a few low caste 
men on show with their receipt books, to show the amount of 
loan they have received.'^ But the 'aristocratic' societies 
usually resented the presence of more than a few low caste 
men; one society in Surat district, for instance, insisted, 
in some ways perhaps not completely unjustly, on higher 
interest rates for low castes if they were admitted.
Such problems might eventually bring about the fail­
ure of a society. But the end of a society might eventually 
come from 'mere inertia or ergo-phobia; death by dying as it 
might be called. In such cases it is probably best to remove 









Rept., 1909. p. 12.
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off toy the putrefaction,*^
Campbell came to the heart of the problem of credit 
co-operatives in his Reports for 1908 and 1909. Put simply, 
it was that the ryot was extremely reluctant to repay his 
loans from the society. To a large extent this was not toe - 
cause of any essential dishonesty. It was mainly because he 
persisted in regarding the co-operative society simply as 
another money-lender. With the large increase in his debt 
over the decades the idea of repayment of prinaipal as well 
as interest had become foreign to the ryot. According to 
Campbell, the so-called 'agreement* between debtor and credit­
or in the village., which Westerners considered to be almost 
sacrosanct, because it was in writing, was really 'that the
debtor will get as much and repay as little as possible. The
2settlement is a working out cf this agreement>' This view 
was carried over into the co-operative field. A good many 
ryots preferred the perpetual tussle with the saukar to the 
out and dried methods of the co-operative society. And further­
more, the co-operative society, as a business organization, 
with very real responsibilities to all its members, could not 
possibly give the same easy accommodation to the villager in 
the matter of loans as the individual saukar could give. It 
might grant a lump sum at sowing time, to be paid back, as a 
lump sum, at harvest time. But in the meantime a child might
1. Rept,, 1907. p.5.
2. Rept., 1908. p. 5 .
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be born, there might be a wedding, a cow might die, the crop 
itself miglit fail. The saukar could grant a new loan and an 
extension of time, while, of course, raising his interest 
rates ;"** the society could not possibly do so while keeping its 
rates at a modest (for India) nine per cent.
Could the co-operative society hope to beat 
the saukar at his own game? Campbell believed that it could 
- given state assistance. This assistance would take the form 
of adequate government loans to societies at the beginning, 
and means of recovery of debts by summary procedure if nec­
essary. Campbell claimed that he did not hold out the possibi­
lity of a government loan in order to persuade people to set
2up societies; he did tend, however, to grant almost auto­
matically a government loan as soon as a society had collected 
deposits.^ But Campbell felt that the very aondition that 
there must be deposits from members was wrong. In 1907 he was 
writing that it was not easy to understand 'how a man who is 
already in debt, has current calls on his cash (e.g. at 
assessment time), and wants further loans, can deposit any 
money whatever with profit or with propriety.* Even if a man 
by chance had a little money hidden away, Campbell added, he 
was not always ready to 'give himself away to his Saukar* or 
to weaken his case for revenue remissions or suspensions by
4
displaying it in the form of deposits in a co-operative society.
Rept*, 1909i p.9*
2. Rept., 19109 p*15
3. Regrs. 1 Coiif. Procs., 1911, pp.4-5.
4. -Kept7, 1907, p.6.
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But it was fairly certain that the members of the 
Satara societies had no money hidden away. Theirs was a 
particularly hard and famine ridden existence. The story of 
the formation of the Satara societies is typical of Campbell. 
In 1908 there was plague in the Satara district. Campbell was 
sent down on special duty to help with inoculations. His 
sympathetic personality made itself felt amidst 'the inevit­
able hustling and heckling1 of the Deccan villages. Every­
where he went, he claimed, he was asked for help, for 'a 
society1. He decided on a new policy. Overnight almost, 
the number of societies 'registered1 in the Bombay Presidency 
nearly doubled. At the beginning of the co-operative year 
there were sixty nine societies; at the end 145.1 Campbell 
seems to have believed that by registering these Satara 
societies and thus confronting Government with a fait accom­
pli he could force Government to grant large loans to the 
2
societies. But Government loans on the scale Campbell had 
hoped for were not forthcoming. The Government of Bombay was 
able to obtain from the Government of India a slight relaxa­
tion of the equal deposits rule in certain special cases, 
but in practice most of the Satara societies failed to 
obtain loans.
What Campbell had in mind, in fact, was 'the total 
transference of tagai ^EakkaviJ?’ to the"Co-operative" Depart­
ment. 1 He compared co-operative societies with local bodies. 
Government had not waited until local Boards had become more
1. Ibid,, p.2.
2. Rept.t 1908, p.8*
'polished* "before trusting them with money. With supervision, 
these organizations managed to *get on, more or less.1 Simi­
larly co-operative societies, given supervision as well as 
money, would 'get on*. It was quite ohvious that what the 
people needed was money. Government had the money. It was as 
simple as that, 'We shall do more good perhaps in the East if 
we take people as they stand and help them where they are.
But the Government of Bombay was not going to make the radical 
alterations in its administrative and financial structure 
which Campbell suggested - certainly not while the Government 
of India continued to see State aid to Co-operation in any 
form as little more than a necessary evil, and certainly not 
while the impetuous and comparatively young Campbell stood at 
the head of the Co-operative Department.
In 1910 Campbell was still complaining, with truth,
that the conditions attached to loans from Government tended
to encourage the formation of societies of the 'aristocratic*
kind, but that they had :directly opposed the initial progress
2of democratic societies.'
There seems to be little doubt that the co-operative
societies were placed at some disadvantage when it came to
recovering unpaid debts. Under the Co-operative Societies Act
a society, in the event of a debtor's refusal to pay a debt,
had no final resort except the Civil Court, The burden and the
1. Campbell to Govt.. No.494 of 28 February 1908, (Poona, 
Decentralisation.)
Rent., 1910* p.10.
aost of suing in a Civil Court and of having the Court's 
decrees executed, were, Campbell thought, enough to break a 
society. Yet it was argued by some that it would not be right 
to give co-operative societies privileges which others did not 
have. That would savour of 'favouritism'. 'I cannot help 
thinking that a point of view starting on these lines will 
end finally by logical procedure in negation of government 
altogether, ' replied Campbell. 'Surely it is one of the high­
est privileges of Government to favour the good and disfavour 
the evil.1 It was also said that societies should not be 
'pampered.' 'But children and plants die without care,' 
wrote Campbell, 'and grown-ups too for that matter. It was 
foolish to say that societies should rely only on 'moral 
pressure' to recover their debts. 'It is almost as though 
one argued (after reading some treatise on the "family"... or
the like) that as the family should obviously be based on
2
piety...no provision against impiety was required.' Summary 
procedure was the only answer to the societies' problems in 
this matter, Campbell believed. Summary procedure pervaded 
the administration of India. ^ And by ' summary' Campbell 
meant anything 'on the spot' as opposed to 'an extraneous 
something that takes a long time in coming'. It could be 
decision and execution by a Revenue authority; it could mean 
decision and execution by the society itself -'by Panch' as
1. Campbell, Note 'On the Question of summary-procedure for 
the recovery of co-operative societies' dues', in Regrs.' 
Conf. Procs., 1907> p.28,
2. Regrs.1 Conf. Procs.f 1908, p.29.
8. Ibid., p.28 _____________
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Campbell termed it.1
Campbell1 aomplaints about Governments attitude on 
these matters - and his complaints on several other more per­
sonal questions - came to a head with the enquiry promoted by 
the Royal Commission on Decentralisation in 1907♦
On the first government notification of the appoint­
ment of the Commission Campbell had written *1 suppose this
2hardly affects us at all.1 A later Bombay Government cir­
cular invited officers to submit 1lists of all cases in which 
they have to refer to this Government, or through them to the 
Government of India, for orders which they could, in their 
opinion, more suitably give themselves without submission to 
higher authority.1 'Have we anything whatsoever?' Campbell 
asked his Head Clerk.
Later, however, Campbell had fresh thoughts, 
prompted by a sense of personal grievance. Was there not 
very close at hand a situation where decentralisation was 
necessary? Was it not intolerable that his own reports and 
letters to Government should have to 'pass wholesale through,
or filter through, the Director of Agriculture' and be sub-
4jected to 'journalistic criticism' on the way?^ His feelings
1. Ibid., p.27.
2. Campbell, Note, undated, written on his copy of Bom. G.R. 
General Dept. No.5307 of 28 August 1907. (Poona, Decentral­
isation. )
3. G. of B., General Dept., Circular No.5731 of 20 September 
1907> and Campbell's note, undated, written on it. (Poona, 
file cited.)
4. Campbell to Govt., (through D.A.), No.1464 of 17 October 
1907. (Poona, file cited.)
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were hurt further when, by an error, he was described as 
’Acting Registrar1 in a list of witnesses to be heard by the 
Decentralisation Commission.'*"
What had happened was this* McNeill had reached the 
Collector’s grade when he was appointed Registrar and was in 
no way subordinate to the Director of Agriculture. In July 
1906 the Government of Bombay suggested to the Government of 
India that, as the first steps had been taken in the matter of 
co-operative societies, it was no longer necessary for the 
post of Registrar to be filled by a man of full Collector’s 
status. This was perhaps an indication that the Government of 
Bombay attached no great importance to the post; nevertheless 
the Government of India and the Secretary of State agreed to 
the proposal in December 1906. Accordingly, Campbell was, in 
January 1907, formally appointed to be Registrar - to work
’under the aontrol of the Director of Agriculture and of Co-
2operative Credit Societies,’ But Campbell had been given 
an acting appointment in October. He said that there had been 
no allusion to the coming arrangements in the note  ^which he 
received at that time. Campbell claimed that the 'first 
definite intimation* he had received of a 'complete change* 
was a demi-official order from Government, some time after
1. Campbell to Govt., No.1766 of 21 December 1907. (Poona, 
file cited.)
2. Viceroy to Sec. of State, Despatch No.11. (L.Rev.) of
16 April 1908, and enclosures. (I.O.L.* Rev.Letters from 
India, 1908.)
3. The author has been unable to trace this.
the permanent appointment had been made, directing him to 
report in future through the Director of Agriculture.
Campbell felt that principles were involved. 'Mini­
mize the man on the spot1, he wrote, 'and co-operation may 
run to theory and die....When I desire to encourage I want 
(because the people need) - expedition, replies in no un-* 
certain voice, and definite promises - from myself. Even if 
such are not required for general administration, yet assured­
ly are they when it is a matter of getting the down-trodden 
to trust, the suspicious to work, and the poor to stake their 
all in a strange device of government. *^
This protest had no effect. So Campbell produced - 
with profuse 'humble* apologies for its length - a collection 
of 'Notes' and 'Memoranda* for the Decentralisation Commission. 
His memorandum 'On the position of the Registrar of Co-opera­
tive Societies, Bombay', featured, of course. Practically the 
whole of the administrative system of the time is covered. 
Campbell wrote muoh on the uselessness^ of the office of Divi­
sional Commissioner, on the necessity of keeping a Civilian 
in one language area, (as Registrar, he had to cover three 
language areas), on the necessity of giving each Collector a 
Personal Assistant, on the folly of the prevailing government 
hankering after the numerical in reports. After his usual 
oomplaints about the lack of facilities for summary recovery
1. Campbell, Draft Memo, for Decentralisation Commission, 'On 
the position of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 
Bombay. ' (Poona, Decentralisation.)
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by ao-operative societies he moved on to his proposals for 
co-operative societies.
'I think in time the function of Co-operative Credit 
Societies, if they do their work well, may he extended with 
advantage.
For instance - sahool hoard, agricultural schemes, 
management of water-courses, and even collections of assess­
ments or arrears are all things that might come (in whole or 
in part) within their purview at some future date.1
More immediately, he suggested that co-operative 
societies should he given charge of all takkavi operations 
under an extension of the system of * joint-takkavi.*^
Campbell did not develop these themes. It was, how­
ever, his single heading, * Re introduction of the "Panch" sys*^  
tern through the medium of Co-operative Credit Societies1
which most interested the Decentralisation Commission when
2they came to hear Campbell.
It was only a heading which the Decentralisation 
Commission had to go on. For, much to its author*s discom­
fiture, *Mr. Campbell!s omnibus report*^ had been returned 
in toto to him by the Bombay Government as *not likely to be 
of the kind wanted by the Commission.1 Instead, he had been
1. Campbell, Draft *Uote B* for Decentralisation Commission. 
(Poona, file cited.) Under the 1joint-takkavi1 system 
money was lent by Government to a village or a group 
within a village.
2. R.C. on Decentralisation, Mins, of Ev., P.P.1908, (4367)J
5ET7 i T 5T - 9T':--------- ---- ---------------
3. An Under-Secretary1 s note, 3 April 1908. (B.R.O., R.D.
Vol.80 of 1908.)
asked to submit mere headings of his seven main points.^-
In its final Report the Commission rejected the
suggestion that 'panchayats should come under the Registrar
2
of Co-operative Societies' * In the meantime, however, 
Campbell found himself 'accused', so he wrote, of having 
started such a heterodox idea. This provided an occasion for 
Campbell to re-submit the whole of his Report, He had not, he 
olaimed, said that panchayats should be bound up with the 
Registrar of Co-operative Societies as a person - 'a policy 
which looks to me on the face of it more or less disastrous1. 
He had merely pointed out the connection which should exist 
between panchayats and the co-operative movement as such. He 
went on to alaim that he had advocated the extension of 
rights of summary procedure to co-operative societies 1 qua 
panchayats' - though, in fact, it would seem that he had not 
done so either in his report or in his oral evidence. Govern­
ment had already advocated, he said, summary procedure in con- 
nection with panchayats.
Campbell's treatment was actually not quite as severe
A
as he imagined^ Lamb, the Bombay Revenue Member , it would
1. Campbell to Govt., No.646 of 15 March 1908. (Poona, file 
cited.)
2. fi.C. on Decentralisation.f Rept.r P.P. 1908,(4360); xliv, 
240.
3. Campbell to Govt. No,646 of 15 March 1908. (Poona, file 
aited.) He quotes, on the judicial powers of panchayats, 
Bom. Judicial Dept, to G.of I, No.1675 of 1 April 1905♦
4. Richard Lambs Asst.Collr.,Bom.,1879I Collr.,1892; Sec.Bom. 
R.D.,1904; Ch.Sec.Bom.,1907? Member of Council,Bom.,1908; 
Member. Governor-General's Executive Council, 1910; 
K.C.S.I., 1911; retd.,1915.
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appear, was not content with his Under-seeretary1s disparag­
ing unwillingness to bother him with Campbell's Report, and 
he specifically asked for it to be sent to him . Obviously, 
what the Bombay Government disliked was Campbell's attempt to 
make his personal feelings known by means of a submission to 
a Royal Commission.
But Campbell’s sense of grievance increased* It
should not be imagined, he wrote, that he was fa bitter and
2disappointed man, heatened by friction1. But, he asked, who 
was being trained to take his place? Should it not be a 
senior man? fIn other Provinces, Registrars may be found con­
siderably senior to the Bombay incumbent, who has to hold his 
own with men of thirteen, fifteen, seventeen or even more may 
be years1 of service.' But could a senior person be appointed 
if he was to be subordinate to a Direator of Agriculture7who 
in any case knew 'more about turnips than turnovers'?^
This brought, at last, what seems to have been an 
honest appraisal of the position from Keatinge: 'It would 
cause endless friction and waste of time if I were to attempt 
to take any part in the control or supervision of the work in 
connection with Co-operative Credit Societies,...1 seldom see
1. Lamb's remarks on Under Secretary's note cited. (B.R.O. 
file cited.)
2. Campbell to Govt. No.494 of 28 February 1908. (Poona, 
Decentralisation.)
3. Campbell to Govt.(through D.A.), No*2698 of 3 December 1909 
encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.936 - 28 Confl.. 28 February 1910. 
(Poona, Subordination of Regr. to D.A.)
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Mr. Campbell, have practically nc correspondence with him, 
and know nothing about his work, poliay or movements except 
such information as I glean from his annual report....So far 
as my control is concerned Mr, Campbell has the substance of 
what he wants without the name. I have the name without the 
substance. I had imagined this would satisfy him; but evident­
ly it does not1
Campbell undoubtedly had the intimate grasp of the
workings of co-operative societies which Keatinge could not
have. Yet the fact remains that he organized some extremely
poor societies. A large part of his career as Registrar is
the rather sorry story of his efforts to make the hastily
registered Satara societies work without any money. The
societies which were organized amongst the Kaliparaj tribal
people of the Mandvi taluka of Surat during his period had
money to begin with. But the money came from the members1
2old money-lenders. This was in accordance with the Govern­
ment of India's ideas, but, in reality, 'After organizing 
village societies, the money-lenders managed to get the loans 
advanced to the members in satisfaction of their swollen 
claims. The result was that the loans were not used for prod- 
uctive purposes and they could not be r e p a i d . I t  was, in
1. Keatinge's forwarding remarks, - No,8444 of 11 December 
1909 - on Campbell's letter cited above.
2. Evidence of Khandubhai Desai, Committee on Co-operation in 
India, 1914-15• (Punjab Records Office, Patiala.)
3. C.M.Gandhi, 'Glimpses of the Co-operative Movement', in 
B.C.Q., April 1954, p.14.
fact, only in the Karnatak, where, in Canon Rivington, Camp­
bell found a kindred spirit, that much progress was made 
before 1911. The Lingayats, who were predominant in the rural 
areas, were quarrelsome,"1' as most puritans in religious
matters are inclined to be. But on the whole they were 
2
thrifty. Co-operation made an appeal to such people.
Although societies set up during Campbell's period 
as Registrar were few in number and often poor in quality 
certain broad lines of development were successfully laid 
down.
The nature and extent of the control that had to be 
exercised from o^ ltside the societies was the most difficult 
problem that every Registrar had to face. Honorary organiz­
ers, Campbell found, were not suitable for audit, which had 
to be performed in a strictly business-like way. Campbell 
therefore asked Government in September 1907 for the services 
of two men to act as auditors. They should be, he wrote, 
thoroughly honest, preferably having a command of two of the 
languages of the Presidency, and with a thorough knowledge of 
accounts. They should be paid a salary of Rs,150 to Rs.250, 
with travelling allowance, and each be given a pattewala.
The Co-operative Auditor, or 'Inspector' as he was at first
1. See S.SaSalimath, !The Lingayat of the Karnatak* in 
W.Burns,(e&) Sons of the Soils Studies of the Indian 
Cultivator, pp.17-22.
2. There is perhaps a germ of truth in the suggestion made to 
the author in India that the Lingayats are an illustration 
of what is commonly called the 'Tawney* thesis, that 
religious puritanism and care in money matters go hand in 
hand.
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somewhat confusingly called, was to "be no mean member of the
official hierarchy: he was to have, in fact, the status of a
Mamlatdar. The Government of Bombay hesitated to grant
Campbell what he desired. But he showed that other provinces
had similar staffs of auditors - argument by analogy often
proved successful in spheres where there was inter-provincial
rivalry - and, at length, his request was granted.'1'
Campbell also felt the need for additional staff in
2the lower grades. He was able to obtain a Circle Inspector 
from the Revenue Department to help look after the Gujarat 
Kaliparaj societies^ and a permanent clerk to keep an eye on 
the Karnatak societies. This was not before he had had to 
resort for a time to the expedient of paying for an extra 
assistant for the Karnatak himself. A temporary assistant 
for the poverty stricken Satara societies showed signs of be- 
aoming semi-permanent by 1911, the year Campbell gave up his
4
position as Registrar. The Government of India, however, 
were not enthusiastic about such developments; they deprecated 
’the creation of anything resembling a regular service of 
subordinate officials for the control of the co-operative 
movement1.
1. Bom.G.R. Finance Dept. No.1990 of 23 April 1908 
and enclosures. (Poona, Permanent EST.)
2. ’Circle Inspector* - revenue official in charge of one of 
the four or five ’Circles’ into which a taluka was divided.
3. Campbell to D.A. No.2502 of 6 November 1909, encl.Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No.12356 of 22 December 1909.
A, Rept., 1911« p.l; Rept..1912, p.9.
5. G. of I., R.& A. Dept. (L.Rev.) Circular Letter No.l.- 
402-3 of 2 January 1912, encl.Bom.G.R.R.D. No.825 of 
25 January 1912.
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The development of an official staff did not mean 
that the honorary organizers were neglected. Par from it.
In fact, although Campbell's somewhat unbusinesslike methods 
repelled some Indians, the quality of his personality 
attracted many more.
In Surat, Campbell was assisted by Khandubhai Desai. 
Khandubhai had recently retired from an extremely high posi­
tion for an Indian to have held at this time, that of Presi­
dency Engineer. He had thrown himself into all movements, 
political, social, and economic, which he believed had as 
their aim 'a new India, with a high sense of rectitude and
i
duty.' A British member of the I.C.S., who served as a
young man in Khandubhai»s district, has confessed that he al-
2ways regarded Khandubhai rwith some awe1*
One of the most significant aspects of Campbellrs 
period as Registrar was the gradual use of help from sources 
other than the ranks of retired government officers. One of 
those appointed as an honorary organizer at this time was 
G-.K. Chitale of Ahmadnagar. His appointment was possibly 
made at the instigation of McNeill, who had gone to be Coll­
ector of .Ahmadnagar. Chitale was a pleader who was setting 
out on a career in local and Presidency politics. Co-opera-
1. Khandubhai Desai, Evidence, Committee on Co-operation in 
India, 1914-15. (Punjab Records Office, Patiala.) See also 
fA Correspondent from Surat1, Obituary Notice of Desai, 
B.C.Q.,June 1923, p.75.
2. Sir Robert Ewbank, 'C.M.Gandhi, Tributes and Reminiscences 
- II', in B.C.Q., June 1923, p.75.
3. See Hugh Tinker, The F^oundations of Local Self-Government 
in India, Pakistan and Burma, p.144.
tion appears to have provided Chitale with a aonvenient 
spring-board to his future career, and he tended to take in­
creasingly less interest in co-operative affairs later on; 
nevertheless his assistance was doubtless valuable while it 
lasted.
Campbell did not make a place in his list of offic­
ial honorary organizers for every *Native gentleman* who 
might temporarily wish to curry favour with Government, how­
ever. *1 wait till people work before I consider them help­
ers. Yet it can hardly have been lack of work that pre­
vented G*K. Devadhar and R.M. Sane from being added to the 
list of honorary organizers in Campbell*s time. Perhaps it 
was their politics. In 1908 there was a temporary scare when 
the Collector of Poona claimed that townsmen, members of the 
Sarvajanik Sabha, were stirring up disaffection amongst the
agriculturists in the surrounding area under the guise of
2promoting 1 agricultural improvement. 1 Yet on the whole the 
Bombay Government remained much more willing to trust the 
Indian element than, for instance, the Government of Bengal.
G.K. Devadhar was certainly not of the Tilak school. 
He was a foundation member of Gokhale's Servants of India 
Society, who, probably because of his close contact with 
Christian missionaries in his youth, was largely responsible 
for having the constitution of the Society which Gokhale set 
up changed so that it would be not only a political organiz-
1. Rept., 1910» p.16.
2. See Bom.L.Rev. Admin. Rept., 1907-08, pt.ii, p.27.
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ation "but also a group of 'national missionaries'. Hadapsar 
society, which Devadhar organized just outside Poona, became 
a model; for years to come any visiting dignitary could not 
leave Poona without a visit to Hadapsar. Its success - or, 
rather, its seeming success, for its collapse in the twenties 
was to be disastrous - was mainly the result of Devadhar's 
ability to wheedle deposits from hi© Poona friends.
Sane had rather different political and social 
leanings from Devadhar; he was friendly with Tilak as well 
as with Gokhale. He had been a teacher in the New English 
School in Poona, and editor of Dnyan Prakash and of Kesari 
at various times in the eighties and nineties. At the same 
time he studied law. He was one of the first members of the 
Sarvajanik Sabha, and he preserved a deep reverence for both 
Ranade and Tilak until the end of his life. 'His independence 
and impartiality prevented him from becoming a partisan on
p
one side or the other. ' In 1894 he moved! to Barsi, a market 
town in Sholapur district, to practise law. His work as a 
newspaper editor and now, espeaially, as a small-town lawyer, 
gave him an extraordinarily good knowledge of the rural areas 
- a knowledge that was hardly shared by those of his colleagues 
who stayed in Poona. Sane made his first appearance in a
1. N.A. Dravid, 'Entrance to the Servants of India Society1, 
in H.N. Kunzru (ed.), Gopal Krishna Devadhar, p.24*
2. Obituary notice of Sane in Mahratta. 6 December 1925.
3. The Poona Brahman, however, often had closer links with 
the rural areas than his counterpart in, say, Calcutta.
co-operative report in 1907. ^  Ha took great pains not to
"bring politics into tlie co-operative movement. This was an
extremely difficult task at times; Tilak, a retired Registrar
has written, fdid not like Sane's mixing himself up with
Government-sponsored on-operative activities and told him •
2
that in the end he would see his mistake.1 Sane's ability 
as an orator in Marathi, his integrity and above all his clear 
thinking in co-operative matters - he was the Bombay move­
ment's p-cutest critic from within - were to keep him in the 
forefront for the next twenty years.^
The first serious sign that Campbell’s policy was
not in accord with Government of India ideas came at the
Registrars * Conference in January 1911. E.D. Maclagan, the
new Secretary to the Government of India in the Revenue and
Agriculture Department believed that a spirit of competition
between the Registrars of the various provinces was 'not un- 
£
healthy1. ‘ He noted, rather unfavourably, the small number of 
rural societies in Bombay, as compared with the number of
iirban societies in that Province, and as compared with the
numbers of rural societies in other provinces. When it came 
to a discussion of government loans to co-operative societies,
1. 1907, p. 12.
2. V. 3.~Bhide, 'Memories and Reflections of an Old-Stager1, 
in B.C.Q.,April 1954, p.10.
3. Bor Sane, see Govind Raghunath Kale, Barsi Central Co-oper- 
ative Bank Ltd. va Barsi talukantil Sahakari Batpadya 
yatsa Itihas, /in Marathi /, pp‘. 1 -3.
4. Regrs.1 Conf Procs., 1911» pp.4-5.
5. Ibid., pp.4-5
the Registrars of Bengal and Madras said that, in compliance 
with the original Government of India precepts, now that tho 
movement had taken root, they were giving government loans 
very sparingly. Campbell, on the other hand, had to admit 
that he 'appeared to have used more from this source of 
supply than other provinces'. At present there was a sum of 
Rs. 1,60,000 of government loans outstanding, as compared 
with about Rs. 41,000 in Bengal and Rs.45,000 in Madras. He 
considered that he was 'morally bound to give the equivalent 
deposit, if the members deposited money with the society.1 
Maclagan replied that Campbell was under an 'entire misappre­
hension as to any moral obligation' to give equivalent gov­
ernment loans in such cases. Such a moral obligation could 
arise only 'if the Registrar induced the members to deposit 
money by a promise of such assistance' But this was in 
fact what Campbell had been doing.
When Campbell came to write his Annual Report in 
August it was fairly obvious that he was going. The Report 
is a summing up, in a style rather more sober than Campbell's 
usual one, of his work as Registrar. He still maintained 
that this work should be seen in terms of 'educational pro­
gress.... And I feel that we ourselves are included in the 
educational progress? and are perhaps the most important 
part thereof!1 But he was now ready to say with the orthodox 
that 'our best policy will be, probably, to concentrate on
1. Ibid., pp.29-30.
good centres and urge to perfection societies already good, 
rather than spend more money on doubtful returns.... .We can
afford to lop fairly heavily now15^  there is no doubt that
2he had the Satara societies in mind.
A confidential Government Resolution, despatched on 
18 December but dated 1 December, the date of R.B. Ewbank's 
appointment to the position of Registrar, made clear what had 
been the real reasons for the change* fNo progress* had been 
made in Effectively associating* the work of the Registrar 
of Co-operative societies with that of the Director of Agri­
culture. *It is not possible for Government to permit the 
indefinite continuance of arrangements in which the work of 
the Registrar remains aloof and separate from the work of 
the Agriculture Department.*^
There was a good- deal of wisdom in the note of Lamb, 
the Chief Secretary in 1907? on Campbell*s work: 'Mr. Camp­
bell is now our expert on co-operative credit; and like other 
experts he is a little apt, apparently, to think that - as to 
his subject at least - in him alone there is wisdom, and that 
anyone else's opinion is mere obstacle and hindrance.1^
Campbell had a clear notion of many of the problems 
co-operatives were up against. He was a sincere idealist. A 
few of the heresies he advocated later almost became orthodoxy.
1. Rept., 1911*PP*2, 4.
2. Ibid., pp.1-2.
3. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.11391 " 257 Conf1., of 1 December 1911. 
(Poona, Subordination of Regr, to D.A.)
4. Lamb, Note, 22 December 1907. (B.R.O., R.D. Vol.80 of 1908.)
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Yet it cannot be said that the co-operatives which he set up 
were models for the future. The best comment on his career 
as Registrar was perhaps provided by Campbell himself. 'If 
co-operation has done nothing more it has anyhow afforded a 
delightful occasion for friendly work side by side of a 
Government Registrar with philanthropic Native gentlemen. 
This association on equal terms of European and Indian is 
probably the most significant aspect of the history of the 
co-operative movement in Bombay in the years preceding 1911.
1. Rept., 1907» pp.1-2.
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IV
A G R I C U L T U R A L  B A N K S  A G A I N
(1904 - 1911)
Though Co-operation1s advent in India had been
heralded by a good, deal of publicity, other schemes for the
alleviation of- agricultural indebtedness remained in the
background. No sooner, in fact, had the Co-operative
Societies Act been passed than there was a revival of
interest in agricultural banks.
The main reason for this revival of interest was
the apparent success of Cromer*s Agricultural Bank of Egypt.
This privately owned bank received some financial assistance
from Government. It was supposed to distribute loans to the
peasants through its own officers, but the Government
collected the Bank*s dues through its tax-collectors. Cromer
had considered the *political objection* to connecting the
State in this way with the collection of debts,^  as he had
done in India. But apparently he did not now believe this
to be an over-riding objection. In its time jthe Egyptian
Bank was aonsidered to be a noteworthy experiment; the
authorities in Egypt had to deal with a large number of
2enquiries on the subject.
The most important convert in India to the idea of 
agricultural banks was Frederick Nicholson, the same Nicholson
1. Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of 
Egypt and the Progress of Reforms, 1895* p.d.
P.P. 1896 (797«); xcvii, 9d9.
2. Report on ...Egypt and the Soudan in 1903* p.13.
P.P. 1904 (1951)1 cxi, 203.
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whose report had lain behind the Co-operative Societies Act.
He visited Egypt to see for himself the working of the Agri­
cultural Bank and came back enthusiastic about the possibili­
ties of setting up similar institutions in India. He was, in 
fact, a man of enthusiasms, some of them possibly somewhat 
short-lived. He now wrote that 1 co-operative credit societies 
are only one form of credit system.... It has never been con­
tended that they are or should be a sole system. 1 He believed 
that fnothing but very slow progress1 in the formation of co­
operative societies in India could be predicted. Agricultural 
banks could supply oo-operatives with the capital they needed.1 
But it is clear from Nicholsonfs report that he intended that 
the proposed agricultural banks's main source of business 
should be, as in Egypt, loans made direct to the cultivator, 
rather than loans to co-operative societies.
The Madras Government, of which Nicholson was now a
member, were quick to agree to his scheme for promoting an
2agricultural bank in that province. A great change had 
occurred in administrative opinion there in the few years 
since the fierce denunciation of Nicholson's report on co­
operative societies. The Government of India also agreed to 
the scheme, making very few provisos - Curzon had given up the 
Viceroyalty but the energetic Ibbetson was still on the
1. Nicholson to Govt, of Madras, 5 February 1904, encl.
Viceroy to Sec. of State, Despatch No.37 (L.Rev.) of
7 December 1905. (I.O.L., Rev. Letters from India, 1905.)
2. Sec., Govt, of Madras, R.D., to G. of I., R. & A. Dept.,
Ho.1333 (Confl. No.170) Rev*, of 3 December 1904, encl. 
Despatch cited.
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Council. They believed that the scheme merited 'a liberal
measure of assistance', even acceptance of fa substantial
degree of risk.fl
The major portion of the capital of the Egyptian
Agricultural Bank was provided by the British-backed National
Bank of Egypt, an institution, as the Madras government put
2it, 'financially and politically strong. 1 The Government 
of India believed that the Madras venture should also be 
floated on the London market, the shareholders being guaran­
teed a minimum dividend of three per cent, per annum for fif­
teen years; 'should the bank be started and prove a failure', 
the Government of India informed the Secretary of State some­
what airily, 'then at the most Government will have lost on 
the guarantee a sum which cannot exceed 22i lakhs of rupees 
spread over fifteen years'. The Government of India was even 
prepared to agree to the Bank's paying Revenue Department 
officials to aollect its debts at the same time as the assess- 
ment, as in Egypt. Wedderburn, it must have seemed, was 
about to come into his own.
Possibly to the surprise of those in India, the Sec­
retary of State decided that the experiment was worth trying, 
and wrote that he was prepared to place the scheme 'informally
1. Despatch cited.




before financial houses of standing in London1. It was not 
long before the Secretary of State was approached by a syn­
dicate of British capitalists with interests in India, led by
Sir Ernest Cable, of Bird and Company, the Calcutta jute ex- 
2porters. Their plan, which included provision for guarantee 
of a four per cent, interest rate, was accepted in principle 
by the Government of India while it was still being considered 
at the India Office.^ It was the news that such an Agricul­
tural Bank might soon be formed that prompted in two Indian 
businessmen, Vithaldas Thackersey and Lalubhai Samaldas, the 
response which eventually led to the formation of the Bombay 
Central Co-operative Bank.
Erom the beginning of the movement in Bombay the
need had been felt for additional capital. If it was not
forthcoming from Government the only alternative was to turn 
to private sources. Dupernex expected that the urban co­
operative banks would be able to raise sufficient capital to 
meet both their own needs and the needs of the rural societies.
This plan appeared to be feasible to those who framed the
1904 legislation.
McNeill reported at the end of his first year that
1. Sec. of State to Viceroy, Despatch No.82 (Rev) of 27 April 
1906. (I.O.L., Rev. Letters to India, 1906.)
2. Cable had been a member of the Imperial Legislative Council 
from 1901 to 1903, representing the Calcutta Chambers of 
Commerce.
3. Viceroy to Sec. of State, Despatch No.17 (L.Rev.) of 
9 May 1907. (I.O.L., Rev. Letters from India, 1907)
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the establishment in Bombay of an urban co-operative which
would attempt to provide for the rural societies1 needs had
been suggested to *a few native gentlemen1 at the Oriental
Club.'*' Vithaldas Thaokersey was the organizer of the fBombay
Urban1 Co-operative Society* He was a Bhatia, the son of one
of the first big millowners in Bombay; he was still young
but was already a member of the Municipal Corporation and of
the Legislative Council, and, as an energetic, and confident -
perhaps over-confident - financier, wielded great influence
2in. those days of rapid economic, development.
McNeill and Campbell also managed to obtain loans 
for various societies not only from the Bombay Urban Society 
but also from individual businessmen in Bombay, though the 
extent of the interest of Bombay businessmen in co-operatives 
at this time appears to have contrasted unfavourably with the 
attitude of their Calcutta counterparts. One of those who 
helped most with loans was Lalubhai Samaldas - 'at almost too
A
kindly a rate to begin with1, even Campbell was forced to say; 
Yet Lalubhai was no mere soft-hearted philanthropist. His 
background was different from that of Vithaldas. He came 
from a family of Nagar Brahmans which had supplied Lewans to 
Bhavnagar, a First Class Indian State in Saurashtra, since 
1828. Lalubhai had risen to be Chief Revenue Officer of the
1- Rept., 19039 pp.1> 5.
2. See H.L. Kaji, Life and Speeches of Sir Vithaldas 
Thackersey, passim.
3* &ept., 1309, p.12.
4. Rept., 1907» p.10.
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State before going to Bombay to set up in business. The ex­
istence of his family estates meant that he had no financial 
troubles? he could afford to be independent both as a bus­
inessman and as a politician, dwelling as he was *in the 
midst of middle-alass lawyers and retired officials who were 
living lives on incomes a sixth of what he could expect.
He was evidently a striking figure, with his turban and his
2broad, silk-bordered dhoti. He brought a certain gentility 
to the life of Bombay, too: *he said that even though he was 
in business he could look upon it as a Brahmin and not as a 
Vaisya. In the Indian aontext this is perhaps the most 
significant comment which he could have made on his life. In 
politics he had annoyed his political chief, Sir Pherozeshah 
Mehta, by supporting the government-sponsored Alienation Bill 
of 1901. His experience of revenue administration told him 
that the measure was needed.
When Lalubhai was invited to comment on the pro­
posals of the 1901 Committee on Co-operation he had brought 
forward his own proposals for starting an agricultural bank 
in one of the talukas of Gujarat. He felt that private cap­
ital was necessary because it would be difficult to obtain 
capital from the ryots themselves, and that it would not be
1. S. Natarajan, Lalubhai Samaldas, p.19.
2. D.A. Shah, rLet us remeber our own pioneers in time1, in 
B.C.Q., March 1946, p.163.
3. S. Natarajan, op.cit., p.24. It should be said here, 
perhaps, that Natarajan's now rare biography of Lalubhai 
Samaldas, though it consists of only sixty small pages, is 
extremely valuable as a piece of historical analysis, as 




| wise to leave the running of co-operative societies in the
hands of the villagers. 'In the ryotwari tract,1 he commented, 
fthe village Panch does not exist, and for some years at 
least it will not come into existence.'^- When the Co-opera-- 
tive Societies Act was passed, however, he was willing enough 
to help in the government experiment, in spite of the reject­
ion of his own scheme. He paid particular attention to the 
societies in Ahmadahad and Kaira Districts, and soon joined 
in Vithaldas Thackersey's Bombay Urban Society.
But it should be emphasized that it was not only 
their interest in co-operative societies which led Vithaldas 
and Lalubhai to make their first proposal for the financing 
of Indian agriculture. It was also the feeling that British 
interests should not be allowed any further entry into that 
most basic of India's industries, agriculture - the feeling,
to quote Vithaldasfs biographer, that 'foreign capital should
2not be allowed to exploit the agriculturists of India*. The 
foundation of their Bank must, in fact, be seen as part of \ 
the great burst of swadeshi commercial activity which India 
experienced from about the year 1906. The directors of the 
Bank of Baroda, for instance, founded in 1908, included many 
of those who later joined the directorate of the Bombay
1. Lalubhai Samaldas to Commr., U.D. , 1 August 1902. (Poona,
ADM. S.0.7 )
2. Kaji, op.cit., p.158.
Central Co-operative Bank.^
Lalubhai and Vithaldas first learnt of Cable's
scheme during their visit to Calcutta in 1906 for the second
'All-India Industrial Conference', itself to a large extent
a swadeshi gathering since it was held at the same time and
place as the meeting of the Indian National Congress for the
year. Lalubhai interviewed 'the Britisher' behind the scheme,
presumably Cable, and later saw the private secretary to the
Viceroy. Bombay, he said, could do what the British syndicate
proposed.. He obtained an assurance that Lord Minto would not
2
overlook Indian opinion in considering such a scheme.
When Vithaldas arrived back in Bombay he prepared a 
scheme for an agricultural bank and published it in the 
Times of India Illustrated Weekly. The scheme was an ambit­
ious one. Share capital of twenty five lakhs was to be 
raised on the stock market in the usual way, and a government 
guarantee of four per cent, interest on one hundred lakhs of 
debentures was requested. The Bank would be registered under
1. This was particularly evident from the literature issued 
at the time of the Jubilee celebrations of the Bank of 
Baroda in 1958. Some of the swadeshi banks crashed in 1913 
- but Britain had her South Sea Bubble at a somewhat simi­
lar stage of development. The men who launched the first 
Indian shipping enterprise, Scindia, in the words of the 
biographer of Lalubhai Samaldas, 'knew only half of what 
they were doing and, were completely ignorant of ships and 
shipping1. (Natarajan, op.cit., p.41.T One, Sir Shapurji 
Broacha, advised against buying the first ship, however - 
he had had the misfortune to travel on her to America 
thirty years before! (Ibid. p.40.) Yet Scindia has 
succeeded.
2. Natarajan, op.cit., p.159.
the Co-operatives Societies Act* It was to have an All-India 
field of operations which, Vithaldas claimed, would taake for 
economy of management and security. f Its work would not he 
confined to agriculture. 'Every one of the Central Banks 
hitherto formed under such conditions,' Vithaldas claimed, 
'has found it distinctly necessary to do other business to 
keep the "pot boiling." Co-operative Societies' business is 
a capital addition where there is other business. However, 
the very undertaking given to do it at minimum rates makes 
it desirable, if not indispensable, that there should be a 
good flow of other business to earn a dividend and keep the 
Bank in strength.' 'A portion' of its capital was to be 
earmarked for agricultural purposes - apparently for loans 
to individuals as well as to co-operative societies. Vithal­
das laid emphasis, as others before him had done, on long 
tern loans for debt redemption."^ "
A great many objections were raised to this scheme. 
It seemed to be an attempt to obtain the privileges of a 
government guarantee, and registration under the Co-operative
Societies Act, for what appeared to be in most respects an
2ordinary joint stock concern. In these circumstances it 
was something of an achievement for Lalubhai, who was invited 
by the Government of Bombay to attend the Conference of 
Registrars of Co-operative Societies held in Simla in 1908,
1. Thackersey, 'Agricultural Indebtedness and How to 
Relieve It', in The Times of India Illustrated Weekly,
7 August 1907, p ."8™.
2. See Prov. Co-op-Conf. Procs., 1908, pp.10, 26.
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to persuade the Registrars to agree to a resolution stating 
that if an agricultural bank were set up all the capital 
should be issued in India in rupees. On the other hand, the 
majority of the Registrars believed that no government guar­
antees were necessary in order to set up such a bank.^
Lalubhai and Vithaldas saw that their original scheme 
had little prospect of success. They decided to oonfine 
their attention, in the meantime, to co-operative societies 
1m the Bombay Presidency. In a modified scheme for a bank 
they omitted the proposals for doing business with individuals 
and put the figures for share and debenture capital at one 
fifth of the original estimates.
This scheme was first put forward at the Provincial
2
Co-operative Conference of December 1908. At this same Con­
ference, however, McNeill, who hadi kept up his interest in 
problems of agricultural indebtedness, brought forward another 
scheme, which was thoroughly in the Wedderburn tradition. He 
called for the establishment of lTaluka Co-operative Credit 
Societies1, financed partly by Government and partly by the 
money-lenders. Holdings and indebtedness would be checked 
from the records, the recognized nominal indebtedness, would 
be reduced by at least twenty five per cent., and the land 
would be mortgaged to Government. Debt redemption would be 
undertaken only in cases where the operation could be
1. Regrs. 1 Conf, Procs.. j-908, pp. 14-15.
2. Lalubhai Samaldas, *A Scheme of a Central Financing Society 
in Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., 1908 , pp.25-27 *
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completed within twenty five years. Village societies would
continue to exist, hut they would operate only as the agents
of the taluka societies. McNeill believed that experiments
should be made first in three or four villages, but he was
thinking of a much wider field of operations as an ultimate 
1goal.
The two Indians* scheme and McNeillfs scheme both
happened to attract the attention of Clarke, the new and en-
2ergetic Governor of Bombay. Clarke minuted that he was 
most anxious that some positive action be taken on them. The 
magnitude of the operations involved in McNeillfs scheme, he 
said, staggered the imagination. But he was quite willing 
to address the Government of India immediately on the matter 
of guarantee of four per cent, interest on twenty lakhs of 
debentures, as proposed by Lalubhai Samaldas and Vithaldas 
Thackersey.^
Muir-Mackenzie, a Member of Council, put the indebt­
edness of the Presidency at twenty eight crores, or eighteen 
and a half millions sterling. This sum in itself, he wrote 
candidly, was 'not so very large'; even so it could be taken 
that Government could not find the money for McNeill's scheme. 
He agreed that in the circumstances the Indians' scheme was
1. McNeill, 'Debt Liquidation', in Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., 
1908, pp. 22-25.
2. George Sydenham Clarke: service with Royal Engineers, 
1868-1904, including a period in Egypt; Sec. Cttee. on 
Imperial Defence, 1904-07, Govr. Bom. 1907-1913? Baron, 
1911.
3. G. S.C^ Tarke^ JT., Minute of 30 December 1908. (B.R.O., R.D. 




Clarke was highly gratified. The Government of 
India should be immediately informed of the Government of 
Bombay's intentions, he wrote. He added, with the naivety, 
the cynic might say, of one new to India, that he trusted
2that the Government of India would raise no difficulties.
The reply of Carlyle,^ the Secretary to the Govern­
ment of India in the Revenue and Agriculture Department, to 
the Government of Bombay's letter was not encouraging. The 
fact, he said, that the Government of India and the Secretary 
of State were still considering a scheme for an Agricultural 
Bank on the Egyptian model, (presumably Cable's scheme), 
made it necessary to postpone consideration of any further 
schemes for guaranteed banks. Carlyle oommented unfavourably 
on the proposal that the Registrar should sanction all loans 
before they were made to societies. This would mean, he 
thought, that if the Bank got into difficulties with regard 
to arrears it would be in the interest of Government to use
1. M-Mack^enzie_yr., Minute of 3 March 1909. (B.R.O.,Compila­
tion cited.) John W.P. Muir-Mackenzies Asst. Collr., 1876; 
U.Sec., G. of I., 18895 Offg. Sec.Bom. R.D., 1896 & 1898; 
Ch.Sec., Bom.,1900; Member, Irrigation Commission, 1901; 
Member of Council, Bom., 1905 5 K.C.S.I.,19095 retd.,1910. 
Muir-Mackenzie was responsible for 'many measures of prac­
tical philanthropy.' (Indian Social Reformer, 10 January 
1909.)
2. G.S.CATarkeJT’. * Minute, ^c. 10 March 1909_7* (B.R.O., 
Compilation cited.)
3. R.W.Carlyle. After Carlyle retired he wrote, with his 
brother, the well known History of Medieval Political Theo­
ry in the West. One suspects that he was better as a 'polit­
ical theorist than as an administrators he disliked speaks
ing in the Legislative Council, and 'Secretariat work was 
never completely aongenial» to him. Dictionary of National
Biography, 1931-1940, p.144.
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its officials to make recoveries. This in turn would mean 
the maintenance of a permanent Co-operative Department. Such 
an eventuality, he said, the Government of India wished to 
avoid. (This attitude, of course, contrasted somewhat strange­
ly with the Government of India»s earlier willingness to use 
Revenue Department officials to recover the dehts of an Agri­
cultural Bank.) Carlyle repeated the Government of India's 
official view that future capital requirements of co-opera­
tive societies should he supplied Toy local 'Unions1 - urban 
aocieties in which the rural societies could take shares."^
He claimed that the object of the promoters in making the 
provision that all loans should be sanctioned by the Registrar 
was simply to give Government the best security possible. 
Government could drop those conditions if they saw them as
guarantee of interest on the debentures was absolutely necess-
aomments were out-z-spoken. He opened with an attack on Henry
1. Carlyle to G. of B. No.971 - 110-5 of 20 September 1909. 
(B.R.O., Compilation cited.)
2. But see below, Chapter V, for complaints in the early days 
of the Bank's operations that the Bank was using this pro­
vision to force the Registrar to make the investigations 
of borrowing societies that it should make itself. It is 
perfectly true, however, that right from the start the pro 
moters said they were willing to have the provision 
dropped. See Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., -^908, p. 16.
3. Vithaldas Thackersey to Lamb, 15 October 1909.
(B.R.O., Compilation cited.)
Carlyle's letter was sent to Vithaldas for comment
2involving responsibility rather than security. But the
ary in order to obtain the confidence of the investing
Carlyle's letter was also sent to McNeill. His
Wolf£, who, he believed, was behind* the Government of India's
attitude. Mr. Wolff was a good writer, he said, and had high
ideals. But had he ever selected an area and tried to put
his ideals into practice in a human situation? To force the
£ormation of UnionsB would be 'unhealthy1 and 'artificial1.
Why slavishly follow German models all the time, anyway? When
Unions came into existence in Germany there was already half
a century of joint stock banking experience. The Government
of India's attitude was astonishing. Let the Government of
Bombay decide whether State aid would promote or destroy self-
respect. The growth of. agencies which helped the people need
1
cause no alarm.
Several new factors helped the Government of Bombay
in breaking down the Government of India's attitude. First of
all, the negotiations^ seem to have been taken out of Carlyle's
hands and put into the keeping of Meston, the Finance Member
of the Viceroy's Council. He took a muah more favourable view
of the scheme. Secondly, Vithaldas Thackersey himself was
elected a member of the Imperial Legislative Council, and
2was able tto make fruitful contacts with Meston.
But almost certainly*^  the chief reason for the
1. McNeill to U.Sec., G. of B., R.D..No.R.-4923 of 24 October 
1909. (B.R.O., Compilation cited.)
2. Meston to Lamb, D/0 of 8 February 1910.(B.R.O.,
Compilation cited.)
3. The author has not had access to the confidential records 
on the matter kept in New Delhi, and up to the time of the 
writing of the final draft of this chapter the records for 
1910 had not become available at the I.O.L. But Hubert 
Calvert, then Registrar of. Co-operative Societies, Punjab, 
dropped a hint along the lines which are followed here in 
his letter in B.C.Q. s. March 1922, p.268.
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fairly sudden increase of interest was the news that all was 
not well with the much vaunted Agricultural Bank of Egypt.
The Report of Sir Eldon G-orst on the conditions in Egypt in 
1909f published in 1910, admitted that the Bank had not 
really been put to the test until the end of 1907, when a 
somewhat artificial period of prosperity in Egypt had come to 
an end. The Bank did not have sufficient machinery to conduct 
enquiries into the suitability of applicants for loans. Many 
of the loans were not being used for productive purposes and 
the loans outstanding amounted to £(Egyptian) 8,,136,000. The 
delay and expense of recovery through the Civil Courts of 
those debts which could not be recovered at the time of the 
revenue collection had put obstacles in the way of enforcing 
prompt repayment. Co-operative Societies were henceforth to 
be encouraged in Egypt.^ The G-overnment of India were 
certainly not going to embark on Cable's scheme for an Agri­
cultural Bank with such a warning before them.
It is reasonable to assume that the India Office,
frightened by the Egyptian failure, were now wary of any
scheme for a guaranteed bank. It is also reasonable to
assume that the India Office were still rather more wary of
Indian commercial schemes as such than they were of British
schemes. It must be assumed, finally, that there were hard
bargainers on both sides. Both sides knew that the giving of
1. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the 
Finances, Administration and Conditions of Sgypt and the 




unnecessary aoncessions was not good business.
So the arguments went on for some time, chiefly on
the theme of the proportion of debenture capital to share 
1
capital. Finally, the Secretary of State agreed to what was
2virtually the promoters1 original proposal.
The Secretary of Statefs despatch expressing basic 
agreement with the scheme is significant. His agreement to 
the scheme, he said, was not to be construed as in any sense 
an abandonment of the co-operative principle, and should not 
stand in the way of any future organization of Unions 
amongst societies themselves. The sanction of the Secretary 
of State in this particular case was intended, the despatch 
continued, to be a demonstration of the profitable use to 
which loanable capital might be put in a dry area, and thus 
encourage the formation of similar institutions in other 
parts of India without government assistance. The last 
proviso is important. It is surely evidence of the personal 
attitude towards state intervention in economic matters of 
Morley himself, an attitude which the Indian Industrial Com­
mission of 1916-1918 found to be 'deadening'.^ Nevertheless,
1. Sec. of State to Viceroy, Despatch No.85 (Rev.) of 30 Sep­
tember 19105 V. Thackersey and L. Samaldas to U. Sec.
U. of B., R.Do, 17 November 1910.(B.R.0.,Compilation cited.
2. Telegram Sec. of State to Viceroy, 21 March 1911*
(B.R.O., Compilation cited.)
3. Sec. of State to Viceroy, Despatch No.85 (Rev.) of 30 Sept­
ember 1910. (B.R.O., Compilation cited.) The author has 
been permitted to make notes of the substance only of
this Despatch.
4. Indian Industrial Commission Rept., 1918, Vol.I. p.4.
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for some years, the guarantee of interest on the Bombay 
Central Co-operative Bank's debentures remained 'The most 
interesting departure from the general policy of government1 
on the co-operative movement. ^
It was unfortunate that, although negotiations for 
the formation of the Bank were protracted, no great amount 
of thought was given, either by the Government or by the 
promoter Si of the Bank, to the problem of the types of socie­
ties which the Bank would finance* The Nira Canal irrigated
area had been in the minds of both parties from the beginning
2as one possible scene of operations. But concentration of 
the Bank's resources in that area does not seem to have been 
envisaged until towards the end of 1910, when the possibility 
arose of a serious limitation of long-term debenture capital, 
through the unwillingness of the India Office to guarantee 
the interest on the required amount.^ The re after, in spite 
of the Secretary of State's final agreement to the amount of 
debenture capital proposed originally, the promoters appear 
to have been determined to press for rapid developments in 
the Nira Canal area. Sir Vithaldas was 'in a great hurry',
4
commented one of the Bombay Government's Under Secretaries*
1. V* Venkatasubbaiya and Vaikunth L. Mehta, The Co-operative 
Movement, (Servants of India Society Political Pamphlets, 
1918), p.164.
2. See P.J.Mead, Acting D.A. to Ch.Sec., No..A/5356 Confl. of 
2 October 1907, (Poona, ;D.A. 24' ) °, also Clarke, Note,
30 December 1908, (B.R.0.,Compilation cited.)
3. See R.A.L^mbJ7’., Note, 28 November 1910. (B.R.O., Compila­
tion cited.)
4. R.D.Bell, Note,4 October 1911.(B.R.0., Compilation cited.)
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There is evidence to suggest, however, that hy this 
time Government, too, were in a great hurry - to get rid of 
their own somewhat unprofitable Canal finance scheme.
The Nira Canal had been opened in the year 1884. At 
first, the increase in production had been in the garden 
crops which had previously been grown. But an incoming group, 
the Saswad malis, gardeners by caste, rented increasingly 
large areas for the production of sugar-cane and made large 
profits. The original inhabitants, mainly Marathas, did not 
have the experience with irrigated crops of the malis, and 
often made poor attempts at copying the malis1 methods. With 
an annual capital outlay of Rs.500 per acre necessary for a 
good crop of sugar-cane, some credit agency was obviously 
necessary. Money-lenders supplied the capital - on condition 
that they were given marketing rights over the crop. The 
peasant normally had to pay over twenty per cent, for his 
capital.1
In 1907-08 the Assistant Collector in oharge of the 
Nira Canal area, J.P.Brander, had strongly advocated the es­
tablishment of a state-aided Joint Stock Bank, on the model 
of the Egyptian Agricultural Bank, for the provision of 
credit to the sugar-cane growers. Muir-Mackenzie, the 
generous-minded and fairly adventurous Revenue Member of the 
Bombay Government, was interested in the scheme. But before
1. For the early years of the operation of the Nira Canal, see 
Harold H. Mann, 'Economic Conditions in some Deccan Canal 
Areas', in B.C.Q., December 1918, pp.121-126.
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making a decision on the joint stock hank scheme the Govern­
ment sanctioned an experimental scheme for advancing takkavi 
loans to approved sugar-cane growers, a rate of nine per cent, 
heing charged as interest. The scheme was intended to demon­
strate the possibilities of success of an agricultural hank • 
'in the hopes that some hanking agency may he induced to step 
in and compete with the sowkars.
An Indian 'Special Officer', with a small staff, was 
appointed to carry out the scheme. On the whole B.B. Sahasra- 
hudhe, the man appointed, performed his task well. The pro­
cedure for the grant of loans was worked out; inquiry into the 
borrower's security, inspection of his crops during the grow­
ing period, application of pressure on him to bring his 
produce to the government depot for sale so that loans could 
he recovered. However, from the beginning, arrears began to
2appear. By 1911 there were three lakhs of outstanding debts, 
and it was assumed that the takkavi scheme was radically 
faulty, to be consigned to oblivion, together with all schemes 
for agricultural banks.
So, as the Registrar wrote in 1912, co-operative 
societies were formed on the Canal 'at the desire of Govern- 
ment.1 Even in 1920 it was possible for a Registrar to
1. Muir-Mackenzie, quoted B.B. Sahasrabudhe, Interim Report 
for the .First Crop Year 1908-1909 of the Nira Canal Tagai 
Loans Scheme, Poona District, p.!9>
2. R.B. Badve, Report on the working of the Nira Canal 
Societies up to the close of the co-operative year 1913 - 
1914, p»2.
3. Ewbank to D.A. Ho.486 of 10 February 1912, encl. Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No.7651 of 12 August 1912.
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bring Government to remember their special duties in connect­
ion with the Nira Canal ao-operative societies by reminding 
them that the canal societies were 'started by the Bank taking 
over the tagai liabilities of government at their request.
This willingness to hand over the takkavi scheme to 
the Co-operative Department appears to be part of a tendency 
in higher administrative circles in Bombay to regard co­
operation, if not as a panacea for all rural ills, certainly 
as something to fall back on if a real remedy could not 
easily be found.
Two other instances of the attitude to co-operation 
of government officials at this time may be quoted. Keatinge, 
the Director of Agriculture, in a book published in 1912 
entitled Rural Economy in the Bombay Deccant placed an extra­
ordinarily high value on co-operation. In fact the only
other major proposal in this book was an undeveloped suggest-
2
ion about consolidation of uneconomic holdings. In 1913 
George Carmichael, then Chief Secretary, was asked by the 
Government of India for his views on the problem of indebted­
ness and land transfer. He refused to contemplate legisla­
tion which would further restrict the agriculturist's right 
of alienating his land. 'As regards composition of debts', 
he wrote, 'my view is that no useful progress could be made
1. Otto Rothfeld, Regr., to Govt., No.E.S.T. - 124 of 26 July 
1920, encl. Bom. R.D.Order No. 2452 of 18 August 1920.
2. Keatinge, Rural Economy in the Bombay Deccan, pp.196 et 
seq. and p. 164• Admittedly, over the years he did develop 
his suggestion about consolidation; See Keatinge, 
Agricultural Progress in Western India, (1921), pp. 63-76;
135-253:
unless Government or Co-operative Credit Societies with a bank 
behind then are prepared to finance the operation. But 
Carmichael knew that in practice the Government of India 
would not now have anything to do with such natters. Again, 
then, co-operative societies were the only positive remedy 
put forward.
It is against this background that the work of the
2new Registrar, R.B. Ewbank, has to be seen.
1. Carmichael, Note, 7 May 1913, encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 735 
of 23 January 1914.
2. R.B. Ewbank; Asst, Collr., 1907; Regr. Co-op. Socs.,
Bom., 1911-19; Sec., Cttee, on Co-operation in India, 1914; 
Dep. Sec. G. of I., 1920-24; Acting Private Sec. to Lord 
Reading, 1925? Acting Sec. G. of I., 1926-27; Sec. General 
Dept., Bom., 1929-34; retd., 1936; Member, Commission of 




T H E  R E G I S T R A R  A N D  T H E  S O C I E T I E S
(1911 - 1916)
R.B.Ewbank was a young man, and had served only 
four years in India before being appointed Registrar of. Co­
operative Societies in Bombay in 1911. In his previous 
service in Gujarat he had tried, as any ambitious young 
Civilian tried, to make a reputation for himself in a part­
icular field. The field that he had chosen was agriculture, 
and he had to his credit participation in the organization 
of Agricultural associations1 and co-operative societies 
in Surat and the Panch Mahals.
He had not been Registrar very long before it 
began to be evident that he was attempting to aonduct the 
administration of the co-operative movement along lines 
that were somewhat different from those of Campbell. fIn 
previous years', Ewbank wrote in his first administration 
report, 'this^  Department daimed to be judged by an educa­
tional criterion rather than by statistical returns. Eight 
years have elapsed since the movement was first initiated 
and I think that the time has now come when this rather in­
commensurable standard should be abandoned and emphasis 
laid upon results.'“*■ And indeed there were results - of 
the kindi understood by the Secretariat - in. the first years 
of Ewbank's regime. In 1912 Ewbank had to record that 'in
1. Rent., 1912. p.2.
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the number of its societies the Bombay Presidency is now 
ojonsiderably behind all the major Provinces of India.'^  But 
the number of co-operative societies in the Presidency had 
risen from 251 to 368 during 1911-12;^ by 1913 there were 
515 societies,*^  and by 1914 the total was 698.^ Indeed, 
by 1914 the Government of Bombay had begun to fear that 
the movement might 'run away', and it laid down the policy 
that no official pressure should be used to accelerate the 
formation of credit societies.
This rise in the number of societies was partly 
the result of the opening of the Central Bank in Bombay. It 
was, too, partly the result of an increase of public con­
fidence in the co-operative movement - an increase which 
appears to have come about quite suddenly, after seven or 
eight years during which the attitude of the public at 
large could only be described as 'one of some suspense.'^ 
Ewbank took up his position at quite an auspicious moment. 
But the rise in the number of societies was also the result 
of increased efficiency under the new Registrar, coupled 
with a rigid adherence to Campbell's final advice - to con­
centrate on the most hopeful areas. Procedure in the Regis-
7
trar's Office and in the districts became more standardized;
1. Ewbank to D.A. No.2090 of. 8 May 1912, encl. Bom. G.R. 
Finance Dept. No.2931 of 6 September 1912.
2. Rept., 1912« p.20.
3. Rept., l9lj« p*23.
4. Rept., l9l4t P-29.
5. Ibid., p.2.
6. See Rept., 1907. p.11. Cf. Rept.. 1913. p.18.
7. See Ewbank, Note, 19 January 1912, at side of Draft Cir­
cular to Auditors and Special Mamlatdars. (Poona, Miscel­
laneous XVIII, Orders on Audit and Inspection.)
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new model rules were promulgated, especially by means of a 
i two hundred page Manual in English,1 which Ewhank lob-
i
! oriously prepared. To Ewhank, of course, Co-operation was
|
not a mission in life in the sense that it had heen for 
Campbell, though there was a definite streak of idealism 
and religious faith in him too. Co-operation, as far as he 
was concerned, was primarily a Government policy - to be 
vigorously put into action simply because it was a Govern­
ment policy. But Ewbank worked hard along his chosen lines 
- at first usually pragmatic, later more theoretical. And 
he never forgot the human element; he was never, the editor 
of the non-official Bombay Co-operative Quarterly wrote in 
1920, the movement’s ’official dictator.’2
Ewbankfs advent meant an end to the encouragement 
of what Campbell had called ’democratic* societies - societ­
ies for such people as sweepers and poor Satara agricultur­
ists. On the Satara societies of the famine zone, Ewbank 
commented in his first report, with a certain amount of 
irony: 'Mr. Campbell stated last year that the position was 
not without hope but required delicate handling, and this 
is undoubtedly the truth.’J By 1914 Satara was, in 
Ewbank1s opinion, ’the plague spot of the Presidency.'
113 societies had, at one time or another, been registered 
from the district. Already forty six had had to be liqui-
1. A Manual for Co-operative Societies in the Bombay 
Presidency, l9l4.
2. B.C.Q., March 1920, p.243.
3* kept., 1912, p.9.
dated and there were still some fifteen thoroughly "bad1 
societies which would have to be wound up."^  fPor the sub­
merged debtor, the loafer, or the hopelessly illiterate*,
Ewbank pronounced, fno system can create wealth or
2independence,*
With the opening of the Bombay Central Co-operat­
ive Bank the Government of Bombay at first assumed that 
there would no longer be any need for government loans to 
newly organized societies. Campbell had to issue a • 
airaular in October 1911 advising such societies to apply 
to the Bank and not to Government for loans.^ In December,
Government aonfirmed that no further loans would be given
4
to oo-operative societies. The Bank, for its part, 
appeared to be confident that it could meet *all legitimate
5
demands of co-operative management in this Presidency.' ^
But at the very beginning of its career the Bombay 
Central Co-operative Bank ran into difficulties over the 
method of financing societies. The societies were scattered 
all over the Presidency and normally demanded only small 
loans. How could the Bank, with its limited resources, con­
tact all the societies in order to judge what their credit
1. Rept., 1914, p.3*
2. Rept., 1 9 1 p.4.
3. See Motilal Chunilal, Government Loans to Rural Co-op­
erative Credit Societies1, in Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., 
1912, p.14.
4. Bom. G.R. finance Dept. No.4045 of 11 December 1911.
5. Thackersey, *Position of the Bombay Central Co-operative 
Bank, Limited1, in Prov. Co-op. Conf, Procs..1912, p.27-
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was worth and hence what amounts it could lend to them?
There was at first no one to do this work in Gujarat. When 
the Bank finally did appoint an 'Inspector1 for Gujarat it 
was found that by the time his salary and travelling ex­
penses had been paid the Bank's profit was only about one 
and a quarter per cent; it had to pay four per cent.
interest to its debenture holders and over one per cent.
1
sinking fund charges.
The Bank's Directors claimed that when their 
articles of association were being drawn up they had come to 
'some understanding1 with Government, to the effect that
while the Bank was establishing itself Government officers
2
would help in the valuation work. Ewbank was possibly not 
completely sure about the truth of these claims. Yet the 
Bank was determined to press them. The Directors found that 
the clause in the agreement between the Bank and the Secre­
tary of State which specified that no loan could be granted 
without the sanction or recommendation of the Registrar, in 
practice could be made to work very much in their favour..
The Directors of the Bank, Ewbank informed Government in 
February 1912, 'have stated that in all ordinary cases they 
will sanction loans of the amount recommended by me and at 
the rate of interest and for the period approved by me. As I
1. V.L.Mehta, Manager, B.C.C.B., to Ewbank, No.L~3 - 1318 of 
26 March 1914, encl. Bom.G.R.R.D. No.6606 of 1 July 1914.
2. See Ewbank to D.A. No.486 of 10 February 1912, encl.Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No. 7651 of 12 August 1912.
3. Ibid,
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am responsible for assuring myself that loans are safe 
before sanctioning them, they expect me to hold an enquiry 
on the point through my own agency and are prepared to 
accept my conclusions.
W.W. Smart, the Acting Director of Agriculture at 
this time, was outspoken in his denunciation of this arrange­
ment * The Central Bank, mainly in order to gain the con­
fidence of the money market, had declared a dividend of six 
per cent, about four months after its flotation. Smart 
asserted that this was evidence that the Bank was reaping 
the profits while Government bore all the expenses. He 
would surely have added, if he had seen the correspondence 
on the matter, that here was evidence of what many, from the 
India Office downwards, had prophesied at the time of the 
Bank's flotation. The Directors of the Bank, he said, were 
clearly interpreting the Agreement in a way which appeared
'to require from the Registrar the business ability which
2they themselves should supply.1
Yet it was business ability which the new Registrar 
undoubtedly possessed, and in good measure. Given the staff, 
he informed Government boldly in February 1912, his office 
could 'do all the enquiry and valuation work involved in 
granting loans, and is. ready, if the policy is approved, to 
continue to undertake this work permanently.
1. Ibid.
2. Smart to Govt. No.A.-3736 of 27 May 1912 encl. Bom.
G.R. aited.
3. Ewbank to D.A. No.486 of 10 February 1912 encl. Bom.
G.R. cited.
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Ewbank had, in fact, begun to use for such work
three fSpecial Mamlatdars1 who had been appointed to serve
under the Registrar in the closing days of Campbell's 
✓ 1
regime. They were intended to have the experience, status
2
and authority of Revenue Mamlatdars. Ewbank now wanted to 
retain them for some years.
The assertion of the Directors that they had an 
understanding with Government over assistance in the early 
stages may well have been true. Certainly the Government of 
Bombay readily agreed to sanction the continuation of the 
appointments of the Special Mamlatdars until July 1914. What 
told most was probably Ewbank fs argument that it was 'only 
equitable1 that enquiries into the assets of the Nira Canal 
group of societies, formed at the behest of Government, 
should be made by an official agency. No doubt, too, Govern­
ment were inclined to agree that the case of many single new 
societies was somewhat analogous. Finally, there was little 
doubt in these early days that in practice the representa­
tives of the Central Bank, dealing as they were with such 
matters as the size of holdings and their encumbrances, 
needed to have 'a quasi official position1 so that their 
enquiries would not be hampered by 'the recalcitrance of
village officers'. This last factor weighed heavily in the
3Bank's considerations,
1. Bom. G.R. Finance Dept. No.2292 of 15 July 1911.
2. Campbell to Govt. No.C - 487 of 3 July 1911, encl. Bom, 
G.R, cited.
3. For this paragraph, see Ewbank to D.A. No.486 of 10 
February 1912, encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.7651 of 12 August 
1912.
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The position of the Special Mamlatdars, especially 
that of R.B.Badve on the Nira Canal was characteristic of 
the relationships - close, yet at times charged with mis­
understanding - which rapidly grew up between the Government 
and the Central Bank. Ewbank was at this time adamant that 
no government employees should be responsible for visiting 
a village actually to make recovery of loans from the Bank 
which had not been repaid. The extent that the Bank's em­
ployees could go in intervening in the affairs of societies 
was not defined. The seeds of future disagreements were 
here. But even in 1912 Ewbank was aware of the dangers of 
Government's giving the Bank the assistance of Special Mam­
latdars in areas where it appeared to be in competition with 
other urban co-operative agencies. He instanced the case of 
Dharwar District. The Southern Mahratta Urban Society had 
to some extent been financing the rural societies of the 
district. 'Now1, wrote Ewbank, 'the Bombay Central Bank has 
entered the arena with its infinitely longer purse and with 
an official estimate of the value of the assets of each un­
limited society to go upon.^
It might be asked, of course, why difficulties such 
as those caused by the scattered nature of the societies, 
the lack of prestige of non-offiolal ass opposed to official 
executive officers, and by competition between co-operative 
financing agencies, had not been foreseen earlier. The 




Ewbank’s task in guiding the Central Bank so that 
it would find its proper role in the co-operative movement 
was thus not an easy one.
In the first season of the Bankfs operations it 
advanced loans amounting to over nine and a half lakhs to 
twenty nine societies in the Nira Canal area and only 
Rs. 1,82,187 to seventy other societies,1 Ewhank was ob­
viously not completely happy with this unbalance in favour 
of the Canal societies, though he defended the position at 
the 1912 Registrars1 Conference. The Bank’s ’primary 
object1, he told the Conference, was ’to finance rural
societies in irrigated tracts where crops are valuable and 
2
certain. ’ Edward Maclagan, the Secretary to the Govern­
ment of India in the Revenue and Agriculture Department, 
commented somewhat tartly that the Bank’s activities did not 
seem to have had the effect of ’unduly increasing* the 
number of ’ordinary rural societies.
In the following year Ewbank was able to report
that the Bank had ’stretched many points to meet the con-
a
venience of its client societies’. Over and above the 
amount distributed to the Nira Canal societies it had in
1. Thackersey, ’Position of the Bombay Central Co-operative 
Bank, Limited’, in Prov. Co-op, Conf. Procs., 1912,
. pp. 25-26.
2. Regrs.’ Conf. Procs., 1912, p.8.
3. Procs. cited, p.25.
4. Rept., 1913# pp.5-6.
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that year given loans amounting to over a lakh both in
Gujarat and in the Deccan, and half a lakh in both the
Konkan and the Southern Maratha country.1 But in spite of
this healthier distribution of the Bankfs funds, largely
brought about by the use of the Special Mamlatdars, there
was still a great deal of criticism of the Bank's activities.
Much of this centred on the Nira Canal scheme. At the 1913
Registrars' Conference, Maclagan asked, for an explanation as
to why the Nira Canal Societies 'could not be called co- 
2
operative.' Henry Wolff was critical of the 'capitalist
arrangements' on the Canal, too.1
The main difficulty on the Canal, as Ewbank himself
admitted, was that there, to a large extent, 'co-operative
machinery was being used to fulfil the functions of a land 
a
bank'. In June 1911? &o a report of 1914 ran, the culti­
vators on the Nira Canal had been Informed' that the govern­
ment takkavi scheme of finance would be brought to a close 
by the end of November 1911. They were 'advised' to form 
co-operative societies, which were in fact 'organized*
5
amongst them during the monsoon. The Bombay Central Co­
operative Bank guaranteed to lend .money to them at seven 
and a half per cent. ; the government rate had been nine per
1. Ibid., p.4.
2. Regrs.' Conf. Procs., 1913» p.3.
3. See Rept., 1912, p.$.
4. Regrs.' Conf. Procs., 1913. p.3.
5. Badve, Report on the working of the Nira Canal societies,
p. 2.
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cent. From the beginning it was evident that the ryots had
little idea of the meaning of the change from a government
to a co-operative scheme. But in fact they were given
little chance to appreciate the differences; as a matter of
policy it was decided 'to follow as closely as possible the
main lines of the Takavi scheme.'1 Sahasrabudhe, the
'Special Officer' in charge of the government scheme, 'after
retiring from government service', became the first agent of
the Bank on the Canal. It was doubtful whether many realized
the difference in his function. The societies were started
with no members' deposits; instead, no doubt to the great
relief of Government, the Bank took over the collection of
the debts of all the takkavi borrowers and immediately paid
a sum representing the outstanding debts into the local
2government treasury.
One of the most important aspects of the government 
scheme had been that the cultivators who were financed had 
to bring all their produce to the government shop for sale, 
so that repayment of loans could be enforced. This was, of 
course, merely to imitate the normal methods of the money­
lender-cum-shop keeper. A similar practice became a feature 
of the Bank's scheme; indeed, all that happened was that the 
government shop became the Bank's shop. But the four 'Circle 
Inspectors' who had previously been employed were now
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Sahasrabudhe, Interim Report...p.1.
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dispensed with* These men had visited the borrowers several 
times during the growing period to encourage good practice 
and to report on the general state of the crop. The twenty 
nine new co-operative societies employed five 'secretaries1 
between them^ but it was no part of their duties to inspect 
the crop 5 this was left formally to the committees of the 
societies. Yet there was little encouragement for the 
committees to perform this duty; as one of the more intelli­
gent auditors remarked, 'patronage remained in other hands,
2garbed under the name "veiled control".1
The term 'veiled control' was used to describe the 
work of Badve, the Special Mamlatdar for the Nira Canal area 
All applications for loans from the Bank's branch on the 
Canal had to pass through his hands and receive his approval 
He had 'a practical power of veto in granting loans to 
members.'-' He controlled the staff of secretaries; in 
effect he controlled the societies. Badve was efficient and 
hard working. But he found it difficult to forget Revenue 
Department ways.
Sometimes they were the only ways that worked, as 
Ewbank himself knew. At the end of the season in 1913 the 
despatch of the produce of the canal societies was being de­
layed by a shortage of railway wagons. Ewbank drafted a
1. Badve, op.cit., p.5.
2. K.S. G-ore, Remarks on submitted audit memo on the Nira 
Canal societies for 1914. (Poona, Nira Canal and Central 
Bank. Hereafter the title of this file is abbreviated in 
footnotes to ^ N.C.& C.B. ')
3. Badve, op.cit., p.2.
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telegram to the railway*s head office which read, at first,
* Government Jaggery Store stiff ering serious loss owing to
shortage of wagons at Diksal. 1 It was perhaps only an
afterthought which led him to change the wording in the
final draft to 1 Government Co-operative Jaggery Store. . .*
- still a somewhat inoongruous combination according to oo-
1
operative theory.
There was a further cause of apathy in the Canal 
societies, though it was never specifically stated. This 
was the patriarchal rule of the Raje of Malegaon, and other 
•men of- rank*, in the area - men who were putting their 
inherited wealth and status to use in the new irrigated 
economy.
2Malegaon was an inam village; its Raje came from
an old; Maratha family, and his influence extended- throughout
•3
Bhimthadi taluka and 'beyond.-' In the original government 
scheme the Sardar had ‘consented* to *his* ryots taking 
takkavi and had stood security for them all. His Karbhari 
had opened the shop for the disposal of the jaggery and had
1. See Draft Telegram to G.I.P.Railway, Bom., 18 March 1913. 
(Poona, N.C. & C.B.)
2. See Map in Bhimthadi Taluka, Second Revision Settlement 
Report. (S.fe., G.of B., H.S. Ifo.520.;
3. The Raje of Malegaon was a *Pirst Class Sardar1, one of 
the seven in the Deccan given powers of civil jurisdic­
tion in their inam areas. See list in Bombay Government 
Gazette, pt.iii, 3 March 1910. For the influence in 
Maharashtra of *the top 96 families*, who can trace their 
prestige and their land holdings back to the time of 
Shivaji, see Maureen L. Patterson, ‘Caste and Political 
Leadership in Maharashtra: A Review and Current Appraisal*, 
in The Economic Weekly, 25 September 1954, pp.1065-1067.
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'lent the services of his relation Mr. Uplekar* to look
after it.^ Perhaps partly for his pains over the takkavi
scheme, the Raje was nominated a member of the legislative
Council in 1910. When the co-operative scheme began^he
Raje expected to have the same position under it as he had
had previously. Ewbank was to a large extent prepared to
fall in with the precedents which had been set. 'I should
be extremely loth to settle matters in a way that does not
command your approval 5 and am therefore bringing my camp to
0
Baramati on November 8th1, Ewbank wrote to the Raje. The 
impression had to be given that Ewbank was going to see the 
Raje: in Indian society a great deal depended on the simple 
question of whether a person was asked to see a government 
officer or whether the government officer came to visit him. 
The Raje was undoubtedly anxious to do the best he could for 
'his' ryots, by obtaining funds for them. But the form in 
which those funds came - takkavi or co-operative loans - did 
not concern him. He was totally indifferent to ao-operation 
as: such.
Another 'man of rank1 was potentially far more 
dangerous than the Raje. This particular person said that 
he would deposit large sums provided he could have members 
of his choice in 'his' societies. He had already lost his 
title of 'Rao Bahadur1 because of a criminal action. Badve
1. Sahasrabudhe, op. cit., p.31*
2. Ewbank to Raje of Malegaon, No.4976 of November 1912, 
(Poona, file cited.)
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alaimed that this man would *levy a blackmail. He would
insist on the members* gul being brought to him.'*3" Ewbank
laid down that this particular man should not be allowed; to
2deposit in *hisf societies*
But the necessity for more general rules about de­
posits from *the interested public* grew after the banking 
crisis of 1913-1914. The societies cajne to be looked upon 
as safe places for investment. Many societies obtained
large deposits from *pleaders, doctors and other pandharpe- 
•2
shas* the committees, Badve claimed, were advancing these 
large sums * without my knowledge.'^ In the tradition of the 
area these people demanded a large say in the rule of the 
societies.
The societies were not really ready for independence
- yet if they were not given any freedom of action at all
they would not have the chance to develop the very qualities
of responsibility which were required. Here was a familiar
enough problem. As in the sphere of local self-government
it was tempting in such a situation to emphasize the first
consideration and ignore the second. Ewbank eventually
decided, however, to risk giving the societies a greater
1. Badve to Ewbank Ho.56 of 4 May 1914. (Poona, file cited.)
2* Ewbank to Badve Ho. 3263 of 7 May 1914. (Poona, file 
cited.)
3* Badve, Report ora the working of the Hira Canal Societies, 
p.4. The word‘pandiiarpesha’now had a wider connotation 
than that implied by its original meaning of *founder* 
of. a village.
4# Badve to Ewbank, Ho.56 of 4 May 1914. (Poona, file cited.)
5. See Rept., 1912, pp.3-4.
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interest in the business conducted by the Special Mamlatdar 
and the Bank. In 1913 he made tentative approaches to 
Devadhar for assistance in the formation of a 1 Uni on1, for 
the whole of the Poona District, which might help with the 
inspection and perhaps the finance of the canal societies. 
The scheme fell through.^ Nevertheless the idea continued 
to appeal, and remained under discussion between the Reg­
istrar and the Bank. In 1915 the Bank accepted a proposal
for an 'Advisory Committee1, appointed by the Registrar from
2the members, as 'an experimental measure'.
It was somewhat disconcerting to find that at its 
first meeting the carefully selected 'Nira Valley Co-opera­
tive Board1 passed resolutions in favour of recovery of 
debts 'by instalments', and the postponement of arbitration 
on outstanding claims. !If this is a specimen of the work 
of the Supervising Boardr, commented E.L.Moysey, who was 
acting as Registrar at the time, 'it is not likely to be 
very useful'.^
Raiffeisen probably would not have approved of the 
structure of the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank. There 
was only one co-operative society amongst its 911 original
1. Badve to Haigh, Acting Regr., No.261 of 31 October 1914. 
(Poona, file cited.)
2. V.L.Mehta to Regr. No. R5/203 o f  1915. /Exact Date
not given. J (Poona, file cited.)
3. Chairman, Nira Valley Co-op. Board, to Regr,, 22 November 
1915 (translated by Badve), and Moysey's comments.
(Poona, file cited.)
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shareholders, and because the share capital was fully sub­
scribed before the final date for consideration of applica­
tions, societies at first could not become shareholders 
except by buying operations on the open market,1 One
*
Director, at least, did not want to ‘complicate matters, by
2having societies as shareholders. But at least the Direct­
ors took care to distribute the shares fairly widely; the 
assertion that if they had wished fthe whole capital aould 
have been subscribed by the Directors'*^  is probably true.
And, as Ewbank wrote in 1913, the Directors' 'primary object, 
which they may claim to have attained, was to place money
A
within the reach of the ryot.' This was the fundamental 
fact about the Bank. The capital of Bombay was at last 
reaching the mofussil. Bombay was at last giving something 
back to the hinterland which, to some extent at least, it 
drained of capital. During the period from March 1911 to 
March 1912 the working capital of the rural societies of 
the Presidency increased from Rs.4,88,552 to Rs.14,47,118.
1. Bank*Si evidence, Bom.Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., 
1930, VolIV, p. 431? Rept., 1912, p.3 5 V.L.Mehta to 
G.P.S. Collins, Regr., D/0 Ro7l388 of 25 January 1927. 
(Poona, file cited.)
2. Evidence of Dr. Stanley Reed, Cttee. on Co-operation in 
India, 1914-15. (This committee is hereafter referred 
to in footnotes as the 'Maclagan Cttee.', after its 
President, E.D, (later Sir Edward) Maclagan. The Minutes 
of Evidence were in the G-. of I. Archives at Simla, but 
it would appear that some of the records there were not 
transferred to New Delhi when the change of capitals was 
made, and henceforward were looked after by the Govt, of 
the Punjab. The minutes of Evidence are now in the Punjab 
Records Office, Patiala.)
3. Reed, loc.cit.
4. Rept., 1913t p.4.
The Bankfs working capital at the end of this period, after
five months of working, was Rs.6,23,215; virtually all
of this had gone to rural societies and so was responsible
for a great deal of the increase in the societies1 working
capital. In 1913 the working capital of the rural societies
including funds obtained from the Bank, was Rs.22,41,896,
the working capital of the Bank Rs.ll,84,452; in 1914 the
figures were Rs.28,03,849 and Rs.15,04,435. About half of.
the working capital of the rural societies at this time,
then, came from the Bank in Bombay.**" The proportions were
to remain fairly constant, though actual capital was to
increase considerably.
■If our Directors cannot get money nobody can1, one 
2
of them claimed. The Directors were certainly men of stand 
ing in Bombay. Gokhale was included in the original list of 
Directors, though he never took any part in the Bank*s work. 
But an active Director, Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy, was on the 
Viceroy^ Legislative Council, as, of course, was Vithaldas 
Thackersey. Sir Shapurji Broacha had charge of the invest- 
ments of the Maharajah of Baroda, and in fact supplied 
most of the fixed deposits in the early days.^ Chunilal 
Mehta, a family friend of Lalubhai Samaldas, was the son of
1. For statistics see Rept., 1912, pp.17 & 20; Rept., 1913 
pp.21 & 23; Rept., 1914, pp.27 & 29.
2. Reed, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee.
3. Information from Sir Stanley Reed,
4. Reed, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee.
5. Ratarajan, Lalubhai Samaldas, p.24.
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Vibhukhandas Atmaram, a ‘merchant prince1* The person who
provided most of the inspiration on the Board, once
Vithaldas had ceased to take a very active interest in the
Bank, was lalubhai Samaldas. The Board was not, of course,
typical of the Bombay business community; it represented
extraordinarily well, however, the small but distinguished
group of Bombay ‘liberals1.’1’
The everyday management of the Bank was left in the
hands of Vaikunth Mehta, except for a period when Vaikunth
was away, in 1914-15, during which, significantly, K. Natara-
jan, perhaps the arch-liberal of the time, and the editor
of The Indian Social Reformer, acted as Manager. Vaikunth
Mehta had only recently graduated from Elphinstone College
when he took up his post in 1912. As the son of Lalubhai
Samaldas he worked as Manager for a number of years simply
2for ‘pocket money from father*. Indeed, the Bank in the 
first few months, before it took up premises in the Port 
area, operated from Lalubhai *s home at Andheri. Vaikunth 
Mehta had his father*s vision, ability, and honesty, and he 
had also a quiet and gentle modesty of his own. Ewbank and 
Vaikunth Mehta often toured the societies together. A close
1. It is perhaps significant that when Gandhi began his agi­
tation in 1916 against indentured emigration to South 
Africa, two of the four men who helped him first in 
Bombay, Reed and Lalubhai Samaldas, were Directors of the 
Bank, and a third, K. Natarajan, was for a time Acting 
Manager. See The Story of my Experiments with Truth. p.295*>
2. The phrase was used by Sir Stanley keTd in an interview 
with the author.
3. See V.L.Mehta to Ewbank, 21 November 1912. (Poona,
Original Circulars, I.)
relationship between the Indian and the Englishman grew 
up. Ewbank was the first European Mehta came to know we 11, ^ 
and he apparently made quite an impression on the young 
Indian; it is probably significant that Ewbank, also a 
young man, was soon beginning his informal letters !My dear
p
Vaikunth1, instead of fMy dear Mr. Mehta1.
All the capital which the Bank could provide at
3
this stage was eagerly borrowed by societies in the mofussil. 
Nevertheless there were complaints from some of the societies 
about the rate of interest charged by the Bank. These came 
on the whole from the prosperous areas of; Gujarat and
A
Dharwar. The Bank was bound by its agreement with the 
Secretary of State not to lend at more than eight per cent.
c.
At this time it normally lent at seven per cent. This was 
not exorbitant: the Bank rate in Bombay in 1914 was around
7
six per cent. The linking of the mofussil with the Bombay 
money-market was obviously fruitful in areas where the 
normal lending rate was well beyond this figure. Yet it 
would appear that in the better areas of Gujarat between six
1. Information from Shri Mehta.
2. Vaikunth Mehta was still Managing Director of the Bombay 
Provincial Co-operative Bank, (as the Central Bank be­
came), when he was called upon to become Finance Minr- 
ister in the 1946 Congress Government of Bombay. His 
early experiences no doubt contributed to the moderation, 
yet complete honesty, of his political attitudes.
3. Reed, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee.
4. Rept., 1912, p.l.
5. See Swbank, A Manual for Co-operative Societies in the 
Bombay Presidency, (I9l4 e dn.j, p.124
6. Reed and Thackersey, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee.
7. Reed, loc. cit.
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and seven and a half per cent, was the rate at which most 
agriculturists of good standing could "borrow. In these 
areas the Central Bank's loans were of little use 5 a 
Society had to have some margin to work on.
'The Central Bank1, Khandubhai Desai of Surat com­
plained, 'has very few expenses and takes nearly a,11 the 
2profits. 1 Such charges appear to have been taken up by 
certain government officials, normally slightly suspicious 
of 'Bombay business interests1, when the time came in 1914 
for a reconsideration of the position of the Special Mam- 
latdars. Stanley Reed made a strong representation 
against weight being given to these charges. Reed was the 
influential editor of The Times of India; he was not a 
supporter of radical Indian aspirations, but the members of 
the Board of the Bank had made an astute move when they had 
asked him to join them as the sole European director. He 
fought well on their behalf. None of the directors, Reed 
told G.S.Curtis, who was acting as Chief Secretary, received 
any financial reward for his services. The Manager, Vaikunth 
Mehta, had taken no pay whatsoever for his work5 'the 
services we have obtained from him1, Reed averred;, 'would be
1. Khandubhai Desai, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee, Cf.M.H. 
^MahadevJ  Desai, 'Co-operation in Gujerat', in B.C.Q., 
June 1917, p.27#
2. Khandubhai Desai, loc.cit.
3. See Reed to Curtis, D/0 of 20 April 1914^ (B.R.O., R.D. 
Vol.428 of 1914,)
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cheap to us and to Government at the salary of several 
hundreds of rupees per mensem. 1 The result of such savings 
had heen that there was now standing to the credit of the 
Bank 'a substantial sum which looks like a profit.1 But 
under the Agreement with Government half of this sum had to 
he returned to co-operative societies at the end of three 
years. The other half was being used to build up the reserve 
fund of the Bank.^
There was undoubtedly a good measure of philanth­
ropy in the Bombay Central Bank’s work. But the Bank’s 
profits were considerable enough to enable it in 1914 to
agree - though reluctantly - to pay half the salaries and
2expenses of the Special Mamlatdars.
Ewbank had at one time thought it might be possible 
to dispense with the Special Mamlatdars when their three year 
terms of appointment expired in 1914. Their existence ob- . 
viously rankled in the minds of some. But Ewbank had begun 
to wonder whether it would ever be wise to ask the Bank to 
make all its enquiries in the districts itself, ’There is a 
gulf fixed between the financiers and city men who manage 
the central Bank and the humble village panchayat, which can 
only be bridged by the creation of some intermediary institu-
1. Ibid,
2. Mehta to Ewbank No.L-3-13l8 of 26 March 1914; Ewbank to 
Mehta, No.2372 of 2 April 1914; Mehta to Ewbank No.L-4- 
228 of 28 April 1914, - all encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No,6066 
of 1 July 1914.
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tion in toudh with both extremes.1
For want of some better alternative, Ewbank proposed
to use as a bridge an institution which was already coming
into existence. This was the 'district banking union1.
Several of the larger urban co-operatives had for some years
been financing rural societies in the surrounding areas.
During 1913 Ewbank had induced the urban banks at Surat,
Barsi and Dharwar to modify their constitutions so that they
approximated to those of the Pabna central banking unions of 
2Bengal. By 1914 the Surat Urban Co-operative Bank, for 
instance, had been reconstituted as the 'Surat District 
Banking Union'. There were 'about forty* rural societies 
which had become *affiliated' to it by buying shares. The 
societies had four representatives out of fifteen on the 
Union's managing committee; they were inclined to object to 
the Union's exercising its power to control their borrowing 
from sources other than the Union and to inspect their books. 
The Union employed an 'Inspector* who was supposed to check 
the societies, but he was untrained, and the brunt of this 
work appears to have been borne by Khandubhai Desai.The 
'district banking unions', apart, perhaps, from Sane's Barsi 
taluka union, usually remained urban banks at heart: if money 
aould be lent in the towns why bother to go out into the
1. Rept., 1914, p«6.
2. For the various types of 'unions' in Bengal, see
3. andubhai Desai, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee
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rural areas? Such unions would obviously be somewhat
unsatisfactory as intermediaries between the Central Bank in
Bombay and the village societies.
But Ewbank appears to have thought for a time that
they should be given a trial. He wanted the unions to give
loans, take bonds and make recoveries on behalf of the
Central Bank, earning a commission from the Bank for this
work. But the Central Bank was not enthusiastic about
unions; it held that their guarantee, made on the basis of
the work of their ill-paid and ill-trained inspectorate, was
not worth having.*** Eventually it agreed to lend through
unions: 'The transition has been proposed by Government and
we simply have to concur, ' Reed claimed, somewhat exagger- 
2
atedly. But the conditions which the Bank laid down were 
so strict,^ and the half per cent, margin that it was
4
willing to allow the unions as commission was so small,
5that not a single union decided to act as the Bank's agent. 
Ewbank was still casting about for some effective intermed­
iary financing institution when he joined the Maclagan 
Committee in 1914.
With the Bank Rate at around six per cent, the 
Bank's debentures, carrying only four per cent, interest,
1. Ewbank to D.A., No.3311 of 8 May 1914 encl. Bom.G.R.R.D. 
No.6066 of 1 July 1914.
2. Reed, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee.
3. Mehta to Ewbank No. 1-4-228 of 28 April 1914, encl.
Bom. G.R.cited.
4. See Khandubhai Desai, Evidence, Maclagan Ctteec
5. Maclagan Cttee. Rept., p.140.
did not attract ordinary investors. So the only sources 
from which the Bank could raise its debenture capital,
(which was intended to be three times its share capital), 
were the big trust funds and charitable endowments.^
Shortly after the Bank had been opened Vithaldas Thackersey 
asked the Government of Bombay to have the debentures of 
the Central Bank declared 'eligible for the investment of 
money held in trust or as charitable endowments. 1 He based 
his request on the fact that the Trusts Act of 1882 and the 
Charitable Endowments Act of 1890 made the 'debentures of 
Railway or other Companies the interest whereon has been
2guaranteed by the Secretary of State' eligible in this way. 
Though the Bank was not registered under the Companies Act, 
the High Court was empowered by the Trusts Act to prescribe 
Qs securities investments other than those specifically 
mentioned in the Act. But this the Bombay High Court re­
fused to do, saying that the prinoipal and the interest on 
the debentures were insufficiently secured.^ The High Court 
judges refused at this time to give any further reasons for 
their decision, but the Government Solicitor surmised that 
the High Court had rejected the Bank's application because, 
according to the Agreement with the Secretary of State, 
Government was committed only to the guarantee of repayment
1. V. Thackersey to Ch.Sec., No.G.-3-723 of 6 March 1914, 
encl. Bom.R.D. Order No.6270 of 8 June 1915*
2. Thackersey to Govt., 16 November 1911, encl. Bom.G.R.R.D. 
No.230 of 9 January 1912.
3. Prothonotary, High Court, to Solicitor, G. of B.,No.367
of 1 July 1913 and No.495 of 11 September 1913, encl. Bom. 
G.R.R.D, No.635 of 21 January 1914.
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of interest on the debentures for forty-one years, and not
to the repayment of the principal.^ it appears that the
Bank's solicitors had not noticed the import of this clause
at the time when the Agreement was finally endorsed, though
they sometimes tried to shift the blame for their oversight
2
to Government. It was discovered that the Bank's debentures 
were fnot what everybody thought they were, trustee securi­
ties. The Government of India for some years refused to 
legislate so as to nullify the effects of the Bombay High 
Court's decision, though the Government of Bombay pleaded 
with them to do so. It was 'scarcely possible to conceive 
of any company over which Government exercises a more aom- 
plete control than his Bank,1 the Bombay Government claimed, 
'and the freedom allowed to it appears infinitely less than 
the discretion permitted to the Boards of guaranteed 
Railway C ompanie s.'^
The Bank had great difficulty in getting its deben­
tures taken up after the High Court's decision. This diffi­
culty had repercussions on the whole pattern of the Bank's 
lending.
1. Solicitor, G. of B., to Govt., No.1005 of 18 July 1913, 
encl. Bom. G.R. cited.
2. See F. Currimbhoy to G. of B., No.S.6-6 of 19 August 1916, 
encl. Bom. R.D. Order No.2242 of 23 February 1917 5 also 
^Fragments ofJTThackersey to Ewbank 1916_7*. (Poona, 
N.C. & C.B.)
3. Currimbhoy, letter cited.
4. P.R.Cadell. Gh.Sec..G.of B., to G. of I.. No.9693 R.D. of 
9 October 1916, encl. Bom.R.D, Order No.5242 of 23 
February 1917.
5* See below, Chapter VI.
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Though the Government of Bombay was willing to 
give its support to the Bank in its struggle to have its 
debentures recognised as trustee securities an element of 
suspicion of its activities remained in that Government.
This suspicion was greatly increased by the failures of 
Indian banks in December 1913 and early 1914. Vithaldas 
Thackersey lost heavily in the failure of the Specie Bank - 
and the responsibility in the matter which he felt so keenly 
was actually his, to some extent.^ So the Government of 
Bombay fs action earlier in 1913 in refusing to allow the 
Bombay Central Co-operative Bank to invest its funds in the
Specie Bank - in spite of the Directors1 protests of the
2soundness of the Specie Bank's finances - was justified by 
events.
The Central Co-operative Bank itself weathered the 
storm remarkably well, however. Its shares fell from 23 to 
14t and some short term deposits were withdrawn. 'But it 
was never forced to stop or curtail its lending business or 
to raise its rates. Any deposits that were withdrawn were 
at once replaced by one of the Directors. At no time was it 
in the slightest danger'. Its position, Ewbank claimed when 
he wrote his Annual Report in 1914, was 'now as strong as 
ever.
Nevertheless, when, as a direct result of the
1. See Kaji, Vithaldas Thackersey, p.137.
2. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 10309 of 13 November 1913 and enclosures.
3. Rept., 1914> p.4.
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Bombay banking crisis, A.E.English., the Registrar in Burma,
suggested a full scale Government of India inquiry into the
workings of the co-operative movement,^ " Lamb, the Revenue
Member of the Bombay Government, welcomed the proposal. He
hoped that the inquiry would concentrate on the stages 'above
2that of the individual society. ' A few months later, what 
became known as the 'Maclagan Committee' was born.
The desire to give the non-official element as 
large a role as possible in the movement is a thread which 
runs consistently through Ewbank's administration. Ultimate­
ly willingness to trust the non-official element at this time 
in Bombay stemmed to some extent from Lord Willingdon, the 
Governor from 1913 to 1918.^
Of course, new honorary organizers were usually 
chosen from those who had already earned the trust of Gov­
ernment. They might be presidents of municipalities like
A R
R. G. Naik in Belgaum and S.K. Rodda in Dharwar. They
1. L.J.K./Kershaw?7., Rote, 6 July 1914. (N.A.I., G. of I., 
R. & A. Dept. (X.Rev.), Loose A.Procs., November 1914, 
Pile 312 of 1914.)
2. Lamb, Note, 23 August 1914, below R.D. Unofficial Refer­
ence No.7691 of 18 August 1914. (B.R.O., R.D. Vol.428
of 1914.)
3. Information from Sir Robert Ewbank; cf.Gandhi, The Story 
of my Experiments with Truth, pp.276, 279.
Lord Willingdons M.P., 1906-12; Govr, Bom., 1913-18;
Govr. Madras, 1919-24; Governor-General, Canada, 1924-3D? 
Viceroy of India, 1931-36.
4. See Ewbank to D.A., No.2123 of 9 May 1912, encl. Bom.
G.R.R.D. No. 5207 of 1 June 1912.
5. See Ewbank to D.A., No.5180 of 18 November 1912, encl. 
Bom. G.R.R.D. No.11673 of 23 December 1912.
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might come from the traditional leaders of society?
Krishnarao Dhulap, the honorary organizer for the Ratnagiri
District, for instance, was an inamdar and was reported hy
Ewbank to be fan influential man of an old Maratha family. f"^
S.D.Garud, as well as being a pleader in Dhulia, West
2Khandesh, was a jaghirdar. He was for a time an elected 
member of the Legislative Council; but he tended on the 
whole to go along with Government. The taluka town pleaders 
possessed a great deal of influence amongst a litigious 
peasantry. Hence the importance of a man like M.R. Tarkunde, 
a pleader of Saswad, as an organizer of societies amongst 
the malis of that area.
Brahmans tended to predominate amongst the honorary 
organizers of the pre-war years. It is significant, however, 
that even at that time the possession of wealth, as well as 
high traditional social status, was emphasized when honorary 
organizers were being chosen, particularly in commercially- 
minded Gujarat. fMr. Ambashankar Uttamram Malji is a wealthy 
and influential gentleman of Broach and should be classed as 
proposed by the Registrar1, wrote an officer in the Bombay 
Secretariat when Malji was appointed to take the place of 
Motilal Chunilal, who retired from co-operative work in ' 
1913.^ Malji was a Brahman whose family had taken to
1. Ewbank to D.A. N0.483I of 23 October 1912, encl. Bom.
G.R.R.D. No.11241 of 9 December 1912.
2. See Ewbank to D.A. No.1719 of 29 March 1913, encl. Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No.3908 of 25 April 1913.
3. Note, attached Bom.G.R.R.D. No.905 of 30 January 1914, 
(Original). (B.R.0.,R.D. Vol.428 of 1914.)
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aoinmercial pursuits; lie was both a pleader and a millowner, 
Ewbank recommended that Malji should be placed 'in the first 
class'. ^
This division of the honorary organizers into first,
second and third classes came into operation most obviously
in. respect of the grant of travelling allowances for the
honorary organizers' tours* An honorary organizer received
a grant for the class of train travel which corresponded to
his 'class' as an organizer. Organizers were classified
'according to their social standing ancL on a scale slightly
2above their estimated private income'. In a status­
conscious society some sort of gradation was probably nec­
essary, but there were some incongruities. Raghunath Garud, 
'a young man who has not yet taken any part in public, life',^ 
was put into the first class immediately on joining the 
movement, mainly because of the reputation of his- family 
as Khandesh jaghirdars. On the other hand, Ewbank had to 
obtain the special permission of Government before he could 
place S.K. Rodda in the first class. Rodda, in 1912, was. 
the President of a Municipality and a man of 'far-reaching 
local influence', and he was also an elected member of the 
Legislative Council. But he had been on the salary of an 
'officer of. the second class' when he had retired from
1. Ewbank to D.A. No.6549 of: 15 December 1913, encl. Bom.
G.R. cited.
2. Bom. G.R.R.D. No.2705 of 19 March 1918.
3. Ewbank to D.A. No. 10566 of 23 October 1916, encl. Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No. 12760 of. 27 December 1916.
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government service in 1908. Such distinctions produced,
it was later admitted, *a certain amount of jealousy and 
2friction1.
Sometimes the choice of honorary organizers was 
unfortunate. Ewbank at one stage was quite sure that he had 
found an extremely useful addition to his band in the person 
of an influential pleader with a large practice* and the 
President of a Municipality in Khandesh. A year later 
Ewbank was writing lamenting that this particular person had 
been * of no use at all. His inactivity has hindered rather
4
than helped the movement. 1
Some honorary organizers worked extremely hard. In 
1915, R.G. Naik at Belgaum claimed to have spent the whole 
or parts of 181 days in co-operative work and to have des­
patched 387 English and 157 vernacular letters. Naranbhai 
Desai, who worked amongst the Kolis of Mandvi taluka, was 
apparently not far behind. They were given part-time clerks 
as assistants. But most of the honorary organizers were, 
in the words of R.M. Sane, *more or less holiday workers1.
The Gujarat honorary organizers, in particular,
1. Ewbank to D.A. No.5180 of. 18 November 1912, encl. Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No. 11673 of 23 December 1912.
2. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 2705 of 19 March 1918.
3. Ewbank to Govt., through D.A., No. 8087 of 17 November
1915, encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 13352 of 14 December 1915#
4. Ewbank to Govt., through D.A., No.10566 of 23 October -
1916, encl. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 12760 of 27 December 1916.
5. Bom. R.D. Order No. 7030 of 15 July 1916, on Ewbank to 
D.A. No.3036 of 10 April 1916.
6. Sane, fNotes on Conditions precedent to the Registration 
of a Rural Co-operative Society1, in Prov. Co-op. Conf. 
Procs., 1912, p.44.
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were apt to give an unnecessarily officious flavour to their 
work. They were likely to call upon the secretary and even 
all the members of a society to travel considerable 
distances in order to meet them. Ewbank issued a circular 
which spoke of frequent oomplaints about this. Members 
1 should never be called more than a mile or two at most un­
less there is the most pressing need for their attendance.1'1’ 
It should perhaps be added, however, that the organizer in 
Gujarat who arranged to meet at a central place only the 
secretaries of a number of societies was usually merely fol­
lowing normal Revenue Department practice. Most of the 
secretaries of societies in Gujarat were talatis, and, 
especially in North Gujarat, these people frequently lived 
in the taluka town rather than in the villages they super­
intended. Co-operation suffered from this system as much as 
any other government department. For instance Motilal 
Chunilal, as an ex-revenue officer, assumed, seemingly 
without question, that the societies in the Prantij taluka 
of, Ahmadabad district aould all be audited from the one 
place. fThe Secretaries of the ten societies are, so far 
as I know, Talatis, who are always to be foundi in Prantij; 
if not he ^Ehe auditor^ can always write in advance.*2 No 
doubt the prevalence of suah attitudes contributed to
1. Ewbank to all Honorary Organizers, Gujarat, No. 2651 of 
14 December 1912. (Poona, Original Circulars, II. )
2. Motilal Chunilal to Ewbank, No.43 of 31 January 1912. 
(Poona, Miscellaneous XVIII, Orders on Audit and 
Inspection.)
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Ewbank1s tart comment on the Prantij societies; 'officially 
started, and exhibiting all the defects of their origin.1
Amongst the honorary organizers at this time, then, 
there were all sorts. A few such as Sane and Devadhar took 
part in ao-operative work simply because they felt good 
could come from it. Many others no doubt had mixed motives. 
Some might be seeking titles and similar recognition from 
Government; others might be wishing to reinforce their 
traditional status - though some traditional leaders seemed 
to simply fall naturally into the positions which they felt 
were theirs by right; others again, such as the pleaders, 
might have assisted partly in order to give themselves added 
ajontacts with potential clients. The honorary organizers 
came mainly from the educated, 'English-knowing* classes. 
There were few real rural leaders amongst them. They were 
usually 'loyal' - though at this time it was really not very 
fashionable to be actively 'disloyal1. Yet the days of the 
gentlemen honorary organizers were already numbered.
The 1904 Co-operative Societies Act had provided 
for the registration only of credit societies. The possi­
bilities of forming other types of societies were realized, 
but it was felt that it was better to experiment first with 
the relatively simple credit societies. However, a demand 
had arisen in some provinces for registration of societies
1. Rept., 1912, p.7*
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other than credit societies, particularly co-operative
marketing societies. By 1912 it was felt that the knowledge
of co-operative principles was now such that this demand
could he met.'*’ With the concurrence of the Government of 
2Bombay the Government of India passed a new Act, The Act
of 1912 permitted registration to any society which had as
its object 'the promotion of the economic interests of its
4members in accordance with co-operative principles'.
Though there had been little demand for non-credit 
societies in Bombay, the Bombay Government felt that they 
should keep up with the other provinces and experiment with 
ao-operative purchase and sale. They thought a beginning 
aould perhaps be made with co-operative purchase and storage 
of fodder and with co-operative milk marketing.
Ewbank's initial response was, understandably, a 
little cool: he had difficulties enough with the opening of 
the Central Bank and the associated Nira Canal scheme. 'The 
prime need of the agriculturist', Ewbank asserted in his 
Report for 1913> 'is cheap and ready credit.... Until credit 
has been really cheapened and democratized, it would be 
suicidal for societies to dissipate their funds...upon 
speculative purchase and sale.1 Apparently in direct reply
1. See Maclagan Cttee, Rept., p.7.
2. Bom.G.R.R7D. No.3632 of 21 April 1910.
3. For the explanation of the Act see India, R. & A. Dept.
(L.Rev.), Circular N0.13-C of 9 March 1912, in Ewbank,
Manual, (1914 edn.), pp.209-213* For theAct itself see 
Ewbank, Manual, (1919 edn.), pp.17-32.
4. Clause 4*
5. See Rept., 1913* p*10.
6. Ibid.
to this, the Government of Bombay, in their resolution on 
this report, explicitly declared that 'the co-operative 
movement will not have its full effect on the agricultural 
eaonomy of the Presidency unless the purchase of agricultural 
requirements and the sale of agricultural produce are organ­
ized on a co-operative basis.
Now Ewbank was not one to avoid responsibility. 
Nevertheless, the initiative in the earliest development of 
societies other than credit did not come from the Registrar. 
It came from two outstanding officials of the Agriculture 
Department, one British and one Indian.
Dr. Harold H. Mann, then Principal of the Poona
Agricultural College, organized a society for the co-opera-
2tive supply of manure on the Mutha Canal, near Poona. It 
was one of many experiments made in the Bombay Presidency by 
this far-seeing scientist, sociologist and social worker, 
Harold Mann was, to quote the Bombay Co-operative Quarterly, 
'one of those rare officials in India who are as unlike the 
popular conception of an official as any individual can be'. 
In the first place he had not a background of public, school 
and Oxford or Cambridge. Instead, he had had a scientific 
training at Yorkshire College, Leeds, not yet a full Univer­
sity, and at Manchester, and, before going out to India, had
1. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 9101 of. 4 October 1913.
2. Mann to D.A. No, 3518 of 16 November 1912, encl. Bom. 
G.R.R.D. No, 11465 of 14 December 1912.
3. B.C.Q., December 1927, p.134.
150
also made a pioneering sociological study of life in an 
English village, which had brought him to the notice of 
Charles Booth and Patrick Geddes.1 He was always a York­
shire puritan at heart - in India he interested himself in
2
the causes of temperance, untouchahility and prostitution.
He was responsible for sociological investigations of vil­
lage life in India^ which remain virtually unequalled for 
4
accuracy, and according to one writer, the college of which 
he was the first Principal, came to be !the best known agri- 
cultural college in the East.Particularly as Director of 
Agriculture in Bombay from 1921 to 1927f Mann was responsible 
for scientific agricultural investigations of a high order.
He counted G-okhale, Tilak and Gandhi among his friends: the
Mahratta, the organ of Tilak* s party, wrote in 1920, when 
there was a possibility of his retiring, that he had 1 loved
7
India with the intensity of an Indian*. Naturally, some of 
his compatriots found this outspoken and often obstinate man, 
who was in any case not a member of the I.C.S., somewhat 
difficult to fathom.
V.H. Gonehalli, then *Extra Deputy Director of
1. See Harold H. Mann, *Life in an Agricultural Village in 
England1, in Sociological Papers, (Sociological Society), 
1905.
2* B.C.Q., loc. cit.
3. land and Labour in a Deccan Village, Vol.I, 19171 Vol.II, 
1921.
4. See, Walter C. Neale, *The Limitations of Indian Village 
Survey Data*, in Journal of Asian Studies, May 1958,
pp. 398-399.
5. T.P.Main, Acting D.A., Annual Rept. of the Department of 
Agriculture in the Bombay Presidency, 192^-1923» p.17.
6. Information from Dr. Mann.
7. Mahratta, 13 June 1920.
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Agriculture*, wa^ responsible for organizing the first co­
operative dairy for the supply of milk to Bombay, Gonehalli 
was the son of a poor cultivator in the Kanara District. He 
had worked in the fields until he was fifteen. By dint of 
Remarkable powers of perseverance and self help* he won his 
way by scholarships to a school teaching position, to Bombay
i
University, and finally to Cambridge. There he read for a 
degree in agriculture. He worked for ten years in the Agri­
culture Department after his return to India, and it is, of 
course, during this time that he made his most significant 
contributions to co-operation. Then, after more study in 
England, he joined the Provincial Civil Service. He died at 
a comparatively early age; he had already reached the rank
of Collector, maintaining that it would be of 1 great benefit*
2if his fellow officers had his agricultural background. 
Gonehalli*s rise, which perhaps seems a little freakish, may 
to some extent have been due to the very fact of his lowly 
origin. Nevertheless, he undoubtedly had great ability and 
tremendous enthusiasm.
By 1914 Ewbank felt more confident that he would be 
able to cope with co-operative purchase and sale. Accordingly
1. R.P.Barrows Sec. G. of B., R.D., to G. of I., R. & A.
Dept. (Agric.), No.26l-P. of 13 July 1906, encl. Viceroy 
to Sec. of State, Despatch No.21 (Agric.) of 2 August 1906
(I.O.L., Rev. Letters from India, 1906.) See also B.C.Q.
December 1929, p. 183. The author has heard Gonehalli held
up as an exemplar even today by an ambitious but not
particularly high government official.
2. R.C. on Agric.. Mins, of Ev., Vol.II, pt.i, p.189.
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when G-onehalli became keen abont the possibilities of co­
operation as a means of agricultural improvement, Ewbank 
obtained permission to utilize his services chiefly in the 
organization of non-credit societies amongst agriculturists.
In 1916, Gonehalli reported - •briefly1, but in . 
fact at great length, as was his custom - on the progress 
which non-credit societies were making. His report gave the 
impression of- immense activity and optimism. fIf the depart­
ment succeeds in starting and developing in the next few 
years three to five purchase societies in each taluka, ' 
Gonehalli wrote in one place, !the problem of agricultural 
organization in respect of supplying seed, manure, and im­
plements ordinary and improved will have been undoubtedly
2solved to a very considerable extent.*
Ewbank was forced to add a note of his own to 
Gonehalli*s report. It was a perceptive note, necessarily 
something of a lecture. Gonehalli*s ’actual accomplishment*, 
Ewbank pointed out, was in fact only nine non-credit socie­
ties that were working and three that were not, together 
with three ordinary credit societies. In addition Gonehalli 
had done a good deal of spadework, but many of his embryo 
•societies* might never reach the registration stage. Gone­
halli had been most successful in arousing interest - *and 
even*, Ewbank added with perhaps a touch of envy, ’enthusiasm*
1. Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 7330 of 7 August 1914, on D.A. to Govt., 
No. A-5887 of 18 June 1914*
2. Gonehalli to Ewbank, No.312 of 1 March 1916, encl. Bom.
R.D. Order No. 5669 of 2 June 1916.
- for his schemes* But some of the societies which Gonehalli 
had recently organized were not, . Ewbank considered, organ­
ized 'on a thoroughly business like and paying basis*.
Ewbank proceeded to emphasize that before any society was 
set up 'The amount of profit that will be earned must be 
forecasted and compared with existing methods.' To be effect 
ive, Gonehalli would have to concentrate his efforts in one 
or two areas of the Presidency and not leave the completion 
of his schemes to subordinates or 'inexpert local endeavour. 
'Plying visits' were of little use; when necessary, Ewbank 
said, using almost the same words as those which Campbell 
had used about himself, Gonehalli should be able 'to sit 
down for a week at a time beside a new type of society*.
And Ewbank still believed that *A credit society is the 
easiest to organize, is valuable as a training ground for 
more difficult enterprises, and is the first condition of 
most of the new schemes....Societies formed of indebted 
agriculturists have no chance of success till the underlying 
credit problem has been solved.
On the whole, Ewbank*s caution was necessary in a 
movement that was often somewhat unthinkingly dedicated to 
removing the apparently unnecessary 'middleman'. The middle­
man, Ewbank was sure, would not be 'obliterated without a 
2struggle. ' Ewbank saw more clearly than many the attention 
to detail, the business ability and the members' loyalty
1. Ewbank to D*Ae No. 1930 of 8 March 1916, encl.Bom. R.D.
Order cited.
2. Rept., 1914, p.12.
that were necessary if non-credit societies were to he 
a success.
Perhaps the "best general picture of the societies 
at this time was provided by P.B.Haigh, who wrote the 1915 
Report. He was merely acting as Registrar while Ewbank was 
away as Secretary to the Maclagan Committee and on leave; 
his views, therefore, are really those of the intelligent 
and informed outsider. Haigh was told by a member of the 
Committee of a society in the Deccan that *a society means 
that our Rao Saheb distributee Government money to poor 
men ....It is a matter for regret that in rural areas, 
societies intended for the poorest and most ignorant classes 
have proved a failure.1 This was in spite of the fact that 
•The most strenuous, efforts were made by Mr. Campbell*.
But Haigh had come to the conclusion that *The man with 
"the economia holding" who can do a little more than make 
both ends meet, is our most promising recruit *.^  This had 
been Ewbank *s guiding principle all along, although he had 
never put it in so many words.
There was the usual crop of failures and even 
scandals. Of course, the records magnify these: the Regis­
trar* s life tended to be largely taken up with such problems, 
while the good societies were to a considerable extent left 
to take care of themselves, in the hope, perhaps, of
1. Rept., 19159 p.9*
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honourable mention in the Registrars Annual Report.
As an instance of a had society we may take a 
society in Broach District, whose registration was cancelled 
by Haigh in 1915. The Chairman of. the Society was also the 
Secretary, and none of the other members of the Committee or 
of the society had attempted to interfere with him. He 
'persistently endeavoured to avoid having his books in­
spected1, and they aould only be secured by the unusual
procedure of having an order issued under the section of the
1
Act which permitted, such a course. When the society was 
2cancelled the wily chairman appealed against the ruling. 
E.L. Moysey J was then acting as Registrar. He, after con­
sulting Malji, the Honorary organizer, refused to rescind 
his. predecessor's order. Malji reported that before can­
cellation the societies' members had been so apathetic that 
it was difficult to collect them for a general meeting 
without the 'assistance1 of that powerful figure in the 
revenue administration, the Mamlatdar. The society owed 
Rs.4656 to the Broach Co-operative Bank and Rs.3367 to the 
Bombay Central Co-operative Bank. Malji thought, according 
to Moysey, that the cancellation of that society would have 
'an excellent effect on the rapidly growing number of 
societies in Broach District, several of which appear to
1. Section 17(3).
2. Order of Haigh, Registrar, 12 July 1915, (Poona, D.A.8.)
3. E.L.Moyseys Asst. Collr., Sind, 1901$ Asst. Collr., Bom., 
1909; Acting Regr., 1915 5 retd., 1922
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resemble this society too closely..,. At present members of 
societies, especially it seems, in Gujarat, are apt to 
leave everything to the Managing Committee.
In the most prosperous parts of Gujarat co-opera­
tive credit could make little impact. At first sight it 
appeared that this was simply because the majority of the 
inhabitants had no need of it. Yet there was another side 
to the picture. According to Khandubhai Desai every large 
village in such areas had several men who had surplus cash 
to lend. He claimed that these wealthy men were trying to
extend their holdings and to reduce the others in the vil-
2lage to the status of. labourers. Statistics on the matter 
may not be very accurate,*^  but a reliable contemporary 
observer, Harold Mann, had little doubt that the process 
was going on.^ Khandubhai asserted that the prosperous 
opposed all the efforts of the poorer cultivators to help 
themselves by forming co-operative societies. As soon as a 
society was formed ini a village the old creditors began to 
press, their claims. A new society in these areas, he thought, 
needed a loan large enough to pay for half the expenses of 
cultivation of its members. Otherwise, it had no chance of
1. Moysey to 1.A.Ho.7489 of 15 October 1915. (Poona, file 
cited.)
2. Khandubhai Desai, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee, (Patiala.)
3. J.N. Barmeda points out that tenants may enter them­
selves as owner cultivators at the time of the census 
simply because of the added status thought to be obtained 
in this way. (Barmeda, Agricultural Tenancy in Gujarat, 
p.99. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Bombay.)
4. Mann, Economic Progress of the Rural Areas of the Bombay 
Presidency, 1911-1922, pp.52-53^
oompeting with the old system* But the Bombay Central Bank, 
he claimed, gave 'only a tenth' of what was required in 
these circumstances.^
The only really encouraging feature about co-opera­
tion in Gujarat at this time was the enthusiasm which was 
found amongst the Kadva patidars of Surat. Amongst them, 
the African-returned seemed to be providing most of the
leadership in a movement for general social and economic
2
reform in the caste. Some of those who returned had made 
so much money that they joined the class of absentee land­
lords. Others, however, had only enough to enable them to 
take up again, with higher hopes, the lands they had left.
One of these was Purshottamdas Itcharam Patel, who was be­
ginning to start out as a genuine popular leader in the co­
operative field. He had been educated only in Gujarati but 
he had learnt 'the benefits of working togetherin the 
Civil Resistance Movement in South Africa, Already, in 1915* 
his credit society was extremely prosperous and well managed, 
and was lending money to the other agricultural credit
A
societies in the neighbourhood. In that year Ewbank made
1. Khandubhai Desai, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee. (Patiala.)
2. Dr, David Pocock confirms that to some extent the same 
process was at work amongst the Leva patidars of Kaira 
and Baroda. But the Kadva patidars were less wealthy than 
the Leva patidars, and were therefore more inclined to 
put into practice the resolutions about marriage and 
dowry reform, and social reform generally, which, under 
the influence of the African-returned, they frequently 
passed at caste conferences.
3. C.M.Gandhi, 'Glimpses of the Co-operative Movement', in
B.C.Q., April 1954, p.16. Cf.D.A.Shah, 'Let us remember 
our own pioneers in time1, in B.C.Q., March 19.46, p.160.
4. Khandubhai Desai, Evidence cited.
him an honorary organizer. Here was someone quite differ­
ent from the townsmen on whom Ewbank usually had to rely.
Many of the notable developments at this time in 
the unirrigated areas of the Deccan took place in the Barsi 
taluka. The Barsi taluka was a somewhat exceptional area, 
completely surrounded by the Nizam1s Dominions and in re­
spect of soil and rainfall ’distinctly better than the rest
2of Sholapur districts, with which it was included. Sane 
in Barsi was giving up some of his legal practice in order 
to devote himself more to co-operative work.^ Gr.J.Padhye, 
who had been in charge of liquidating Campbell’s North 
Satara societies, founded a number of societies in the en­
tirely different irrigated area in the South of the Dis-
A
trict. In East Khandesh, not strictly speaking in the 
Deccan, Otto Rothfeld, the Collector, was able, at the end 
of the period under discussion, to persuade some of the
5
’wealthy and progressive1 inhabitants to form societies. 
Rothfeld was thus, though perhaps he did not realize it at 
the time, preparing himself to be the next Registrar.
Developments in the Karnatak revolved to a consid­
erable extent around the personality of K.B. Bhadrapur. 
Bhadrapur was a member of the Raddi community, which was 
*a small one and comparatively backward.1 He was ’one of
1. Bom.R.D. Order No.4889 of 10 May 1916.
2. Bom.Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., Vol.I. p.39.
3. Rept., 1913, p.2.
4. Rept., 1914, p.10. Rept., 1915, p.11.
5 . R e p t . I 1 a r e . P P .9 - i u r “ ^ ------
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the rising hopes of his caste1, "being 'the first Raddi M.A. *
As a *rising hope1 he attempted in a rather novel way to 
break into the circle of power and privilege that was norm­
ally controlled, in the Districts, by the Indian Deputy Col­
lector. He offered himself to Ewbank as a wholetime auditor, 
completely unpaid, while making it clear that he looked for­
ward to an appointment as Deputy Collector if an opportunity 
occurred. He was appointed as an auditor, but Government 
insisted that he must be paid and that his appointment would 
not necessarily give him any claim to an appointment as a
4
Deputy Collector.
Bhadrapur did not confine his activities to mere 
auditing work. His position with the agricultural classes,
5
both Raddis and Lingayats, was one of great influence.
Ewbank, looking back in later life, averred that it was he
6
who 'set the Movement really going in the Southern Division'.
Bhadrapur received his appointment as a probationary Deputy
7Collector in 1915. But within a year Ewbank wanted him
1. Ewbank to D.A.No.1182 of 3 February 1917* encl. Bom.R.D. 
Order No.5434 of 1 May 1917.
2. Ewbank to D.A.No.10941 of 1 November 1916, encl.Bom.R.D. 
Order No*ll855 of. 1 December 1916.
3. Ewbank to D.A.No.5184 of 25 September 1913* encl.Bom.G.R. 
Finance Dept. No.4038 of 7 November 1913.
4. Bom.G.R.cited,
5. Over half the Raddis are Lingayat by religion* See
R.E. Enthoven, The Tribes and Castes of Bombay, Vol.III.
p.258.
6. Ewbank. 'Memories of the Early Days', in B.C.Q., April • 
1954, p.5.
7. Bom.R.D. Order No.10637 of 6 October 1915.
back as an 1Assistant Registrarf.^  Bhadrapur was somewhat
reluctant to leave his position as Deputy Collector. This
2at first greatly annoyed Ewbank, but he soon came to see 
Bhadrapurfs point and supported his request for a lien.^
The two appear to have worked together happily thereafter.
It was a central principle of co-operation as it 
was introduced into India that the security for loans should 
be personal, depending primarily on the character of the man 
and his sureties and not on the extent of his property. This, 
it was thought, was what would distinguish co-operative 
credit, from the saukar's credit. But a Government of India 
Resolution of- 1914, surveying the lessons that had been 
learnt in the co-operative field over the previous ten years, 
pronounced that mortgages had their uses; co-operative credit
4
need not necessarily be personal.
Campbellfs small societies for poor men had had to 
be based almost solely upon personal credit. And Ewbank*s 
1914 Manual states that in the case of small loans, of up to 
Rs.200 or Rs.300, personal surety would usually be suffic­
ient. Two sureties were generally required: *They may or
1. Ewbank to D.A.No.10941 of 1 November 1916, encl.Bom.R.D. 
Order No.11855 of 1 December 1916.
2. Ewbank to Commr. S.D.No. 12554 of 13 December 1916.
(Poona, *Permanent EST.1)
3. Ewbank to Commr.S.D. No.12915 of 21 December 1916.
(Poona, file cited.)
4. India G.R., R. & A. Dept.(L.Rev.) No.12-287-1 of 17 June 
1914. (B.R.O., R.D. Vol.428 of 1914.)
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may not be members of the society but they must be honest
people known to the Committee.
But Ewbank was firmly of the opinion that 1 loans
for larger amounts or for longer periods,. .require a firmer
2security than personal sureties can offer.* In the Nira 
Canal area, besides personal sureties, a mortgage was almost 
always insisted on. The societies1 mortgage bonds were de­
posited with the Bank.^ Sometimes a mortgage without 
possession was taken. This was often sufficient. Under 
the system of. unlimited liability a borrower*s land was al­
ways liable to be sold in order to make good a default. The 
main object of taking a mortgage was therefore often simply
to prevent the alienation of the land to parties other than
4 .
the societies. But when large loans were made for the re­
demption of old debts, as distinct from current needs, mort­
gage of land with possession was always taken. The land was 
then leased again to its 'real* owner on an ‘annually renew-
5
able rent note 1.
In Bombay forty three per cent, of the total amount 
advanced by co-operative societies during 1913“14- was secured 
on land of one variety or another. This state of. affairs 
did not, perhaps, worry the non-official leaders of the co­
1. Ewbank, Manual, (1914 Edn.), p.77.
2. Ibid., p.78.
3. Reed, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee. (Patiala.)
4. Maclagan Cttee. Rept., p.42.
5. Ewbank, Regrs.1 Conf. Procs., 1913« p.20.
6. Maclagan Cttee. Rept., p.41.
operative movement very much; on the whole they came from 
alasses amongst whom mortgages were part of the accepted 
way of things. At the 1913 Provincial Co-operative Con­
ference a paper by S.S. Talmaki on 'Personal Credit1 was 
’recorded1 without discussion. But Ewbank was concerned 
about the situation, at least insofar as the Central Bank’s 
emphasis on real credit allowed its methods to remain 'very 
mechanical.' Here, he thought, was another argument in 
favour of 'UnionsEwbank claimed that the use of mort­
gages in the Nira Canal area saved credit from becoming
2
'dangerously facile*. There can be little doubt that he 
was correct. Nevertheless, he must have found cause for 
thought in 1914 in the rather ominous report of Badve, the 
Special Mamlatdar, that 'in many instances' defaulters in 
the Canal area, under pressure of 'repeated dunnings... 
through the Secretaries and their peons', had paid off their 
debts to the societies 'by selling their lands or other 
property.
With the increasing emphasis on real credit the 
problem of accurately ascertaining the debts of members or 
prospective members arose in acute form. The officers of the 
societies often had difficulty of gaining access to the
1. Ewbank, D/P to Khandubhai Desai, 24 March 1914.
(Poona, N.C. & C.B.)
2* Regrs.1 Conf♦ Procs.,1913* p.2.
3. Badve. Sept. on the working of the Nira Canal Societies,
p.6.
•Record of Rights1 kept "by the village accountants* The 
desire of the members of co-operative societies to explore 
the mysteries of the village records was resented by the 
accountants* It was an intrusion into the system of power 
and sometimes of corruption which they had built up over the 
years* Ewbank sent a Circular Order to the accountants of 
the villages reminding them that, according to the Land 
Revenue Code, members of the public could see the records 
•at reasonable hours**^ But in the circumstances of the 
Indian village there was obviously plenty of room for dis­
agreement here*
The Record of Rights, even if it was open for in­
spection, did not necessarily give an accurate picture of 
the land and its encumbrances. Under the Land Revenue Code 
a person acquiring a right to land had three months given to 
him to report his acquisition. At any given time, therefore, 
there might be three months* transactions unreported and un­
entered in the Record of Rights* Even if the encumbrances
were correctly shown, it was still difficult to know how
2much actually remained owing -under each.
As credit came to be increasingly bound up in this 
way with legal formalities the problems of recovery, which 
Campbell had seen in relation to summary procedure, began to 
increase. Ewbank believed that Campbell*s proposals had been
1. Ewbank, Circular Order No.5 of 1 March 1916. (Poona, 
Original Circulars, I*)
2. G.S.Curtis, Note, Maclagan Cttee. Evidence. (Patiala.)
Cf.Bom*Prov*Banking Enquiry Cttee* Rept.,1930* Vol.I.p.188
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rejected *for adequate reasons'."*' Nevertheless it was true
that - as an extremely candid Government Press Note put it
in 1915 - societies had ’continually chafed at the delay,
trouble and expense involved in filing suits in the Civil
Courts,* The Press Note quoted ’a few eloquent examples1.
Up to the end of 1913 eighteen suits had been filed in
Baramati to recover the total sum of Rs.16,191. Every case
was undisputed, but the societies concerned had to pay
Rs.914 in court fees and Rs.348 in pleaders* fees. There
were further losses too. In every one of the twelve cases
decided by the end of the year the Court allowed no interest
at all from the date of filing the suit to the date of the
decree, thougn the societies had to continue paying interest
on the money to the Bank during this time. Furthermore, the
debtor was usually allowed a period, of six months for pay.^-
ment, and in some cases it had been ordered that interest
on the amount alaimed should cease altogether from the
2
date of the decree.
Ewbank for some time toyed with the idea of appoint­
ing non-officdal ’arbitrators* in such cases.^ During 1914 
he worked, on a set of draft rules on the subject, which were 
published in their final form in January 1915.^ Under these
1. Ewbank to D.A.No,5884 of 20 August 1914, enal.Bom.
G.R.R.D. No.598 of 18 January 1915*
2. Press Note, forwarded to editors etc. under Govt. Letter 
No. 5660 of 21 May 1915. (Poona, in Government Resolu­
tions file.)
3. See Regrs.* Conf. Procs., 1913» p.22,
4. Bom.G.R.ft.D. No.598 of lo January 1915, published 
(without enclosures) in Bombay Government Gazette, pt.i.
21 January 1915, p.215.
the Registrar himself could, act as arbitrator or appoint 
one or three non-official arbitrators. If arbitrators were 
appointed no legal representation was allowed to the parties. 
The clause permitting the Registrar himself to act was to 
enable him to settle serious cases himself, when local feel­
ing was running high or where defaults were serious. 'It 
is a duty outside the natural functions of his office1,
Ewbank declared, 'and he will of course not take up any more 
cases than he can h e l p . A n y  appeals were to be made within 
a month, to the Registrar in the case of arbitrators, and to 
the Director of Agriculture in the case of the Registrar.
'The Registrar is very averse to undertaking the duty of
deciding appeals', Ewbank wrote, 'but to transfer it to the
2District Court would be fatal to the whole scheme.1
The government press release may well have appeared 
to have been deceptively over-sanguine about the suitability 
of such forms of arbitration to co-operative cases: 'cases 
between co-operative societies and their members are always 
simple and intelligible, and ... the claims are almost invar­
iably just and supported by ample evidence.1^  But at least 
the arbitration system was used. The clauses concerning
arbitration in the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act, on the
4
other hand, had never been operative. The arbitration
1. Ewbank to D.A. No.5884 of 20 August 1914, encl. Bom.
G.R. cited.
2. Ibid.
3. Press Note cited.
4. See D.R. Gadgil, Introduction to K.G. Sivaswamy, Legislat- 
ive Protection and the Relief of Agriculturist Debtors
in India, p.ii.
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system was, in fact, probably over-used "by co-operators. By
the end of Ewbank's regime in 1919 there were nearly 1000
arbitration cases annually;"^  by 1922 there were 1600. As
the Registrar insisted in that year, many of these cases
were fundamentally the result of ‘carelessly giving away 
2money1.
Whatever authority made the award in a case concern­
ing co-operative societies, it still had to be executed. In 
December 1914 Badve wrote to Haigh in great distress about 
the dllatoriness of the Revenue Department in executing the 
decrees which the Court had made in October 1913. The Court 
allowed the defaulters four months in which to pay. When the 
payments were not made darkhasts had to be obtained from the 
Court. It was August 1914 before they could be sent to the 
Collector. They were then forwarded to the Mamlatdar in 
Baramati. More time was lost in going through the procedure 
of issuing various notices5 finally, the date for holding the 
auction of the land of the debtors was fixed for January 1915. 
At this stage most of the worst defaulters applied to the 
Collector for a grant of postponement of the sale of their 
lands until their crops had been harvested. This was given. 
fI don!t think that they would ever pay the money due from 
them within the time allowed by the Collector1, Badve com­
plained. ‘Certainly such things are most disheartening....So
1. Ewbank to G-ovt. No.6318 of 22 May 1919? encl. Bom.R.D.
Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919.
2. Otto Rothfeld, Regr., Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs.t 1922.p.26
long as this pusillanimous method of the civil procedure 
continues to govern the transactions of the societies, I am
afraid, the movement has little chance to succeed /sicJ---
I may kindly be excused for being somewhat outspoken.1
This letter was passed on to the Collector of Poona. 
Somewhat stung by what was, indeed, a degree of. outspokenness 
unusual in a subordinate official, he fastened on one partic­
ular case, (Claiming that he had never been advised that the 
Court decree was one in favour of a co-operative society.
This was quite possibly correct. He said he would do all he
could to help co-operative societies, but he had *300 & more
2Civil Court decrees to deal with*.
In January 1916 Ewbank still had to note in 
melancholy fashions ‘As far as I know, no case yet referred 
to the Revenue Department has been fully disposed of.
This episode does not merely illustrate the cum­
brousness of the processes of the Revenue Department. It 
also shows how a co-operative society which resorted to 
decrees and darkhasts could very easily be thought, by the 
average overworked government officer as well as by the 
average peasant, to be little better than the saukar. Was 
this the penalty that had to be paid for the shift away from 
‘personal credit1?
1. Badve to Haigh No.297 of 9-10 December 1914 (Poona N.C.
& C.Bo)
2. J. Mountford Collr., Poona, to Haigh, D/0 of 
21-22 December 1914. (Poona, file cited.)




R E O R G A N I Z A T I O N  
(1916 - 1919)
The four years that remained to Ewbank as Registrar
were years of stress: and uncertainty, A series of fairly
good years was followed hy the famine year of 1918-1919,
Famine was combined with influenza. The war brought about
a rise in prices. Some groups benefited from this rise. One
gains the impression - it can only be an impression - that
the men with the !economic holdings1, who were seen by
Haigh as Co-operation1s best hope, were amongst those who
benefited, if only temporarily. But it is probable that
the gap between the wealthier and the poorer classes, in
terms of real income, increased."*" Government was perhaps
better equipped to intervene in economic matters5 it was
certainly clear that the war had finally exploded what even
2then was called 'the old policy of laissez-faire' . But 
during 1918 there was a suspicion in some circles - not ex­
clusively those of the Indian nationalists - that the war 
was being used by the Government of India as an excuse for 
dilatoriness.^ In 1918, too, the prospect of the transfer
1. Mann, Economic Progress of the Rural Areas of the Bombay 
Presidencyt 1911-1922, p.6l; Mann, 'The Effect of the Rise 
of Prices .on Rural Prosperity', appix, to B.C.Q., March 
1920. See also discussion in Bombay Chronicle, 7 January 
1920.
2. Ewbank to Govt. No.6138 of 22 May 1919f encl. Bom. R.D. 
Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919.
3. See B.A.Collins, Regr. Bihar & Orissa, Regrs.' Conf. 
Procs., 1918, p.68. See also Sir Daniel Hamilton, ibid,, 
p.57.
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of control over certain spheres to provincial governments 
under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms was perhaps adding to 
the inaction of the Government of India.^ Furthermore, 
Indian nationalism had become a force which, for the first 
time, had to be taken seriously into consideration in co­
operative affairs. During Ewbank*s last four years as; 
Registrar there occurred the brief rapprochement between 
nationalism and British authority, followed almost immed­
iately by the devastating break caused by the Rowlatt Bills 
and Amritsar.
Yet if we look at Ewbank*s administration at this 
time as a whole we find that he was rather more concerned 
with the intricacies of a radical reorganization of the 
financing and supervising agencies of the movement than he 
was with the broader trends in the country at large. Such 
comparatively narrow concerns are, of course, inevitable in 
an administrator.
The stimulus to reorganization undoubtedly came, 
ini the first place, from the Maclagan Committee*s enquiry. 
Ewbank*s horizons were broadened by his work as Secretary 
of this Committee. He had to travel with the members of the 
Committee to all parts of India, to read widely/, to discuss
problems with all manner of people, and finally to assist
2in drafting the Report. Lalubhai Samaldas was a member of.
1. See ibid., p.44.
2. Information from Sir Robert Ewbank. The value of this 
Report is still recognised today; the Reserve Bank of 
India has recently reprinted it.
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the Committee - though possibly only because the Viceroy
himself insisted - on it 1 - and his son Vaikunth Mehta
accompanied him as a secretary in all provinces except 
2Burma. The key men in the an-operative movement in the 
Bombay Presidency were thus vitally concerned in the form­
ulation of the important report which was produced by the 
Committee. After he had finished his work with the Com­
mittee, Ewbank went home for a period of leave, wrote an 
article for the Quarterly Review on the co-operative move- 
ment in India, J and carefully considered the action to be 
taken in the light of his increased experience. His first 
memorandum on the subject was written in England.
It was, Ewbank said, *a thankless task to criticise 
and blacken a system on which not only I myself but innum­
erable other workers have spent so much time and trouble. 1 
But it was necessary to create fa consistent and coherent 
structure 1, and such a structure would not be created by 
•a policy of laissez-faire.1
At the head of the co-operative system in the Pres­
idency, Ewbank wrote, sBbood. the Bombay Central Co-operative 
Bank. It had brought a good deal of. money to the cultivat­
or. Its main defect was that almost all its shares were
1. There was a fierce argument as to whether he should be 
paid the allowance which he asked* Hardinge intervened: 
ordering that he be paid Rs.1500 per month - he was, he 
said, !far the best man*. Bee Hardinge, Note of 27 Oct­
ober 1914. (N.A.I., Loose Original rA' Procs., R. & A. 
Dept. (L.Rev.) November 1914, Pile No.312 of 1914.)
2. Information from Shri Mehta.
3. Ewbank, fThe Co-operative Movement in India*, in 
Quarterly Review, April 1916, pp.368-382.
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held by individuals who were, said Ewhank, 'mainly con­
cerned with realizing their dividends*1 Ewhank was criti­
cizing the Bank with less reserve than before. The Bank's 
Directors, being unfamiliar with local needs, had to rely 
on the Bank's own enquiry staff, and, to a greater extent, 
on the reports of the Registrar's staff. 'The method is 
expensive, and is not capable of indefinite expansion, and. 
affords only an outside view of the working. of. any partic­
ular society.1 The 'unions' whiah had grown up in the 
districts of the Presidency were tapping some local capital 
and providing 'an independent supervisional agency in place 
of a remote board in Bombay. 1 But the unions: were; few in 
number, whereas in Northern India similar institutions had 
become 'the cardinal feature of the whole organization'.
The reason, Ewbank claimed, was tlo be found in the consti­
tution of the unions. Since most of them had, in fact, 
been developed from urban societies, they utilized their 
money in lending to individual members as well as to 
village societies. And the interests of individual members 
as lenders and the societies as borrowers were apt to con­
flict. The village societies of the Presidency were 'on 
the whole in a satisfactory condition1 and in many ways 
Gould 'challenge comparison with the best rural societies 
in any other part of India. » But they had 'not yet com­
bined for mutual supervision and control'? they relied 
entirely on the supervision provided by the honorary
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organizers and by government officials. Because of the 
defects in the unions practically all the rural societies 
suffered from a lack of. prompt finance.^
Here.,, then, was a summary of the criticisms of the 
Bombay system implied- in the Maclagan Committee Report. 
Ewbank1 s proposals for remedying the situation were also 
based on.- the Report. They involved the creation of an 
elaborately tiered structure of financing agencies, each 
with a definite interest in the agencies above and below.
The Maclagan Committee used the terms ’primary society1., 
,union1, ’central Bank1 (or ’district central bank’), and 
’provincial bank* to describe the various stages in the 
system which they proposed. In Bombay the ordinary village 
society or urban society corresponded to the Maclagan Com­
mittee’s conception of a ’primary society’, and the Bombay 
Central Co-operative Bank approached its idea of a ’provin­
cial bank. 1 The term ’union1, which in Bombay had previous­
ly been used to describe ’district central banks' was now 
reserved for an institution new to the Presidency. This was 
an association of several neighbouring societies for the 
purposes of supervision and, at first, of arranging for its 
constituent societies mutually to guarantee, in a special 
way, loans from central banks and the provincial bank.
When Ewbank arrived back in India he still
1. Ewbank, 'Suggestions for the future development of the 
Co-operative System in the Bombay Presidency1, written 
from Bolton Rectory, Cumberland, 5 August 1915.
(Poona, Committee on Co-operation.)
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maintained that he regarded as 1 crucialthe recommend­
ations that societies and district central hanks should he 
represented in the management of Bombayfs fprovinaial hank1, 
and should he ahle to purchase shares so that 1within a
reasonable time1 they could secure a majority of the votes
2at a general meeting. Nevertheless he realized that it 
would he 'a mistake to alienate the goodwill of the 
Direators on the ground that it /the BankJT’ does not alto­
gether satisfy the abstract ideal of a Provincial Bank as 
aonceived by the committee.1^  Por their part, the directors 
of the Bank elected! the ubiquitous^ and, in a sense, hardly 
'representative' G.K. Devadhar to watch over the interests 
of. the societies. Arrangements were made to procure shares 
from individual shareholders for societies which dealt with 
the Bank and wished to have a stake in its ownership. The 
directors said that they would admit other 'suitable1 rep­
resentatives of the societies to their Board as the interest 
of the societies in the share capital increased. It was 
not a completely satisfactory arrangement. But the Bank's 
direators didi keep their word in the coming years. By 1930 
seven of the directors represented societies and district 
central banks and seven individual shareholders. One third
1. Ewbank quoted P.R. Cadell, Ch.Sec., Bom.,to Sec., R. & A. 
Dept., G. of I., 12 September 1916. (Poona, Committee
on Co-operation.)
2. See Maclagan Cttee,1 s Recommendations Nos. 167 and 168, 
Rept., p•174*
3. Cadell to G-. of I., letter cited.
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of the share capital was by that time owned by the societies 
Ewbank *s, deference to pragmatism in 1916 was thus largely 
justified*
Ewbank wished to press ahead with the organization
of central banks in the districts. The investing alasses
had grown with the prosperity brought about by the war. So
it was possible, with some energetic, canvassing, to organize
three new district banks for the districts of Thana, East
2Khandesh and Dharwar during 1916. District central banks 
for Poona and Sholapur were registered in the following 
year.^ Societies were given representation on the direct­
orates of these banks. But investors came as a whole from 
’the intermediate classes between those who deal in Govern­
ment paper and smaller people who prefer to deposit in the
a
savings banks.*^ fUp aountry pleaders and depositors of 
that class*, Vithaldas Thackersey told the Maclagan Com­
mittee, were ’nervous* about their investments; they liked
to have them invested locally and co-operative banks pro-
15
vided an outlet for these funds.
Two of the more important Central Banks were those 
at Surat and Poona. The old * Surat Central Banking Union* 
became the ’Surat District Co-operative Bank* under the new 
arrangements. In 1916, C.M. Gandhi took over the chairman-
1. Evidence of Bank, Bom. Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Kept.
v o t ;t v ,“ 4 3 t :— ---------- --------------
2. Rept., 1917, p.7.
3. Re pt.. 1916, p.20.
4* Khandubhai Desai, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee. (PatXiQ'la.)
5. Vithaldas Thackersey, Evidence, Maclagan Cttee.
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ship of this Bank, and it began to widen its interests 
considerably. It was the combination of C.M.Gandhi's lead­
ership in Surat city and that of Purshottamdas Patel in the 
surrounding rural areas that made possible the special 
developments which took place in the Surat district in the 
years that followed, C.M,Gandhi - shrewd, good-natured, 
though often critical of officialdom - was a leading 
lawyer in Surat city. The Moderates in the Congress had en­
trusted him with the arrangements for the historic 1907 
Congress. He later joined the Liberals; though he was 
always a power to be reckoned with in Surat he was ‘plainly 
not cast for a part in the tumultuous kind of politics that 
developed in Gujerat in later years.Vaikunth Mehta has
suggested that it was unfortunate that C.M. Gandhi's activi-
2ties did not extend much beyond Surat; perhaps, however,
India!s loss was Surat*s gain.
The Poona Central Bank itself became the scene of
'tumultuous1 politics. In setting up the Bank Ewbank began
by getting in touch with people such as Devadhar, M.R, 
Tarkunde,^ the Saswad pleader and honorary organizer, 
Govindrao Kale, the Chairman of the Hadapsar society, and 
V.G.Kale, the Professor of Economics at Fergusson College.
1. V.S.Bhide in 'C.M.Gandhi - Tributes and Reminiscences', 
in B.C.Q.» July 1956, p.4.
2. V.L.Mehta, in B.C.Q., cited,
3. See Ewbank to Tarkunde, L/0 of 6 June 1916, and the fol­
lowing office notes. (Poona, Poona Central Co-operative 
Bank - fA' File - hereafter abridged in footnotes as 
'Poona C.C.B.-A.')
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N.M. Navle, a mali honorary organizer, was added to the list 
of 'promoters1. At a 'big public meeting1 held in August 
1916 Ewbank outlined the steps to be taken. The Nira Valley 
societies would 'of course' be excluded from the proposed 
Bank's purview; there were, however, fifty six< other 
societies in the district which required funds. The Cosmos 
Bank, an urban co-operative bank in Poona, was refusing 
deposits, and there were few joint stock banks in the city. 
Societies would provide 'part' of the working capital. Pro­
vided the Bank was 'economical about staff1 all should be 
well.'*" It was perhaps somewhat embarrassing for Ewbank 
when Gonehalli, who had been put in charge of the organiza^ 
tion of the Bank, came to light with a promise of a substan­
tial sum from N.C. Kelkar, Tilak's lieutenant and the editor 
2
Kesari. But this was in 1917. It was not government 
policy to spurn the nationalists at this time. At the first 
general meeting Kelkar was elected chairman of the Board of 
Directors.^ The election of Kelkar was the signal for an 
outbreak of what appears to have been pro- and anti- Kelkar 
feeling amongst the 'quarrelsome Poona residents' who were 
members of the Bank. They turned the second annual general 
meeting into 'a bear-garden', Ewbank reported in 1919; 
those agriculturists who had attended the meeting (they were 
surely few in number) had been disgusted by the whole pro­
1. Notes of Ewbank's speech at Inaugural Meeting (Poona, 
file cited.)
2. Gonehalli to Ewbank. No.5416 of 27 August 1917,,.
(Poona, file cited.)
3. Proceedings of the First General Meeting of the Poona
C.C.B., 1 October 1917. (Poona, file cited.)
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ceedings. He had had to threaten the cancellation of the
Bank's registration.^
Most Central Banks were much milder affairs.
The 1 guaranteeing union1 was recommended "by the
Maclagan Committee for adoption throughout India, 'unless
experience elsewhere should Belie the results obtained in 
2Burma1. A.E. English, the experienced., and senior Reg­
istrar in Burma, was a member of the Maclagan Committee, and 
it was obviously his enthusiasm for what was virtually his 
own creation that prompted Ewbank to set about organizing 
guaranteeing unions on his return to his post in 1916. 
Guaranteeing unions, were virtually untried in the Indian 
sub-continent, and Ewbank's adoption of them was the great­
est concession to theory which he made in his career as 
Registrar.
That an enormous gap separated the village society 
from the district central bank, and from the Bombay Central 
Co-operative Bank, was undeniable. Ewbank had now come to 
the conclusion that the intermediate organization which 
would assess the ryots' credit needs and supervise the use 
of loans had to be formed amongst the ryots themselves. But 
'mere supervision and advice unweighted by any definite 
responsibility' were likely to prove 'formal and futile'.^ 
'Responsibility' had to include financial responsibility if
1. Rept., 1919, p.19*
2. Maclagan Citee. Rept., p.65#
3. Ewbank, 'Guaranteeing Unions', in Ewbank, ed., Indian 
Co-operative Studies, p.50.
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it was to mean anything at all. So if societies were to he 
grouped together for purposes of mutual credit assessment 
and supervision they ought to he made to some extent liable 
for the dehts of the societies with which they were assoc­
iated. A guaranteeing union would have another virtue. It 
would hring together the leaders of the primary societies, 
rthe little leaders of the labouring classes1, the men with 
whom 'the future hopes, of the movement* lay,*^ * and give them 
responsibility beyond the boundaries of their village.
Such was the vision which Ewbank had before him.
The guaranteeing unions, which he introduced in Bombay rested 
largely on; a system of inter-visiting between the societies 
by chairmen and committee members. Small fees from the 
guaranteeing unions' funds were paid for this. Guaranteeing 
unions were also supposed to employ a 'supervisor* to assist 
the committee members in their duties5 since, however, 
many guaranteeing unions in Bombay consisted of only four 
or five societies, it was difficult for them to afford to 
pay a supervisor out of the levy of one half per cent, on 
the total working capital of the affiliated societies which 
they were allowed to make.
With the help of the information gathered by these 
means the union had to decide to what extent each society 
would be justified in raising capital. Each society had to 
accept a lump liability calculated at a rate somewhere
1. Ibid., p.61.
179
between Rs.20 and Rs.100 per member.^ On the strength of 
this the union applied to the central financing institution, 
through the Registrar, for a lump sum, which it then pro­
ceeded to distribute amongst its constituent societies. 
Until 1920, only the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank,
amongst the co-operative banks, was permitted to handle
2guaranteeing union business. The maximum credit which the 
Bank could grant was to the value of six times the total 
liability of the constituent societies of the union; in 
practice it was usually lower. As a. rule, the credit thus 
opened was not unrestricted. The union had to state for 
what purpose each separate loan was required by each society 
under its control,-^  and the Registrar still had to sanction 
each loan granted by the Bank 1m Bombay. There appeared to 
be plenty of checks and balances.
A
The system was accepted by the Bank. It did not, 
in 1916, appear to be a system that was fraught with 
difficulty.
The Maclagan Committee had to some extent grown 
out of the Bombay banking crisis. It was therefore very 
muah aoncerned with the financial structure and stability
1. Ewbank, Manual, 1919 edn., p.123* In Indian Co-operative 
Studies, p.jSfcT, Ewbank gives the maximum-liability as 
fes.200 per member.
2. V.L. Mehta, Supervising Unions1, in Prov. Co-op. Conf. 
Procs., 1922, Appx., p.xviii.
3. Ewbank, Manual, 1919 edn., p.l24«
4. ’Minutes of a Meeting of the Board with the Registrar, 
February 1916.* (Poona, N.C. & C.B.)
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of the movement. The Act of 1912 had specified that the 
whole of the net profits of societies with unlimited 
liability were to he carried over to a reserve fund. Such 
a reserve fund was intended to come into use in the event of 
liquidation. But liquidation could not he the remedy for a 
society merely in temporary difficulties. The Committee 
visualized these temporary difficulties occurring particular­
ly in periods of famine or of low prices. At such times 
deposits which would normally he renewed might he withdrawn, 
new deposits might he unobtainable, societies might fail to 
repay loans to hanks. Undoubtedly there would he extra­
ordinary demands for emergency finance. The 1912 Act was 
completely silent about the maintenance of what the Mac­
lagan Committee called 'fluid resource1 - assets held, in the 
form of cash or easily realizable investments in order to 
provide against such occurrences. With F.W. Johnston, the 
Government of India Finance Departments representative on 
the Committee, the lack of fluid resource in the movement 
perhaps became something of a bogy.*1' He strongly influenced 
the Committee in its final recommendations.
The Committee recommended that district central 
co-operative banks be compelled to maintain as fluid resource 
•a sum sufficient to meet half the fixed deposits falling 
due during the ensuing year even if no fresh deposits were
1. The opinion of Sir Robert Ewbank.
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received and no repayments of loans made, Primary
societies which took deposits and utilized; them in their
business should, the Committee thought, maintain similar
2
fluid resource. The Committee believed that provincial
banks should maintain fluid! cover amounting to at least
■3
seventy five per cent, of their deposits at call. The 
Bombay Central Co-operative Bank, under its agreement with 
the Secretary of State, had to maintain fluid resource 
amounting to forty per cent, of deposits at call; but, said 
the Committee, there were special circumstances in Bombay.^ 
They were presumably thinking of Bombay's important position 
in the finance of the country, and of the high reputation 
of the directors of the Bank in the Bombay money market.
According to P.R. Cade 11, the Bombay Chief Secre* 
tary, as soon as the nature of the Committee's proposals 
with regard to primary societies and central banks became 
known there was 'the most vigorous protest'. A small con­
ference of leading officials and non-officials interested 
in co-operation, which Ewbank called on his return to India, 
unanimously resolved that the standard laid down by the 
Committee was 'impossible'. Ewbank and Vaikunth Mehta, 
who had both been associated,, with the Committee, agreed 
that 'sudden rushes are impossible and times of scarcity





can "be foreseen and that, at most, /primary^/ societies 
should he required to arrange that three fourths of their 
deposits should fall due for repayment during the harvest 
months*. Ewbank felt, too, that no standard should he 
fixed for co-operative hanks, either district or urban, A 
quarterly financial statement from such hanks would enable 
the Registrar to make any necessary enquiries ahout dis­
crepancies between liabilities and receipts; nothing further 
was needed. The Government of Bombay agreed with Ewbank 
re c omme ndat i ons,^
Jhe quarterly statements from a few of the Banks 
did reveai discrepancies of quite a serious nature around
1920, Warnings from the Registrar appear to have been
2sufficient to remedy the position at this time*. BJr 1927 
Vaikunth Mehta was finding cause to revise his position 
with regard to fluid resource in primary societies.^ But, 
in the famine year of 1918-1919, Ewbank*s confidence that 
the co-operative system could survive times of scarcity was 
put to the test, and, so it seemed, largely Justified,
As Ewbank had prophesied* the likelihood of famine 
was foreseen well in advance. The monsoon of 1918 failed;
1. See, for this paragraph, Cadell, Ch.Sec,, Bom., to
G, of I., R. & A. Dept,, No.8810 of 12 September 1916*
2. Rothfeld, Regr,, to Govt. No.3040 of 19 March 1920, end, 
Bom.R.D. Order No. 1093 of 1 April 1920; Rothfeld to 
Govt. No. A.G.C.P.R. 1 of 30 June 1920, encl. Bom.R.D. 
Order No.2776 of 29 September 1920.
3. V.L. Mehta to G.Ii.Desai, Personal Asst, to Regr., D/0 of 
10 May 1927. (B.S.C.B.,Regr.) See below, Chapter VIII.
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trut while the situation was 1 still developing1 Ewbank 
carefully and coolly laid his plans* He revealed them in 
a paper read to the Indian Economic Conference held at the 
end of 1918, and published in March 1919. Obviously, ex­
tensions would have to be granted. Central banks, he 
thought, might have to carry forward at least threa quarters 
of their advances*^ The situation in the primary societies 
would not be so serious: 'in practically all cases the 
deposits consist of good lying money which the depositors 
have no intention of withdrawing.' Nevertheless, if deposit­
ors made insistent demands they would have to be given their 
money: 'The whole credit of the movement, particularly with 
outside investors, depends on the punctual repayment of 
debts.' But 'mercifully', continued Ewbank, the position 
of the Bombay Central Bank would be 'very strong. ' Not only 
was half its capital non- withdrawable but it commanded 
'ample fluid resources' amounting to eight lakhs. And with
the shrinkage of trade money should be more, rather than
2lesaB easy to obtain in a large city like Bombay.
As it happened, Ewbank was able to note 'with great 
satisfaction' that there were very few withdrawals from 
societies because of the famine. The Central Banks made
A
remarkably good recoveries. To this extent, then, Ewbank's
1. Ewbank, 'Co-operation and Famine», in B.C.Q., March 1919,
p.196.
2. Ibid., p.197.
3. Ewbank, Memorandum No.5746 of 15 May 1919. (Poona,
Original Circulars, II,)
4. Rept., 1919f p.5. But one finds it a little difficult to 
accept the figure of eighty four per cent, recoveries, 
based on statistics supplied by the Banks, which is 
quoted here.
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policy on fluid resource was justified*
Ewbank and the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank 
had to adopt a very conservative policy with regard to 
further loans, however. The finance of the following year's 
crops, they felt, should have first claim on the movements 
resources. All necessary extensions were granted; for the 
rest, it was decided to 'stand fast and conserve resources' 
until the agricultural season of 1919 should set in. This, 
Ewbank admitted, 'might not seem a very heroic course', but 
in the absence of experience of famines it seemed the only 
proper one. He was receiving applications daily from famine' 
stricken villagers, who had to keep family and animals alive 
until July. Ewbank could only advise them to apply for 
takkavi. 'It may appear to some a lame aonclusion,' Ewbank 
wrotaa, 'that, after fourteen years of effort, societies in 
the face of famine can do nothing better than retire into 
their shells and wait for happier days. Nobody deplores 
this impotence more than the present writer'. But to Ewbank 
the conclusion seemed 'unavoidable' that the co-operative 
movement, 'as at present constituted' would not 'for many 
years be strong enough to tide its members over a famine 
on its own resources.
When Ewbank returned from the Maclagan Committee 
and home leave he was immediately faced with the problem of
1. Ewbank, 'Co-operation and famine', in B.C.Q.9 
March 1919, p.198.
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long-term loans. The Directors of the Bombay Central Co­
operative Bank, chastened by their experiences in the Bank 
crisis, and, perhaps, by the warnings implied in the Mac­
lagan Committee report, had decided to cease granting long 
term loans. It was, they said, 'highly inadvisable1 to 
advance loans for periods longer than twelve months on the 
basis of share capital and short term deposits. It had 
originally been proposed to advance long term loans on the 
basis of debenture capital, but while the Bank's debentures 
remained unrecognized as trustee securities, and investors 
for this reason were refusing to take them up, it was im- 
possible to proceed in this field. In August 1916 
Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy sent an ultimatums if the Bank's deben­
tures were not recognized as trustee securities the Direct­
ors would have to ask the Bombay Government to 'take over 
the whole affairs of the Bank or to entrust them to a Pro­
vincial Bank which they may establish on lines which meet
2with the approval of the Government of India, 1 Such an 
ultimatum, the Chief Secretary of Bombay claimed in writing 
to the Government of India, was not made lightly. The wind­
ing up or reconstruction of the Bank would 'almost certainly 
take place if the present decision remains in force.' And 
with the Bombay money market as tight as it then was, any
1. Minutes of. a Meeting of the Board with the Registrar on
1 February 1916. (Poona. N.C. & C.B. ) See also /Fragments 
of_7v. Thackersey to Govt./c, 1915-*l6_y. (Poona, file cited.,
2. P. Currimbhoy to Ch.Sec., Bom.,No.S.6-6 of 19 August 1916, 
encl. Bom. R.D. Order No.2242 of 23 February 1917.
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attempt at reconstruction would be extremely difficult.^
This letter produced, at last, the desired effect.
The Government of India reversed a decision of 1915 and
resolved to support Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy !s amending bill in
2the Imperial Legislative Council.
Such a conclusion in the matter, however, though 
it doubtless provided some comfort in that it removed a 
long standing grievance, came too late. Lending rates had 
risen sharply in Bombay, and it was now impossible to place 
the four per cent, debentures on the market.*^
In all, it would appear, only about six lakhs of 
debentures, out of the twenty lakhs whose issue had been 
authorised by the Secretary of State, had been taken up.^
The Bank did have other long term deposits. Nevertheless, 
the realization that its debentures could not be placed^  on 
the market for an indefinite number of years did enable the 
Registrar and the Bank to come to a tacit agreement to give 
up long term financing in the meantime. ‘Redemption of, old 
debt on a sweeping scale has become possible1, Ewbank had 
written after the Bank had been in existence for a few 
months. He had thus shown himself to be fully in what
1. Cadell, Ch.Sec., Bom., to G. of I., R. & A. Kept.,
No.9693 R.D. of 9 October 1916, encl. Bom. Order cited.
2. G. of I., R. & A. Dept., to G. of B., N0.151-C of 
25 January 1917, encl. Bom. Order cited.
3. B.C.Q., December 1917, p.142$ also information from 
Sir Stanley Reed.
4. Rept., 1915f p.39. Very few more debentures can have 
been taken up after this date.
5. The Bankfs working capital in the famine year 1918-19 was 
Rs.34,86,692 (Rept.,1919* p.26),in which year Ewbank 
alaimed that 1 about half1 its capital was 'non-withdrawable,
6. Rept., 1912, p.5.
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might be called the Bombay tradition of concern for long 
term debt redemption. But from its inception the Bank had 
tended'to prefer short term business. And Ewbank had soon 
seen the difficulties of long term debt redemption. ‘There 
is a real danger', he had written in his Report for 1913*
‘in allowing societies to lock up too large a proportion of 
their capital in long non-productive loans and it is also 
unwise to pay off a debt until the sowkar's claim has been 
verified by some person with a knowledge of law*.^ Debt 
redemption was obviously hardly a matter for the ordinary 
village society to manage on its own.
Another problem which Ewbank was faced with immedi­
ately on his return was, almost inevitably, the Nira Canal 
situation. Overdues in the area had amounted to over 
Rs.1,70,000 in 1915,^ and they still amounted to a lakh 
in 1916.*^
At first Ewbank was confident that the situation 
aould be righted. fI have visited most of the Societies1, he 
wrote to the Collector of Poona, ‘and am of opinion that 
the arrears, which at present look very serious in amount, 
will be entirely wiped out under the orders that have been 
given. They are largely due to the absence of any reasonable 
system of granting extensions and to the fact that nearly all
1* Rept., 1913. p.6.
2. Rept., 1915. p.6.
3. Keatinge, B.A., to Govt., No.7852 of 10 August 1916, 
forwarding Ewbank's Rept., 1916.
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loans have been granted for two years only regardless of
their purpose.1*- The precautions which had "been taken in
the area hy the Bank and the Special Mamlatdar had proved
•almost too thorough. In the pursuit of material safeguards,
the natural safeguards involved in the co-operative system
2have to a large extent been lost.• The 1 natural safeguards 
involved in the ao-operative system*: Ewbank1s experience 
with the Maclagan Committee had given him a genuine apprec­
iation of, and enthusiasm for, the virtues of Co-operation 
as they were expounded by its leading theorists.
Ewbank proposed to organize five neighbouring and 
good societies into a guaranteeing union. In these, mortgage 
credit was to be largely abandoned in favour of personal 
credit. •Maximum normal credits* were to be forecast by the 
Special Mamlatdar only once a year5 the committees of the 
societies were to have full powers within these limits. A 
committee *s requests for a loan would go through the guaran­
teeing union to the Bank. *The Central Bank will trust the 
Union and will not ordinarily go behind its back in individ­
ual cases to enquire how the loan has been applied or 
whether jaggery raised from the loans has been brought to 
the Bank1s shop.1
Ewbank*s methods with the twenty three societies
were to be fairly drastic; they were to include the stoppage
1. Ewbank to Collr., Poona, No.567 of 21 January 1916.
(Poona, N.C. & C.B.)
2c Ewbank, Memo. No.567 of 21 January 1916, encl. letter 
cited.
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of- all credit to individuals or societies and, if necessary, 
exemplary liquidations of societies.’1' The Special Mamlat­
dar was given his orders in drastic, terms, too: ‘This is a 
rather critical moment in your own career. If you succeed
your services will he brought to the notice of Government.
2
If you fail I am afraid that it may do you some harm. *
But, in spite of taking these severe steps, Ewbank 
was at this time convinced that ‘what the 23 second class 
societies most need is constant and careful teaching. Their 
failure has been due as much to ignorance as to anything 
else. * Men from the best villages needed to be encouraged 
to visit and inspire the more backward villages; the best 
time to do this, Ewbank added astutely, was ‘on Monday even- 
ings when the people are generally aollected in the temples.
In 1917 there was a glimmer of hope in Ewbank‘s com 
ments on the Nira societies in his annual report: they were, 
he thought, ‘at last showing signs of being genuinely co­
operative1.^  It appeared that Ewbank*s liberal policy was 
being justified. But by 1919 Ewbank*s hopes, were thoroughly 
dashed. The situation on the canal was ‘intolerable*, 
‘embarrassing both for the Registrar and the Central Bank.* 
Yet the ryots* land was mortgaged to the societies, and they 
alaimed that because of this their credit was ruined outside
1. Ewbank, Memo cited.
2. Ewbank to V.B. Vaidya, Special Mamlatdar, D/0 of 
3 February 1916. (Poona, file cited.)
3. Ewbank, Memo cited.
4. Rept.. 1917t p.5.
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so the societies were morally bound to finance them.'*’
By 1919, however, the problem was more than just 
general slackness amongst the members of the societies* In 
the East of Bhimthadi taluka there were many who were grow­
ing sugar cane at a loss or without adequate profit* ' Their 
houses are as poor as ever,1 wrote Ewbank, 1their crops not 
infrequently are partial failures owing to lack of capital 
or agricultural skill.**.In fact they blunder on in hopes
of making a coup and undertake more than they can carry 
2
through.1 Part of the trouble was salination. Salination, 
the bane of so many Indian canals, particularly when water 
is used too lavishly, had made five thousand acres of former­
ly cultivated land in the Nira valley useless. Many of the
malis were moving on to the newly opened Godavari canal areas. 
But other groups could not afford to do so. As Mann wrote 
at the time; 'To introduce at this stage improved credit 
facilities may help little unless at the same time you bring 
in such agricultural improvements as will lower the cost of 
production or increase the yield, or improve the quality'.
In retrospect, it might seem that the greatest 
triumph of the co-operative movement and its official guides 
in Bombay at this time was to have gained the interest of 
the man who is now universally known as 'Mahatma Gandhi'.
!• Rept., 1919» pp. 9-10.
2. Ewbank, Memo cited.
3. Mann, 'Economic Conditions in some Deccan Canal Areas', 
in B.C.Q., December 1918, p.126.
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It should not he forgotten, of course, that in the war years
Gandhi was still thought of primarily as fMr. M.K. Gandhi
of South Africa1,^  the supporter of the war effort, the
friend of the Bombay Governor, lord Willingdon, the *phil-
2anthropist* working in the Ahmadabad mills - in short, as 
very definitely a !Moderate1 * However, the fact that Gandhi 
was interested in the co-operative movement certainly 
•attracted considerable public attention',^ and it is to 
Ewbank that the credit must go for gaining Gandhi *s friend­
ship and his sympathy - even though that sympathy was not 
always uncritical.
The Co-operative Department gave weaving demon­
strations at Gandhi !s ashram at Ahmadabad for three months 
during 1916-17-^ Ewbank and Gandhi went together on one 
occasion to address, a meeting of millhands. Presumably the 
aim was the formation of a millhands1 society. Gandhi has 
given us a vivid description of this meeting. fThe chawl 
in which they were living was as filthy as it well could 
be. Recent rains had made matters worse.*..There we, were, 
seated on a fairly worn out charpai, surrounded by men, 
women and children. Mr. Ewbank opened fire on a man who had 
put himself forward and who wore not a particularly innocent
1. Rept., 1917» p.21.
2. Collr., Ahmadabad, quoted in Bom.L.Rev. Admin.Rept., 
1917-1918, pt.ii, p.14.
3* B.C.Q. t'"December 1917, p. 132.
4. Rent., 1917t p.21.
countenance. After he had engaged him and the other people 
about him in Gujarati conversation, he wanted me to speak 
to the people.1 Characteristically, perhaps, Gandhi dwelt 
on ‘the moral basis of co-operation* - 1owing to the sus­
picious looks of the man who was first spoken to'.^
'The Moral Basis of Co-operation1 was the subject 
on which Ewbank invited Gandhi to speak at the Bombay Pro­
vincial Co-operative Conference in September 1917. It would 
appear that since the meeting with the millhands Gandhi had
been in Bihar, conducting his Champaran campaign against the
2
indigo planters. He had now had practical experience of 
conditions in the rural areas. And this experience made him 
appear at the Co-operative Conference a 'doubting Thomas 
before the Jesus of co-operation', as he put it.^ The 'so 
called agricultural banks' in Champaran had disappointed him. 
Co-operation conceived simply as an economic movement, he 
warned, was not a panacea for the country's ills. The moral 
as well as the economic aspects of the question needed to 
be emphasized; he was pleased to see that the Maclagan Com­
mittee had done this. But his 'limited experience4 in Cham­
paran had made him question 'the accepted opinion' of the 
money-lender. 'I have found him to be not always relentless, 
not always exacting of the last pie. He sometimes serves his 
client in many ways or even comes to their rescue in the
1. Gandhi, 'The Moral Basis of Co-operation', in Prov. Co-op. 
Conf. Procs., 1917« p*73.
2. See The Story of My Experiments with Truth, pp.298 et seq.
3. Prov. Co-op. Conf.Procs., 1917/ p.26.
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hour of their distress. My observation is so limited that 
I dare not draw any conclusions from it, hut I respectfully 
enquire whether it is not possible to make a serious effort 
to draw out the good in the Mahajan and help him or induce 
him to throw out the evil in him. May not he be induced to 
join the army of co-operation, or has experience proved that 
he is past praying for? r
It was this attitude - that the problem was one of 
somehow reforming the village money-lender, not of removing 
him entirely from the village - which was to characterize a 
good deal of Congress thought on the problem of rural in­
debtedness in the years to come. It was, in fact, not a 
very different attitude from the pre-war British attitude.
One of those who heard Gandhi speak at the 1917 
Provincial Co-operative Conference was his future secretary 
and intimate biographer, Mahadev Desai. Mahadev had been a
p
dose friend of Vaikunth Mehta at Elphinstone College.
When the Bombay Central Bank decided about 1915 to appoint 
an Inspector for Gujarat again, Mahadev Desai was a fairly 
obvious choice. He worked for a time under the Special 
Mamlatdar in the area, D.A. Patel;^ when, in 1916, Patel 
was ordered to the Nira Canal area to assist in making re­
coveries, Mahadev was left on his own.
1. fThe Moral Basis of Co-operation1, ibid. p.74.
2. Information from Shri R.M. Talpade, Editor, B.C.Q.
3. Dahyabhai A. Patel, 1 Co-operative Movement in Bombay 
State 1, in B.C.Q., April 1954, p.25.
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In June 1917 Mahadev published an article on Co­
operation in Gujerat*'!’ This forms the shrewdest assessment 
available on co-operation in that region during this period. 
In many parts of Gujarat, he said, fan impenetrable mass? of 
apathy* towards the co-operative movement prevailed. The 
Registrar, he reported, had aonvened a conference in Gujarat 
in April 1916 to consider the situation, particularly with 
regard to the increasing number of defaults and cases re­
ferred to arbitration. *It is, a little regrettable1, wrote 
Mahadev Desai, ‘that almost all the suggestions came from
the Registrar, and none from the Honorary Organizers from
2whom they were most expected.* fThe whole question* of 
honorary organizers needed to be reconsidered so that men 
could be appointed who had *a thorough knowledge of co­
operative principles and of local conditions...men who are 
keenly alive to a consciousness that they are appointed., 
above all, to serve the people. * If such men were not forth­
coming the only alternative was to have paid, inspectors, 
three or four to a district, 1exercising the closest scrutiny 
in matters of minute detail*. The question of. unlimited 
liability would have to be tackled. Mahadev Desai commented 
that it was 1 curious* that the question * Is the present type 
of society suitable?*, though included in the preliminary 
circular put out by the Registrar about the Conferencef was
1. I^ahadev 7. H. Desai, ‘Co-operation in Gujerat*, in 




eventually dropped from the agenda paper. 'Substantial- men1
simply would not join under present conditions.^ Finally,
something had to be done about the high rate of interest on
loans. fIt is certain that in many parts of Surat and Kaira
Districts a rate of interest ranging from 6 to 7^ per cent.
is the usual one for agriculturists of good credit.1 Unless
the societies could afford to reduce their rate of interest
from their usual 9% per cent, the movement had 'no chance of
2
having the popularity it has had in many parts of the Deccan. ' 
The frustrations in co-operative work of the able 
and devoted young man who was Mahadev Desai are apparent 
from this article. In the circumstances, it would not have 
been very surprising if Gandhi's speech at the Co-operative 
Conference had made an especial appeal to him. Yet there may 
have been more specific reasons 'why, about the end of 1917f 
Mahadev Desai gave up ao-operative work and joined Gandhi.u 
Ramnikrai Mehta's version of Mahadev's departure is thiss 
'While in one village society some of the members who had not 
repaid their dues, repaid them under his influence, this was 
resented by the local Organizer and the Registrar, as they
1. Ibid., p.30.
2. Ibid., p.27
3. B.R. Randa, in his recent biography of Gandhi, says that 
'Mahadev Desai and Narhari Parikh, two Gujarati youths who 
had recently joined his entourage', were with Gandhi in 
Champaran about April 1917. (Mahatma Gandhis A Biography, 
p.162.) This seems unlikely, as Mahadev D e i n c l u c e d  
in the list of delegates at the Provincial Conference of 
September 1917 as 'Inspector, Bombay Central Co-operative 
Bank.' He could perhaps have been on leave of absence at 
the time of the Champaran affair, however.
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thought that the Bank officer interfered with the internal 
management of societies. Shri Mahadev Desai felt very much 
disappointed and left the services of the Bank and joined 
Mahatma Gandhi. The Government and the Registrar were then 
very particular that Central Banks should not have any direct 
association with the society- except providing finance through 
the organisers.
There are, however, some seeming inconsistencies in 
this story, as might he expected: Ramnikrai Mehta was at this 
time Manager of the Bankrs shop at Baramati and therefore not 
closely concerned in the matter. Ewbank always encouraged 
direct association between the Bank and the societies - he 
had often lamented the absence of such contacts. In 1912 he 
had insisted that the Bank should recover its own dues and 
not leave this job to the Government-employed Special Mamlat-
p
dars. Ewbank presumably still held this position in theory, 
even though the emergency situation in the Nira Canal had 
necessitated the use of the Special Mamlatdars to make 
recoveries.
One suspects that in the case in question the honor­
ary organizer - who may have been one of those whom Mahadev 
obviously found to be of little use - resented Mahadevfs 
activities, for reasons that were perhaps largely personal.
An honorary organizer was officially a government servant,
1. Ramnikrai N. Mehta, !R.ural Co-operative Credit in Bombay 
State1, in B.C.Q., April 1954? p.30.
2. See above, Chapter V.
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although he was unpaid, and Ewbank may have felt obliged to 
back him up in a cause which he did not fully understand.
The real reasons for Mahadev*s leaving the co-oper­
ative movement will probably never be known. ^ But perhaps 
this does not matter greatly. It is perhaps sufficient for 
us to realize that the appreciation of the special problems 
of the rural areas which runs through all Mahadev Desai*3 
writings stems to a considerable extent from his experiences, 
not all of them happy, with the co-operative movement in 
Gujarat.
Some of Mahadev Desai's complaints about honorary 
organizers were, in fact, rectified shortly after he left 
the movement.
In January 1918 Ewbank received confidential orders
from Government on the subject of honorary organizers. The
2exact nature of these orders cannot at present be known, 
but it is possible to obtain a fair notion of their contents 
by analyzing the action that was taken as a result of their 
issue. The list of honorary organizers was revised and re­
classified so that an organizer*s position on it depended
1. Neither Sir Robert Ewbank nor Shri Vaikunth Mehta have 
any clear recollection of the incident. No records which 
refer to it appear to have survived, either in the Reg­
istrar's office in Poona, or in the Bank's office in 
Bombay.
2. The author has not been permitted to see Tihem; Ewbank 
referred to them as contained in Bom. Govt. Order No* 
759-51 Confl. of 24 January 1918.
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more on the value of the work that he did for the movement 
than on what had been termed his 1 social standing.1 Only 
three honorary organizers were now placed in 'the first class' 
they were Malji, Sane and E.G. Naik, who were given the title 
of 'Divisional Honorary Organizer' for the Northern, Central 
and Southern Divisions respectively. 'District Honorary 
Organizers' were placed in the second class for the vital 
travelling allowance. Men such as Purshottamdas Patel in 
Surat District and Narayanrao Marutirao Navle in Poona Dis­
trict hecame District Honorary Organizers. Then there came 
a third grouping of 'Assistant Honorary Organizers'. These 
men were on the whole new to the work of an honorary organ­
izer; they all came from the rural areas and were usually 
chairmen of successful societies.
A good many of the old honorary organizers did not 
appear in the new list. Some, Ewhank reported, were unwil­
ling to work - and travel - in the second class after having 
heen in the first class.’1' One of these was G.K. Chitale of 
Ahmadnagar. Looking hack in 1933 he claimed that his decis­
ion had heen taken because he had felt that it was 'not con­
sistent with the self respect of honorary organizers' to draw
2
allowances 'on the meagre scale allowed.' Others of the old 
honorary organizers had not heen doing any work for some 
time, and the opportunity was seized to accept their resig­
1. Ewhank to Govt. No.3565 of 6 April 1918, encl.Bom.R.D.
Order No.7073 of 4 July 1918.




The Assistant Honorary Organizers were, of course, 
not particularly enthusiastic about the status that had been 
granted to them* S.Y. Sontakke, an Assistant Honorary Organ­
izer from the Karnatak, maintained that it was very necess­
ary for someone engaged in public v/ork to keep up his pres­
tige* An Assistant Honorary Organizer, he thought, should
be paid second class double rail fare, so that he could take 
2his servant. Doubtless the honorary organizer would travel 
first and his servant third under this arrangement.
The new class of organizers were perhaps at first 
given too much responsibility. Previous to the reorganiza­
tion honorary organizers had often received and distributed 
money from the Bombay Central Bank to societies *under their 
charge.1 But when an Assistant Honorary Organizer died in 
the influenza epidemic and defalcations came to light Ewbank 
felt that he should probably forbid the Assistant Honorary 
Organizers from undertaking this duty in future.*^  Sane 
agreed.^ Malji, signif icantly, thought that the incident 
showed that in some instances the Assistant Honorary Organ- 
izers did not fown sufficient property.1^  The new recruits 
were obviously from a class different from that of the
1. Ewbank, letter cited.
2. Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs. 1919, p.104.
3. Ewbank, Memo to Divisional Honorary Organizers and Assist­
ant Registrars. No.94 of 7 January 1919. (Poona, Original 
Circulars, II.)
4. Sane to Ewbank No. 18 of 10 January 1919. (Poona, file 
cited.)




It is not clear from the evidence available whether 
the revision of the. list of honorary organizers was directly- 
aimed against the -Brahman community as such. Prom about 
1918, attempts to break up Brahman predominance in the 
circles of government employees become fairly obvious, though 
again confidential orders on the subject are not yet avail­
able for study. Government would presumably propose treat­
ing the honorary organizers in the same way as they treated 
their own full-time paid staff. No full list of the honor­
ary organizers who were removed from their posts in 1918 
survives but at least nine out of the eighteen honorary 
organizers who would 1 cease to work as Honorary Organizers,
but who in most cases have agreed to continue to help the
1
movement whenever they get the opportunity' had recognis-
ably Brahman names. On the other hand, a majority of the
new 'Assistant Honorary Organizers' appear to have been
2non-Brahmans. It appears that, at least in the Karnatak, 
the non-Brahman interest was being officially encouraged, 
'Loyalty Leagues* were being set up by officials in oppo­
sition to the Home Rule League, and at least one high Brit­
ish official was pleased to report that Marathas and Lingay- 
ats were beginning to think that Home Rule would be 'the 
Rule of a Brahmin Oligarchy. *^  In the circumstances, it 
seems not unreasonable to believe that a certain prejudice
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.3565 of 6 April 1918 encl.Bom,R.D.
Order No.7073 of 4 July 1918.
2. See list in Rept., 19199 pp.42-44.
3. See Comrnr., S.D. In Born.L,Rev. Admin. Rept., 19l8-19fp*30
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in some government circles against Brahman leadership of the 
co-operative movement - a prejudice which later became overt 
- may be dated from about this time.
Ewbank's personal approach to the question of caste 
in the co-operative movement was essentially empirical. His 
policy, he wrote in his Report for 1918, was to 'accept caste 
as a basic fact of society and make use of it'. Everybody 
knew that it had its bad aspects, but it showed no signs of
i
disappearing.
Caste was 'made use of' by the urban communal socie­
ties - banks and housing societies - of which the Bombay 
Presidency was becoming 'the home', Caste was the bond- 
although some communal societies had no compunction about
accepting large deposits from 'non-members' outside the 
2caste. Besides the caste societies there were the societies, 
chiefly in the towns, promoted by the Christian missionaries. 
Canon Rivimgton tried to keep his societies open to all,^ 
though in 1914 Ewbank reported that all the officers of the 
Hubli society were Christians.^ The Roman Catholics set up 
societies exclusively for their own flock.
Communal societies were a somewhat different matter 
in the villages. The question came to the forefront when
1. Rept.9 1918, p.11.
2. See G.C.Presswala, Urban Co-operative Banking, Unpublished 
M.A.(?) Thesis, University of Bombay, 1934, pp.144-146,
3. Rept., 1918, p.11.
4. Rept., 1914, p.16,
5* kept., 1918, p.14*
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over-large village societies had to he divided. The Maclagan
Committee recommended that as a general rule - though only as
a general rule - 1 the re should he one society to one village
and one village to one society. f^" Implicitly, the Committee
disapproved of societies for separate castes in the villages,
although they added that they did not advocate 'anything like
a crusade to force the poorer classes on the present mem- 
2hers.1 But the Committee also thought that fa society is. 
apt to become unmanageable if. its numbers exceed a total that 
might vary from 50 to 100. Now villages in the Karnatak 
or in Gujarat were often much larger than in other parts of 
India. A population of four or five thousand was not uncom­
mon „ In these circumstances, the membership of a society 
was frequently mere than one hundred. How was the problem 
to be tackled? Swbank believed that fAs a village with a 
population not exceeding (say) 5,000 is a very real unit it 
seems; a mistake to break it up into several, possibly jar­
ring, societies.r He proposed to allow increases until a 
membership of throe hundred was reached., provided the society 
retained fa substantial unity based on the mutual acquaint­
ance of the members1 and provided that 'sub-committees are
4
appointed for special wadas. A wada, in this context, means 
an area in a village normally inhabited by one particular
1. Maclagan Cttee. Rept., pd8.
2. Ibid., p.19.
3* Ibid.
4« Ewbank to D.A. No.2489 of 31 March 1916, encl. Bom. R.D. 
Order No ,.6400 of 27 June 1916.
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caste.^ Caste was to enter into the society at the sub­
committee level, then, hut basic ’unity1 had to he main­
tained.
In 1919, however, K.R. Kulkarni, an auditor stat­
ioned in the Southern Division, wrote to JSwbank advocating
division on the hasis of caste as one of the remedies for
2overgrown village societies. Ewbank referred the matter to 
Sane. In 1912 Sane had complained of the 1promiscuous mix­
ing of people of various social classes in one society*.^
But now, perhaps partly because his own Brahman community 
was beginning to suffer through rivalries between castes, he 
opposed the idea of division of co-operative societies on 
the basis of caste. It would net be feasible, he wrote.
The ’depressed classes* had practically no property, so it 
would be impossible for them to obtain capital to form their 
own societies. Each case would have to be decided on its 
own merits; he held out hope, in some cases, for division 
on the basis of faction.^- Pactions developed more within 
castes than between them, prompted as they often were by 
disputes over property.
1. See Iravati Karve, ’The Indian Village*, in A.E. Desai, 
ed., Rural Sociology in India, revised edn., 1959, p,l83* 
(Originally published in Deccan College Bulletin, 
vol.xviii.)
2. K.R. Kulkarni, Auditor, S.D., to Regr. (through Asst. 
Regr., S.D.) No.781 of 21 May 1919. (Poona, Original 
Circulars, II.)
3. Sane, ’Notes on Conditions precedent to the Registration 
of a Rural Co-operative Credit Society*, in Prov. Co-op. 
Conf. Procs., 1912, p.44.
4. Sane to Ewbank, No.272 of 5 June 1919.
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Ewbank had little time left as Registrar in which 
to put Sane*s advice into effect. But it appears that al­
though, perforce, he may have had to put into effect a gov­
ernment policy aimed against Brahman honorary organizers, he 
always felt that, so far as rural societies and the finance 
of rural societies were concerned, divisions between the 
castes should not be exaggerated unnecessarily. The Karnatak, 
for instance, was the home of the highly organized and strong­
ly anti-Brahman Lingayats. The Karnatak Central Bank was 
originally projected as an organization entirely for Lingay­
ats. Ewbank prided himself on the fact that the Co-opera­
tive Department had persuaded the promoters to drop the idea 
of communal exclusions *1 am glad to be able to report that 
at least one prominent Brahmin pleader, Mr. Ankalgi, has 
taken an active part in floating this scheme.1 Rural and 
urban leaders of the Raddi and Maratha communities - prac­
tically all those known to Ewbank - had joined in.'*’
It was not merely mofussil honorary organizers who 
had to be thought of as ’leading non-officials1 in the years 
from about 1916 onwards. With the growth of the work of the 
Bombay Central Bank, Devadhar1s ‘Debt Redemption Committee*, 
which sponsored co-operative loan societies in the Bombay 
mills, and the co-operative housing societies, there had come
1. Ewbank to Govt., No.7277 of 26 July 1916, encl. Bom.R.D. 
Order No.9438 of 30 September 1916.
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into existence in Bombay city a new group of persons who 
were interested in Co-operation, intelligent, fluent in Eng­
lish, impatient and on the whole nationalist - very conscious 
of their position in the movement as the intelligentsia.
It was this group which provided the main opposi­
tion to the new Co-operative Societies Rules which Ewbank:
considered necessary in the light of the Maclagan Committee*s
2recommendations, and which he promulgated in June 1917.
The new Rules, they considered, increased the power of the 
Registrar quite unnecessarily. A protest meeting was held 
under the auspices of the Central Bank. The draft rule 
which raised the most vehement objections was one which read: 
'No society, by itself or by the Committee or any officer, 
may take any action which would involve the society in the 
discussion or propagation of controversial opinions of a 
political or religious character, and the Registrar may pro­
hibit any action, or rescind any resolution which, in his 
opinion, is of such tendency,1 The Bombay representation 
stated that the co-operative movement oould not be entirely 
divorced from the life of the nation. Moreover the rule 
might have the effect of turning away from the movement pro-
7
minent oo-operators who took part in politics. There had
1. Significantly, the word was first used in co-operative 
writings about 1919. See Vaikunth L. Mehta, 'Training 
and Propaganda*, in Ewbank, ed*, Indian Co-operative 
Studies, p. 140; also B.C.Q.. December 1919, p.162.
2. Por these Draft Rules see B.C.Q., September 1917 f pp.89-91.
3. Pazulbhoy Currimbhoy to Ch.Sec., Bom., No.G-7/562 of 
28 July 1917. (Poona, 36,12.)
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been virtually no evidence in the Bombay Presidency of co­
operative societies being used for political ends, but such 
activities did occasionally occur in Bengal, and Ewbank be­
lieved that it was desirable to have such a i*ule fin reserve*. 
Nevertheless, he agreed to modify the proposed mile so that, 
like the equivalent Punjab rule, it did not apply to fthe 
committee or any officer* but only to the society as a 
whole.1
Another proposed rule gave the Collector the right
to visit all co-operative societies in his district. The
Bombay meeting objected to this too. Ewbank aomplained that
'Bombay people... seem to draw their distorted views of the
terror inspired by the Collector from the vapourings of the
extremist press. ' But he thought that there was no real need
for the rule from the point of view of co-operation as such,
2and so he withdrew it.
'The vapourings of the extremist press1: almost in­
evitably, perhaps, Ewbank regarded the new nationalism with 
some disdain. Yet he had given way to a considerable ex­
tent over the draft rules, and he soon decided, rather than 
possibly lose altogether the sympathy of the embarrassing 
group of 'educated young men in Bombay', J to try to find
1. Ewbank to D.A. No.1310 of 31 October 1917 encl. Bom. R.D. 
Order No. 6952 of 2 July 1918.
2. Ibid.
3. Ewbank to A.E.Mathias, Regr., Central Provinces, D/0 of 
25 April 1918. (Poona, Bombay Provincial Co-operative 
Institute, III. Hereafter the titles of the Poona files 
on the Institute are abridged as 'B.P.C.I. ')
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outlets for them within the co-operative movement.
He encouraged this vocal and highly literate group 
to produce, at first under the guidance of N.M. Joshi, a 
quarterly periodical which was named the Bombay Co-operat­
ive Quarterly. S.S. Talmaki, of the Saraswat societies, and 
Vaikunth Mehta soon took over most of the editorial work.
The first issue appeared in June 1917, complete with a 
'Message1 from 'C.S.C.1 - obviously Campbell. ('Let us... 
proceed with light hearts and joyful countenance to the 
Ideal we originally had in view.' The standard maintained 
by the Quarterly over the years was extremely high. Usually 
one can recognize the hand of Vaikunth Mehta behind the ed­
itorial contributions - perceptive, well-written assessments 
of the co-operative situation in Bombay and in India in 
general. The Bombay Co-operative Quarterly rapidly became 
a national co-operative journal for India.
A further step in the working out of Ewbank's ideas 
for the Bombay young men was taken in the founding of the 
Bombay Central Co-operative Institute. It was to some extent 
modelled on Horace Plunkett's Irish Agricultural Organization 
Society, though Ewbank saw 'no harm in working out our own
scheme for ourselves without paying too much attention to
2
foreign models.1 Ewbank did not at first intend the Insti­
tute to do anything more than provide 'propaganda1, and, only
1. B.C.Q., June 1917, p.31*
2. Ewbank, Note, undated, (Poona, B.P.C. I. ,III.)
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in Bombay city, some supervision.1
The most acute comments on Ewbank 's proposals came 
from F.R. Hemingway, the Madras Registrar. He advised 
caution; otherwise Ewbank might find that he had placed con­
trol of the whole movement in the hands of fan unofficial 
autocracy that will be quite as unrepresentative and far less 
responsible than the official department.' On the other hand, 
if real power were not given to the Institute, Ewbank would 
find that it would 'languish in the same sort of way that our 
"Provincial Union" has. 1 This body had been set up in Madras 
city in 1914 for propagandist purposes only. 'It now does no 
really useful work', Hemingway wrote, 'and is in the hands
of a few amiable, mildly enthusiastic, men in Madras with no
2experience of the mofussil. '
As Hemingway had virtually prophesied, the Institute, 
given a taste of power in Bombay city, wanted a great deal 
more elsewhere. On two successive days in December 1919, the 
nationalist Bombay Chronicle devoted editorials to the Ins­
titute's ; affairs. The chief complaint of the Chronicle was 
that the Institute had no concern with 'the main functions 
of organization, supervision and audit.1 'It was presumed 
the paper said, 'that the Institute, when started, would be 
entrusted with certain questions relating to the development
of non-credit co-operation and would be recognized as the rep-
•3
resentative association of co-operators in the Presidency.'J
1. See 'Prospectus.' (Poona, file cited.)
2. F.R.Hemingway to Ewbank, D/O (Confl.) of 19 March 1918. 
(Poona, file cited.)
3. Bombay Chronicle, 22 December 1919.
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The goal of ‘absolute self-management in internal affairs' 
should always he kept in mind in the co-operative movement. 
'That Ideal government set before themselves when the move­
ment was first introduced into the country, but in many a 
province it has well nigh been forgotten.Instead, control
was still centred in 'the Registrar's department and its or-
2namental adjunct, the Honorary Organizers'.
Almost certainly the editorial was not written by
its vitriolic editor, B.G-. Horniman. It was probably written
by Sayed Abdullah Brelvi, a member of the paper's editorial
staff, later to become its editor.^ Brelvi, like Mahadev
Desai, was a close friend of Vaikonth Mehta. He was, in
fact, virtually a member of the Lalubhai Samaldas household;
4
Motilal Nehru called Brelvi 'the adopted son of Sir Lalubhai.' 
The editorial in The Bombay Chronicle may therefore have 
represented to some extent the opinion of the powerful 
Lalubhai Samaldas Mehta family. Certainly Vaikunth shared 
the opinion of Brelvi, and, one suspects, of Mahadev Desai,
5
of the honorary organizers of the mofussil.
'It may be taken', Ewbank wrote in 1919, 'that the 
goal of our policy is to restriot official control gradually
1. Bombay Chronicle, 21 December 1919*
2. Bombay Chronicle, 22 December 1919*
3. "See”"M. R. Jayakar, The Story of my Life, Vol.I, 1873-1922,
pp. 237-247 for a description of The Bombay Chronicle's 
interior workings at this time.
4* See Natarajan, Lalubhai Samaldas, p.50.
5. See below, Chapter VII.
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to the functions definitely assigned to the official staff in 
the Co-operative Societies Act and to transfer all initiative 
training, finance and developnent to ao-operators themselves 
as rapidly as efficient, representative and democratic co­
operative institutions can he created,
Ewbank, to quote the words of one of his subordin­
ates, ‘enlisted the co-operation of non-officials to an ex-
2tent unequalled in India.' There is no doubt that Ewbank's
policy in this respect was quite deliberate* As early as
1913 he was speaking of 'democratizing' credit as well as
cheapening it.^ About this time the G-overnment of India also
4
began again to use the phrase 'the democratization of credit* 
it had been almost forgotten since Nicholson's time. Though 
only vaguely as yet, the movement was beginning to be thought 
of not only as providing the opportunity for the growth of 
the Victorian virtue of 'self-help', but also as a training 
ground for political democracy. The ideas behind the De­
centralisation Commission's report were beginning to become 
part of the background of thought of officialdom.
Ewbank's belief in democratization was strengthened 
by the study of co-operative literature which his service 
with the Maclagan Committee necessitated, and he continued
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.6318 of 22 May 1919, encl. Bom.R.D. 
Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919*
2. D.A.Shah, Obituary Notice of Sir Janardan Madan, B.C.Q.* 
April 1957, p-261.
3- Rept., 1913, p.7.
4. India G.R., R. & A. Dept. (L.Rev.), No. 12-287-1 of 
17 June 1914. (Published in pamphlet form.)
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to hold his belief in spite of the fact that he was increas­
ingly faced with a nationalism which he found both irritating 
and somewhat incomprehensible.
About the beginning of 1919 Ewbank felt the need to 
increase the superior controlling staff. But he felt that it 
was now not simply a matter of asking Government for an in­
crease in staff and hoping that such a request would be fav­
ourably considered. He now had to explain himself to the non­
officials in the movement. He therefore convened a meeting 
of ’practical working co-operators*, which met at his office 
in Poona on 22 April 1919. Representatives of the Institute, 
and Sane, Naik and Malji and some other honorary organizers, 
were there. The Bombay Central Bank was represented only by 
Vaikunth Mehta ~ a further indication of the type of people 
who were its directors is given in Ewbank*s note that at this 
time *all the directors except one were absent either in 
England or in the hills.
According to Ewbank*s letter advising Government of 
the results of this meeting, several of the non-officials 
present argued that the co-operative movement was a democrat­
ic and popular movement and ought therefore to be as autono­
mous as possible. But Ewbank had insisted that the addition­
al staff was required mainly in the higher cadres, and not 
so much for the purposes of ordinary administration as for 
’the expert examination of the new schemes that are constantly
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.6318 of 22 May 1919, encl. Bom. R.D.
Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919.
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being put up and for visiting and advising Banks and Societies
on new developments as they arise.
Ewbank managed to persuade the meeting to agree to
an increase in the number of Assistant Registrars. As a
result of the Maclagan Committee G-onehalli had been appointed
an Assistant Registrar in the Deccan and Bhadrapur in the 
2
Karnatak. Many of the Registrarfs powers had been dele­
gated to them. The 1919 meeting agreed that an additional 
Assistant Registrar was needed for Gujarat and Khandesh; 
Gunvantrai Desai, the Auditor for the Northern Division*be- 
came the first Assistant Registrar for that area.^ When Gon- 
ehalli went on study leave to England towards the end of 1319 
his place was taken by Janardan Madan, an Indian member of
4
the I.C.S., who was eventually to become the first Indian
5
Registrar in Bombay.
Ewbank also managed to persuade the 1919 meeting 
that he needed a Personal Assistant. With over 15,000 
letters sent by his office during the past year, nearly 1,000 
arbitration cases and 500 applications for the registration 
of new societies to deal with, the time of the Registrar 
himself, as well as of his staff, was extremely full. *If I
1. Ibid.
2. Bom. R.D. Order No.11855 of 1 December 1916.
3. Bom.R.D. Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919.
4. Rept.5 1920, p.l.
5. Janardan Atmaram Madans Asst.Collr., Bom.,19095 Asst.Regr., 
1919; Acting Regr., 1919, 1921$ Regr., 1923; Joint Sec., 
R.C. on Agric., 1926; Chairman, Bom. Prov. Banking Enquiry 
Cttee., 1929; Sec., R.D., 1934; Commr.,1936; Adviser, 
Governor of Bom., 1939; Kt., 1942.
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remained at Poona,1 he wrote to Government, fI could dispose
of my office work without much difficulty. But in fact I
find it necessary to he on tour for more than half the year;
and while I am on tour about half of every day is spent in
visiting and instructing societies. The result is that I
sometimes have to scamp my office work and although personal
touch with leading workers is essential in this sort of work,
I often find myself regarding visitors almost as personal
enemies and more anxious to get them out of my office than
1
to understand what they want.1
Bhadrapur became the Registrars first Personal
2Assistant for a few months before he finally reverted to the 
Revenue Department to take up the Deputy Collectorship 
which he had coveted for so long.
The higher cadres had been strengthened. What of 
those officials who did the more routine work of supervision 
- the auditors and the inspectors? The Maclagan Committee 
were emphatic that *It is through the audit alone that an 
effective control can be exercised over the movement1.^  The 
Committee recommended that an auditor should not be called
A
upon to audit more than 100 societies a year.
Ewbank, however, was perhaps a little tardy in 
pressing for this principle to be put into practice in Bombay.
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.6318 of 22 May 1919, encl. Bom. R.D. 
Order No. 14140 of 3 December 1919.
2. Rept., 1920, p.21.
3. Maclagan Cttee. Rept., p.57.
4. Ibid,7 p.l76. Recommendation No.100.
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During 1915, 137 societies went completely unaudited. But
Ewbank did not propose asking 'in wartime1 for the number of
auditing officers recommended by the Committee.^ It was not
until 1918 that he asked for - and obtained - his full com- 
2plement. Ewbank was always assiduous in not pitching too 
higjh those of his requests to Government which involved 
finance ; consequently, he usually obtained what he asked for. 
Nevertheless it does appear that he sincerely believed that 
the day would come when auditing could be handed over to a 
non-official agency. For some time, it would appear, he had 
in his mind a scheme for an ‘Auditing Federation1, formed 
from, and to an increasing extent financed by, the guarantee­
ing unions.^ But Ewbank was transferred before this scheme 
came to fruition.
Ewbank felt increasingly that general supervision, 
as distinert from auditing, could not be handed over either 
to the Institute or to the district central banks. 'The 
alternative to expert official control1, he stressed, 'is not 
control by non-official amateurs, however philanthropic, but 
self-control.He rapidly became suspicious of the Institute
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.C.-266 of 19 February 1916, encl. Bom. 
Finance Dept. Order No.2213 of 26 July 1916.
2. Ewbank to Govt. No.13 of 2 January 1918 encl. Bom.R.D. 
Order No.7084 of 5 July 1918.
3. See Ewbank to B.A.Collins, Regr., Bihar and Orissa, D/0 
of 27 March 1918. (Poona, B.P.C.I.,111.) See also Ewbank, 
'The True Sphere of Central Banks' in B.C.Q., September 
1918, p.10. (Reprinted from Agricultural Journal of India, 
July 1918.)
4> Ewbank to Govt. No.6318 of 22 May 1919, encl. Bom.R.D.
Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919* Cf.Ewbank, 'Guarantee­
ing Unions', in Ewbank, (ed,), Indian Co-operative Studies,
p.49.
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and its claims. 'The Central Co-operative Institute \ he 
wrote towards the end of his period as Registrar, ‘can do 
valuable propagandist and training work hut it is not truly 
representative of the movement as a whole and is not in my 
opinion suited at present for taking over any administrative 
work. By 1918 he also strongly opposed any extension of 
the control over the movement which was exercised by the dis­
trict central banks. In the United Provinces and the Central 
Provinces, as Ewbank had noted in 1915, the policy had been 
to make the district central banks not only the balancing and 
lending organizations of the movement but also the main 
supervising agencies. Ewbank now condemned such an arrange­
ment. The ‘small knot of professional gentlemen and land-
2owners at headquarters1, who in practice ran these banks, 
were too distant from the village societies they financed to 
be able to supervise them directly.
In his Report for 1918 Ewhank insisted on the need 
to keep the village society firmly in mind. ‘The object for 
the benefit of which the whole fabric has been constructed is 
the village society.Ewbank had now placed his faith firm­
ly in the men thrown up by the village societies, the village 
leaders who had been brought together in the guaranteeing 
unions. The guaranteeing union was to be, in fact, ’the axis
1. Ewbank to Govt., letter cited.
2. Ewbank, ‘Guarnateeing Unions', in Indian Co-operative 
Studies, p.51*
3* Rept., 1918, p.3*
around which co-operative administration revolves.1^  The 
guaranteeing unions, rather than the urban intelligentsia, 
the philanthropic amateurs, were to provide that means of 
1 self-control*, that truly democratic scheme of administra\ 
tion which Ewbank earnestly desired.
Ewbank1s long career as Registrar came to an end
with his appointment in January 1920 as Deputy Secretary to
the Government of India in the Commerce and Industry Depart- 
2ment. He was given a general oversight over co-operatives 
in India as part of his duties.
If we take the statistics furnished in March 1912 
and in March 1920 as roughly representative of the state of 
the movement in Bombay at the beginning and end of Ewbank's 
term as Registrar, we may understand at least to some extent 
the nature of the growth which took place during this period. 
The number of rural societies had risen from 284 to 2,091# 
Their working capital had increased from Rs.4,88,552 to 
Rs.1,10,39,323. i ■; "the average membership per rural society 
had increased from forty five to seventy five and the average 
working capital per member from Rs.38 to Rs.71# In Dharwar 
District, the best as far as numbers were concerned, about
1. Ewbank, 'The True Sphere of Central Banks', in B.C.Q.t 
September 1918, p.110.
2. See Rept., 1920, p.l.
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1
a third of the villages had societies. These were statis­
tics on which Ewbank no doubt prided himself.
Doubtless , too, Ewbank prided himself on the trib­
utes which were paid v/hen he left for Delhi. The Bombay 
Chronicle did not compliment Englishmen unnecessarily. It 
did not begrudge him this tribute, however: 'When Mr. Ewbank 
assumed charge in 1912, the co-operative movement in this 
Presidency was a negligible factor in the life of the people 
It was looked upon as a fad and a craze promoted by Govern­
ment and taken up by a few stray persons here and there who 
wished to stand well with Government. Prom the very outset 
of his career as Registrar, Mr. Ewbank threw himself heart 
and soul into the movement, preached it with the zeal of a 
believer and by his fair mindedness and frankness attracted 
to it a large number of persons with varied political beliefs 
In spite, therefore, of the differences of opinion which 
Mr. Ewbank has had with co-operators, who are anxious to make 
the movement as democrative /BicJ in its. working and con­
stitution as in its aim, particularly at the time of the 
promulgation of some objectionable rules under the Act, there
1. A good deal of caution is required when working with co­
operative statistics. Por instance, a considerable sum 
was included twice under the heading 'Total Working Capi­
tal1, first as the working capital of central banks, in­
cluding the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank, and then as 
the working capital of. primary societies. The habit of 
adding the statistics of the urban societies to those of 
the rural societies also gives a false impression, espec­
ially when comparisons are made with other provinces, or 
when one is chiefly concerned, as is the author, with the 
agricultural movement. Bombay had more urban societies 
than other provinces; many of the 'urban banks' had very 
high memberships and very large amounts of capital.
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will be general regret at his going.
Such tributes were undoubtedly deserved. Yet today 
it is possible to see that, although Ewbank himself probably 
did not realize it at the time, he did in fact leave the co­
operative movement in a somewhat precarious position. He had 
built up a force of honorary organizers, and then proceeded, 
not altogether perhaps on his own initiative, to disband 
large sections of it. He had seen the Bombay Central Co­
operative Bank grow from its infancy; in spite of his friend­
ship with Vaikunth Mehta there was often in his dealings with 
the Bank a distrust of Bombay 'big business'. He had organ­
ized the Institute, but he did not wish to give that organ­
ization a great deal of real power.
The distrust which Ewbank displayed towards the 
urban elite may frequently have been justified. Yet to that
elite such distrust was probably just another sign of un-
2reasonable British dislike of 'these educated classes.' And 
there was now a dynamic new political ideology which could 
easily draw the urban, elite away from co-operative activity 
altogether.
Ewbank's fundamental sympathies - and, of course, 
those of Campbell and countless other British officers of the 
time - were with the villager. The villager was conceived 
to be someone slow and simple, yet hardy and in most ways
1. Bombay Chronicle, 29 January 1920.
2. Of. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, 'Passage To and Prom India', 
in Encounter, June 1954, p.23.
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basically honest. It was with him, Ewbank felt, that the 
'future hopes of the movement' lay. Democracy must start 
from the bottom. The guaranteeing union, made up of 5the 
little leaders of the labouring classes', was eventually to 
be the 'axis' around which the movement revolved. In the 
meantime, official control at the top had to remain. The 
co-operative movement in Bombay at this time reflected to 
a remarkable degree, in fact, the attitudes of the British to 
the whole problem of the transfer of power.^
But suppose that in the co-operative sphere guaran­
teeing unions proved to be basically unworkable. Suppose, 
furthermore, that for various reasons, the "mass of apathy', 
whiah Mahadev Desai found in the villages, remained largely 
impenetrable. Where then would co-operative democracy stand?
The only workable alternative to co-operative democ­
racy which did not involve control by townsmen and dilettante 
amateurs was, as Mahadev Desai realized, three or four paid 
inspectors for each district. It was an alternative which 
Ewbank by inclination did not wish to face, and which Indian 
nationalises and Government parsimony did not allow him to 
face.
1. Cf. PercdLval Spear, 'From Colonial to Sovereign Status- 
Some Problems of Transition with Special Reference to 
India', in Journal of Asian Studies, August 1958.
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VII
' T H E  P E A K 1 ?
(1920 - 1923)
Otto Rothfeld \.ad reached the Senior Collector's 
grade as Collector of East Khandesh. He was a little too 
unorthodox in his ideas and his methods to be able to look 
forward to a Commissionership, and probably would have re­
tired somewhat earlier than he did if he had not been of­
fered the position of Registrar of Co-operative Societies,^
The post gave this 'brilliant, versatile, impetuous and
■>
impatient officer'*^  full scope for his abilities. 'The Roth- 
feld regime,' one who followed him as Registrar has written, 
'represented, perhaps, the peak which the Co-operative Idea 
attained in official estimation, and almost everything that 
he asked for or ordered was given and carried out without
A
question.'
But although Rothfeld usually had his way, he was 
somewhat distrusted in some official circles. One Collector 
wrote sarcastically of 'the Germanized uniform scheme' which 
had grown up under Rothfeld's administration of the co-opera- 
tive departmenty there was an element of personal rancour
1. Otto Rothfeld: Asst. Collr. and Asst. Political Agent, 
1899-1916 5 Collr., 1916-19205 Regr. Co-op. Socs.,
1920-1923? retd., 1923,
2. See Rothfeld's spe.ech, Prov. Co-op. Conf.Procs., 1923»P»74.
3. D.A.Shah, Obituary Notice of Sir Janardan Madan, B.C.Q,, 
April 1957, p.261.
4. V.S.Bhide, Obituary Notice of Professor H.L.Kaji, B.O.Q., 
January 1953, p.108.
5. (Copy of) A.H.A.Simcox, Collr. Nasik, to Commr. C.D.,D/0 
of 9 June 1921. (Poona, T.A.G.7-)
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here, as Rothfeld, of part Hungarian extraction and with 
relatives in Hungary, had been interned for a brief period 
during the War.**"
Rothfeld had spent some time in the Political Serv­
ice before he became Collector of East Khandesh and had had
time to write several reasonably successful evocations of the
2
Indian scene. Though he toured quite extensively as Reg­
istrar - for about two hundred days a year, in fact - one has 
the feeling that his comparatively leisured life continued. 
His tours took him rather frequently to those parts - Gujarat 
and Khandesh - which he knew well. His annual reports were 
tossed off in a few days with the aid of a shorthand typist, 
instead of being painstakingly written and circulated to the
•i
Assistant Registrars for comment before publication. A per­
sonal Assistant did most of the everyday work that had pre­
viously been done by the Registrar, and many of the Regis^ 
trar*s powers had been delegated to the increasing number of 
Assistant Registrars, Rothfeld, then, represented the new 
type of departmental administrator. His task, as he con** 
ceived it, was to have the ideas; it was largely up to others 
to look after the minutiae of co-operative administration. 
Rothfeld fsaw and planned almost fifty years ahead, leaving 
little unthought and untouched1, one of Rothfeldfs subordin­
1. Information from Shri Vaikunth Mehta.
2. Indian Dust, 1909; Life and its Puppets, 1910; With Pen 
and Rifle in Kishtwar, 1918; Women of India,.1920. See 
also Umar Khayayam and his Age, 1922.
3. Information from Shri D.A.Shah.
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ates has written*^  This is perhaps an exaggeration; never­
theless, it is true that many of the opinions which Rothfeld 
held are, on the face of it, similar to those held in India 
today*
Before he took up his position as Registrar he was
sent on a six week deputation to France and Italy to study
co-operation there - the Maclagan Committee had recommended
that such experience should form, if possible, part of the
2
training of Registrars. What he saw there, he claimed in 
his report on his deputation, compelled him ’slowly to aban­
don the prepossessions I had in favour of non-intervention*
i.
by the State in ao-operative matters,J Rothfeld realized 
where the new developments which he fostered might lead. It 
was hardly possible, he thought, for producers* and consumers* 
societies to develop ’without bringing into question long 
accepted opinions about property and individual rights of 
every k i n d . T h e  co-operative movement, Rothfeld told the 
Provincial Co-operative Conference in 1923, ’stands for the 
oontrol of all business in the interests of the people*. It 
stood *as a barrier to prevent the onrush of the evils which 
have in other countries followed in the wake of the capital­
ist movement.* He spoke quite savagely about the evidence 
of certain businessmen before the Tariff Committee of 1923 -
1. Shah, loc.cit.
2. Maclagan Cttee. Rept.. p.56.
3. Rothfeld, Impressions of the Co-operative Movement in 
Prance and Italy, p.3*
4. Rothfeld, review of L. Smith-Gordon and C.O'Brien, Co­
operation in Many Lands, Vol.l, in B.C.Q.,June 1920,p.35.
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of 1 those who control the means of production1 and who 
wished 'to impose additional taxes on the peasant*One 
instance stands out in which it might he said that Rothfeld 
was acting from 'socialist' motives* In 1922 the Bombay 
Central Co-operative Bank submitted a list of banking in­
stitutions with which it desired to make deposits* One was 
the 'Peninsular and Orient Banking Corporation', an organi­
zation obviously connected with the shipping line of that 
name, Rothfeld, writing to Government, recommended that de­
posits with this Bank be not permitted: the Corporation was, 
he aiaimed, 'a striking example of a bank devoted to the 
interests of a capitalist concern peculiarly opposed to the
ideals underlying co-operation* 1 The Bombay Government were
2not impressed by such arguments, however.
Rothfeld's 'socialism' was chiefly the result of 
his capacity to think the co-operative idea through to its 
logical conclusion. He perhaps had something of the clever 
man's desire to startle the complacent with his 'logical 
conclusions.' His practical achievement was necessarily a 
good deal more limited than the scope of his thought.
After Rothfeld had been Registrar for a few months
the Reforms scheme came into effect in Bombay* Co-operation
became a 'transferred' subject under an Indian Minister.
1* Prov*Co-op* Conf.Procs*, 1923* pp.16-17.
2# Rothfeld to Govt* No.B.P.B/13 of 13 November 1922, encl.
Bom.G.R.R.D. No.6720 of 28 March 1924.
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The first Minister of Agriculture and Co-operation was 
Chunilal Mehta. Chunilal resigned as Chairman of the Board 
of the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank when he became the 
Minister; he was therefore obviously very familiar with the 
problems of co-operation. He belonged to that group of 
Liberals who ruled in most provinces while Congress refused 
to contest the Council seats and who ‘provided the most dis­
tinguished and forceful ministers of the whole Dyarchy 
period.f His philosphy was perhaps somewhat paternalistic. 
Certainly he felt that the initiative in the Indian situation 
had to come from above rather than from below: 'if we do 
desire to have progress, let us not consider what will be 
acceptable or what will not be acceptable to most people.
Let us first see what is good - what is for the good - for 
the agriculturists and the co-operators in the Presidency
and then see what would be the best way of carrying it out
2
according to the wishes of the people.' The Liberals, it 
has been pointed out, ‘did not believe in mass contact.
Rothfeld was the first Registrar to be completely 
independent of the Director of Agriculture. But Rothfeld 
as Registrar, Mann as Director of Agriculture and Chunilal 
Mehta as Minister worked together as a vigorous trio;
1. Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-G-overnment in 
India, Pakistan and Burma, p.130.
2. Prov.Co-op. Conf. Procs., 1922, p.104.
3. B. R. Ambe dkar. Ranade"“ Gandhi ana J inn ah. p. 82. The author 
owes the reference to Dr.Ambedkar's analysis of the 
Liberals to Dr. S.V.Kogekar, the Principal of Pergusson 
College, Poona.
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the harmonizing influence between the stern Director and the 
somewhat flamboyant Registrar was usually the Minister.
During the years of their administration it certainly app­
eared that 'rural development1 had been freed from the tram­
mels of official tardiness and even, for a time, from the 
trammels of official parsimony.
Yet, as Rothfeld pointed out to the Royal Commission 
on Agriculture, 'the Secretariat1 still came between the de­
partmental administration and the Minister of a transferred 
subject. Rothfeld did not object to his proposals being 
submitted to the Finance Department; 'no head of a depart­
ment in this or in any other country could possibly object 
to his proposals, as far as they involve finance, being 
subject to a Finance Department.1 But he did object to the 
continuing Revenue Department surveillance of co-operative 
affairs; 'the Registrar, let us say, or the Director brings 
up to the Minister certain proposals for a change in policy 
for discussion and approval. He goes up to him as the per­
manent head of a department naturally would in any country. 
The Minister approves of the proposals. They are then drawn 
up in detail. They are then submitted through the Revenue 
Secretary, and, in conformity with the old Secretariat 
system, the Revenue Secretary naturally thinks himself
1. Cf. Dr. Mann, when a 'Development Commissioner' was 
suggested in order to bring together the activities of 
the Co-operative and Agriculture Departments; 'my Develop­
ment Commissioner is the Minister.' Regrs. ' Conf.Procs., 
1926, P.54# Chunilal Mehta by this time had ceased to 
be Minister, however.
entitled not merely to criticise the form of the proposals 
and to see that they are put up in a correct form, but also 
to start revising the matter of the proposals already 
approved by the Minister.
Rothfeld failed to mention in this account that 
under the Reforms he himself was not purely an administra­
tive head. He was also a member of the Legislative Council.
2His duties there took up a good deal of his time | one sus­
pects, however, that they were quite enjoyable to a man of 
his temperament. It should also be added that Chunilal 
Mehta*s position as Minister was not as powerful as it might 
have been if Lloyd, the G-overnor, had called joint meetings 
of ministers. Chimanlal Setalvad, the first Indian member
of the 'reserved* half of the administration, claimed that
4
under Lloyd the ministers were 'reduced to shadows,' 
Responsibilities and powers, then, were as yet vaguely 
defined, both in law and by precedent.
Although at the end of his period as Registrar
5
and in retirement Rothfeld professed himself to be strong­
ly in favour of the rapid transfer of political power to 
Indian hands - indeed, he appears to have expected Indepen­
1. R.C. on Agriculture in India, Mins, of Ev., Vol.II. 
pt.i, pp.l66-T577
2. Rept., 19239 p.3-
3. Sir George Ambrose Lloyds M.P., West Staffordshire, 
1910-18., Govr. Bom., 1918-23.
4* Bombay Chronicle, 22 October 1924.
5. See Prov.Co-op. Conf. Procs., 19239 p.745 Prov. Co-op.
Conf. Procs,, 19257 P-97.
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dence by about 1930 -1 he was opposed to the brand of poli­
tics represented by the Congress,
Rothfeld told the Provincial Co-operative Confer­
ence of 1920 that in the past year, for the first time, the
co-operative movement had been 'faced by a clamorous and
2
influential opposition.1 The exact nature of this opposi­
tion he left undefined. In his 1921 Report he noted that 
he had spent a good deal of time in Gujarat inspecting the 
societies there, affected as they were by political con­
ditions'.^ There is, in fact, no conclusive evidence avail-
4
able at present to show that cultivators at this time re­
fused to pay debts owing to co-operative societies because 
they considered the societies to be state-sponsored. In 
1920-21 arrears in Surat increased, 'rather inexplicably', 
as Rothfeld put it in his Report, from Rs.22,000 to Rs.
Rs.1,43,000. The Government of Bombay in its Resolution 
on his Report (was such a Revenue Department resolution an 
anachronism?) had no doubt that the movement had been
c
'hampered by the results of political propaganda. ' There 
would appear to be a strong a priori case for tracing some 
of the increasing embezzlement and 'contempt for the law1 of 
these years to the attitudes to which the non-co-operation
1. Ibid,
2- Prov.Co-op. Conf. Procs., 1920, p.16.
3- ttept., 1921, p.l.
4* The author has not been allowed access to the Confidential 
files in the Registrar's Office in Poona dealing with the 
effects of the Congress agitations on the Co-operative 
movement.
5* Rept.t 1921, p.8.
6. Bom.G.R.R.D. No#P.53 of 8 December 1921.
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movement gave rise, if not to the non-corope rat ion movement 
itself. Rothfeld laid the hlame in this way, frequently and 
bitterly."1'
The Congress attitude to the co-operative movement, 
at first undefined officially, appears to have become more 
favourable with the beginnings of the Constructive pro­
gramme. * In December 1922 Young India published an article
entitled 1 Swaraj and Rural Co-operative Societies.1 Its
2
writer signed himself simply fA Co-operator.' Co-operative 
societies were seen by this writer, almost in orthodox Brit­
ish fashion, as a most valuable training ground for self-gov­
ernment, as a ‘preparation for real Swaraj1. Congress workers 
were asked to enter the movement. Young men were needed - 
one worker to every three to five villages. 'In fact the 
movement for Swaraj and the co-operative movement ought to 
be identical.1 Then came the final twists only if such a pol­
icy were adopted 'would mass civil disobedience and other 
political devices become possible.This last sentence 
appears to have been only an afterthought, different in tone 
from the rest of the article, added to give the article 
respectability in some Congress eyes. It can hardly have 
given the article respectability in British eyes, however.
In actual fact, few Congressmen joined the co-oper­
1. See, e.g., Rept., 1921. p.55 Rept., 1922, p.5.
2. Shri Vaikunth Mehta thinks that the article was probably 
by a South Indian, a personal friend of Rajagopalchari,
(who was then editing Young India), or possibly by 
Rajagopalchari himself.
3. 'A Co-operator', 'Swaraj and Rural Co-operative Societies', 
in Young India, 21 December 1922.
229
ative movement at this time.
Those nationalists who began to play an important 
part in the co-operative movement in the Bombay Presidency 
in the early twenties were rather those who were being rapid­
ly left on the fringe of Congress politics - the Poona dis­
ciples of Tilak, especially N.C. Kelkar and D.V.Gokhale. In 
some brilliant pages M.R. Jayakar has described how these 
men temporized with the doctrines of Gandhi. Within a year 
they had lost their pre-eminent position as leaders of 
Maharashtra and there was nothing left for them but to be­
come 'Responsivists1 They, too, were not really prepared 
to deal with a mass movement.
Furthermore, the disciples of Tilak were Brahmans. 
Kelkar was the last Brahman President of Poona Municipality 
before the 'Samiti' Presidents of recent years. The 1922
municipal election marked the end of 'advanced class' dom-
2ination of the Municipality.
Kelkar's influence was still far from negligible, 
however. His insistence in 1923 that he would remain on the 
Board of the Poona Central Co-operative Bank only if there 
were no party feeling seems to have largely cured that Bank 
of its squabbles.J But the fact that Kelkar and D.V.Gokhale
1. Jayakar, The Story of My Life. Vol.I. 1873-1922. pp.371-375
2. See Y.B.Damle^ 'Oaste in Maharashtra•, in Journal of the 
University of Poona. Humanities Section, No.9. 1^5S, p.93. 
See also M.P.Mangudkar, Municipal Government in Poona. 
1882-1947♦ (A Case S t u d y Unpublished Ph.D.thesis^ 
University of Poona, p.34.
3. Minutes of Annual General Meeting, 24 June 1923, and 
following papers. (Poona, Poona C.C.B.-A.)
230
began to take up co-operative work in earnest at this time 
is to a considerable extent the result of there being little 
else left for them to do, in national, or, increasingly, in 
local politics.
In the rural areas, even more than in the city 
areas, the Brahmans were becoming increasingly unwelcome.
In the Satara District the movement assumed a 
definitely anti-Brahman colour. Most of the organization 
came from over the southern boundary of the district - from 
Kolhapur State. Kolhapur was headed by a strongly anti- 
Brahman Maratha Maharajah, Shahu Chhatrapati. B.V.Jadhav,
'the bitterest enemy of Brahmanism',^ who had been the 
Maharajah's Chief Revenue Officer, virtually had to be ap­
pointed an honorary organizer in the Satara District because 
of the tremendous influence he wielded there. The non- 
Brahmans' greatest triumph in the Satara district was the
conviction of a Brahsaa district honorary organizer for em-
2bezzling co-operative funds.
In Sholapur District, too, feeling ran high against 
the Brahman honorary organizers.^ Sholapur was Sane's dis­
trict. He was very distressed about the agitation. Writing 
in Kesari he condemned the non-Brahman cry that the movement 
was run by Brahmans for their own benefit. The main purpose 
of the movement, he said, was to raise the economic and
1. Dhananjay Keer, Dr. Ambedkar, Life and Mission, p.97.
2. Rept., 1923* p.3^
3. Ibid.,p.TO.
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moral standards of life of the people. With such an aim, 
the main group who benefited were the non-Brahmans. The 
Brahmans who led the movement did so simply because they were 
educated. If the non-Brahmans really wanted the Brahmans to 
go they would go - and the movement would suffer. But the 
non-Brahmans should not blame the Brahmans for all the faults 
of the co-operative movement if at heart they were not pre­
pared to do without the Brahmans."*’
Yet it would appear that the non-Brahmans were, in 
fact, increasingly prepared to do without the Brahmans. They 
did not for a time have many leaders to put in place of the 
Brahmans. The movement for non-Brahman education, to a con­
siderable extent sponsored by the Maharajah of Kolhapur, had 
2
begun. But there was to be a time-lag before the newly edu­
cated could assume positions of responsibility.
Rothfeld's attitude to the controversy between 
Brahmans and non-Brahmans was perhaps not quite impartial.
He was sarcastic about the Sholapur cultivators who 'seem to 
have persuaded themselves in some mysterious way that this 
is primarily a Brahmin movement* But he did not hesitate 
to point out, with even more sarcasm, that in the majority of 
cases of defalcation in 1923 'the offenders belong to the 
educated aiass and to a community which holds the first rank
1. Sane in Ke sari * 29 June 1920*
2. See Maureen L. Patterson, 'Caste and Political leadership 
in Maharashtra', in Economic Weekly* 25 September 1954, 
p. 1065. Cf* Alan R. Beals, 'Change in the Leadership of
a Mysore Village', in Economic Weekly* 25 April 1953,p.488.
3. Rept.* 1923* p*10.
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in the Deccan and the Southern Mahratta Country and prides 
itself on its power and purity.
Rothfeld appeared to many to he aiding the non- 
Brahman cause in a circular which he issued in 1921. A sec­
retary of a society in the Sholapur district misappropriated 
Rs,300 belonging to the society. He was discovered, and 
given a stiff sentence by the Collector. This secretary was 
a watandar kulkarni. Rothfeld issued a circular which
stated that 'under no circumstances should a Watandar Kul-
2karni be a Secretary.1 Rothfeld no doubt felt justified in 
tackling the problem of the power held in the villages of 
the Deccan by these hereditary village accountants. This 
power was certainly not always used for good. But several 
speakers at the 1921 Provincial Conference felt that the 
circular 'indirectly breathes hatred against the Brahmin 
aommunity in general',^ There were black sheep in all groups, 
it was said, but a group should not be judged by its dis-
4
hone st minority,
It was possibly in order to placate Brahman feeling 
that J.A. Madan, who acted as Registrar for part of 1922, 
issued another circular about the place of patels, who were 
usually non-Brahnan, in the work ofthe societies. There were 
instances, he said, in which patels took advantage of their
1. Ibid., p.39.
2. Rothfeld, Circular No. P.O.L.-12 of 2 May 1921. (Poona, 
loose.)
3. V.M. Bakre, Prov.Co-op. Conf. Procs., 1921. p.21.
4. Submissions of M.C.Kelkar, (Jalgaon), and P.K.Jambhekar, 
loc.cit. See also Prov,Co-op,Conf.Procs.,1922*pp.68-69.
233
position in the villages and in such cases they should be 
removed from the co-operative society committees. But, even 
so, 'great care1 should be taken to ensure proper enquiry 
in such cases; the patels, unlike the kulkarnis, were culti­
vators, and usually 'influential* in the village in a useful 
way.**" Madan, as an Indian, was treading delicately in a 
delicate situation.
Rothfeld's general attitude to non-officials in the
co-operative movement might at first appear to be somewhat
akin to Ewbank's. The 'lines of development' which he wished
the co-operative movement to follow were, he said in one
place, those 'by which Government control and Government
supervision are reduced to a bare minimum and on which the
societies are left to work out their own salvation as indiv-
2idual units in a self-governing movement1.
Yet Rothfeld as he wrote this did not have the 
'humble villager' in mind in the way that Ewbank had. 
Temperamentally, in fact, he was a townsman; his 'socialism', 
such as it was, was of the sophisticated, essentially urban 
variety. He, too, disliked mass movements. His socialism 
certainly did not prevent him from relying 'with confidence 
upon educated and moderate opinion among commercial and 
professional leaders of Bombay.1^ Bor under Rothfeld the
1. Madan, Circular No.160 of 7 April 1922.(Poona, Original 
Circulars, II.)
2. Rept., 1923. p.33.
3. Rept.. 1921, p.5.
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Institute was allowed to assume a much more important role 
in the movement than that which Ewbank had intended it 
should assume.
Rothfeld brought forward a scheme for affiliating 
societies to the Institute on payment of a very small fee and 
also for opening up Divisional and even District Branches of 
the Institute, During 1921, the enthusiastic V.H. Gonehalli, 
just back from England, and now assuming the name of fNaikf, 
was given the task of reorganizing the Institute along these 
lines. He succeeded remarkably well. Over 1,000 societies 
joined. Divisional Branches were opened in Gujarat, Mahar­
ashtra and the Karnatak.'*'
With the rise of the Institute the place of the 
honorary organizers in the movement began to decline,
Vaikunth Mehta, for one, was all in favour of this. After a 
aiash with an honorary organizer in one of the canal areas 
he wrote to Rothfelds *1 have very often conveyed to you 
officially and in private conversation my own opinion of the 
system of honorary organizers. You have been inclined to
agree with me and have assured me and so had the Hon. Mr.
2Mehta that it was only a question of time before this 
system which puts a premium on irresponsibility was replaced 
by an agency more amenable to rational discipline....My 
personal view is that a body of persons who are neither 
responsible to Government nor are organically connected with
1. V.H. Naik, Prov. Co-op. Conf.Procs.* 1921* p.124- et.seq.
2. Chunilal Mehta, the Minister,
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■banks or the Institute should have no place in the movement* 
Rothfeld, however, did not take any action in the matter of 
honorary organizers. He probably preferred to let the in­
stitution die a slow death* In fact, it had quite a long 
life in front of it.
The control of the non-official side of the move­
ment remained in the hands of the educated urban minority. 
Rothfeld believed that the primary societies would always
p
need ’advice, supervision and irspection from outside1.
This was very different from the ’self-control1 which 
Ewbank had advocated. Rothfeld in one place claimed that he 
would like to see the outside control aoming increasingly 
from the Institute and the financing agencies. He would not 
however, hand over all powers of supervision to the Insti­
tute until it had fa trained and numerically adequate staff. 
In order to maintain this staff the funds of the Institute 
needed to be ’nearly doubled. Any such increase implied 
not only an increase in the subscriptions but also an in- 
crease in the government grant.1
In practice, Rothfeld probably exercised as much 
control over the movement as his predecessors, if not more. 
Hubert Calvert, the Punjab Registrar, who was a member of 
the Royal Commission on Agriculture, asserted that the
1. V.L.Mehta to Rothfeld D/0 of 17 September 1923* (Poona, 
Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank. Hereafter the title 
of this file is written in footnotes as 'B.P.C.B. f) -
2. B.C. on Agriculturey Mins, of Ev.t Vol.II, pt.i, p.169.
3. Rept.y 1 9 2 p.33.
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Bombay Registrar's office issued circulars 'to an extent un­
known in other Provinces. The trio of distinguished
2 3Punjab Co-operative officials, Calvert, Strickland J and 
Darling,^ went further in theory than did those in most 
other provinces in advocating the 1 self-management1 of 
societies. Yet Rothfeld claimed that there was a 'very much 
larger percentage1 of societies in Bombay which were 'entire 
ly self-managing (which write out their own accounts and con 
duct their whole business very well) than is the case in the
5
Punjab or in any other Province,'
Rothfeldfs outlook towards official control was 
conditioned by his continental experience. 'Why do you 
think official control is necessary? Why not educate a 
society to manage its own affairs?' Calvert asked Rothfeld, 
now retired, when he came to give evidence before the Royal 
Commission. 'I find it very difficult to put what I mean 
into words', Rothfeld replied, 'I have not that trust in 
human nature and I know of no oountries, except Denmark and 
England, which have been able to carry on the co-operative
1. /R.C. on Agric., Mins, of EvcV‘ Vol.II, pt.i, p. 175.
2. Hubert Calverts Asst, uoimr.', Punjab, 1898; Dep.Commr., 
1915; Regr.Co-op.Socs., Punjab, 1916; Member, R.C, on 
Agric.,1925; Commr.,1928; Finance Commr.(Development), 
1932;retd.,1933.
3. C.P.Stricklands Asst.Commr.Punjab,1905; Dep.Commr.,1919; 
Dep.Regr.,1922; Regr.,1926; retd.,1931.
4. Malcolm Dyall Darlings Asst•Commr.,Punjab,1904? Tutor and 
guardian, Raja of Devas,1907;U,Sec.,Govt,of Punjab,1911; 
Joint Regr.,1920; Commr.Income Tax,1921; Regr.,1927; 




movement without a good deal of official control. The 
circumstances of certain intensely individualist countries 
like Denmark and England are very different from those of 
India, and to my mind the analogy appears to be rather with
( o-Vt /* i»» 2 yv
the practice in France and practically every other European 
Country.1 Rothfeld went on to add that 'if the co-operative 
movement is ever going to do what, after all, we as co-oper­
ators look forward to as the ideal, and that is, almost to be 
the State itself in all its economic aspects, it appears to 
me essential that the State in its political aspects should 
also to some extent control the co-operative movement inas­
much as it will also be controlled by it, This point of 
view was poles apart from that of almost everyone else in 
high government circles in the India of the time. The app­
roach of a Calvert to the problem of authority in a country 
like India was fundamentally that of the English liberal. 
Rothfeld, on the other hand, approached the problem in a 
peculiarly European, and, many must have thought, in a 
peculiarly doctrinaire way.
Rothfeld's views on the general question of control 
were probably to some extent the result of his experiences 
with guaranteeing unions.
Even before Rothfeld became Registrar there were 
signs that the guaranteeing unions were not working as they 
should. Henry Wolff had written to the Registrar expressing
1, Ibid.
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the opinion that societies might overlook the defects of 
other societies within the unions in order to obtain similar 
treatment themselves. And this was exactly what was happen­
ing. Even Ewbank had to admit that the half-yearly forecasts 
of the -onions to the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank were 
often too high, and that intervisiting was not taking place 
as frequently as it had been planned that it should. He had 
issued a circular announcing that a Special Mamlatdar, or a
person appointed by him, would visit each union annually and
2make specific enquiries on these points. Yet the guarantee 
ing unions had been intended to eliminate the work of the 
Special Mamlatdars. Once the Registrar felt that he had to 
check, in a way that was more than formal, the recommenda­
tions of the unions to the Central Bank in Bombay 3 the whole 
purpose of the guaranteeing unions was beginning to disappear 
Rothfeld at first went no further than to express 
the opinion that Ewbank had been somewhat over-optimistic 
about guaranteeing unions. Even in 1921 he did little more 
than endorse the opinion of Madan, his Senior Assistant Reg­
istrar, that fUnion members are not yet sufficiently actuated 
with a sense of social service to do their work properly 
without the stimulus of either reward or fear....With, how­
ever, proper supervision and guidance, the spread of the 
Union system seems to me to be the only way for effecting
1. Rept.« 1919« p#21.
2. Ewbank, Circular Ho.92 of 12 June 1918. (Poona, Original 
Circulars,II.)
3. Rothfeld, Review of Ewbank, (ed,), Indian Co-operative 
Studies, in B.C.Q.t June 1920, p.3FI
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that supervision over societies which at present is necessary
and which in some provinces is now undertaken by official 
1
agency. 1
But by 1922 Rothfeld was very concerned about the 
conditions of the guaranteeing unions. Proximity was essen­
tial in grouping societies together in a guaranteeing union. 
Because of the soattered nature of the societies in Bombay 
only sixty six guaranteeing unions had been formed. Yet, be­
cause on the whole the guaranteeing unions were formed in the 
more prosperous areas, they absorbed fifty three lakhs of 
the Rs.1,60,00,000 working capital of the rural societies of
the Presidency. Rothfeld thought this state of affairs some-
2what dangerous. Registrations of guaranteeing unions had 
virtually ceased; only two, in fact, had been registered 
since 1920.^
Strangely, the faults of the guaranteeing -union 
system were never, b o  it would seem, analyzed in detail. The 
basic fault appears to have been that the 'guarantee' came 
into operation only as a last resort. The procedure in case 
of default was outlined by Ewbank in this way: 'The default­
ing society is first cancelled and the joint unlimited: 
liability of its members enforced to the uttermost. It is 
only/ if at the end of. the liquidation any deficit remains,
1. Madan, Note, Prov.Co-op.Conf.Procs.,1921. p«67, also 




the payment of which has been guaranteed by the union, that
the other union societies are required to make it good in
proportion to the degree of liability accepted by each of
them.1 Ewbank added, significantly, that 'As no case has
yet arisen in India or Burma, in which the union guarantee
has been actually enforced, it is difficult to decide which
system will bear the strain best and prove in practice most
equitable to its members.' This was written in 1919* In
the years following, the societies completely opposed any
change in the procedure. The limits on borrowing under the
guaranteeing union system were such that the enforcement of
joint unlimited liability in the one defaulting society
almost always covered the loss. This was what Rothfeld
2meant by the 'illusory' nature of the guarantee. But at 
the same time the credits available under the system, en­
hanced by the 'supervision* that was supposed to be an essen­
tial part of it, were high enough to encourage reckless rec­
ommendations by societies in the unions. They knew that 
almost certainly they would not be affected if the loans 
they recommended oould not be recovered. The result of the 
continuance of such a system could easily have been a large 
number of liquidations.
Another fault of the guaranteeing union system was
1. Ewbank, 'Guaranteeing Unions', in Indian Co-operative 
Studies, p.57*
2. Rept., 1923, p.10. Cf.G.H.Desai, Personal Asst, to Regr., 
Office Note of 29 November 1928: 'almost all of the 
co-operative loans are given to persons who collectively 
are always solvent in the end.' (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
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that from the beginning practically no effort was made to 
train the committees of the unions and their meagre, poorly 
paid staff, Ewbank had plainly expected too much from ‘the 
little leaders of the labouring classes1.
The 1922 Provincial Co-operative Conference appoint­
ed a strong Committee to consider the whole question of 
guaranteeing unions. The Committee reported to the Confer­
ence of the following year. It 'unanimously held that for 
the purposes of supervision it was necessary to have some 
agency intermediate- between the primary society and the 
central financing agency1. While the Committee had 'great 
doubts' about the efficacy of guaranteeing unions, and did 
not believe more should be registered, it did not wish the 
existing ones to be dissolved unless the members wished it.
It was proposed, however, to form 'supervising unions * for 
the purpose of supervision only. These unions would have 
areas larger than the areas which guaranteeing unions served 
'so that', as the Report of the Registrar for 1924 stated,
'more societies aould be affiliated and a better oommittee
2and a well paid supervisor aould be appointed.1
Rothfeld, however, did not 'feel any certitude1, 
as he wrote his final Report, that the new supervising 
unions would do 'all that is required in the matter. The 
fact is that it is extremely difficult to find any unpaid 
workers in this Presidency who are content to do persistent
1. Prov.Co-op. Conf,Procs.t 1923> Appx. p.49-
2. Rept.,1924, p.loT
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and continuous detailed supervision and inspection of a 
kind which secures little applause or public recognition.1^"
Guaranteeing unions had arisen as a result of the
recommendations of the Maclagan Committee* There was one
other important recommendation of the Maclagan Committee
upon which Ewbank had acted much more slowly. It concerned
the distribution of takkavi through and to societies* The
Committee had believed that in times of scarcity short term
loans under the Agriculturists1 Loans Act should be made to
2societies and should be left to them to distribute. The 
Committee claimed that minor government officials extracted 
so much by way of perquisites when distributing takkavi that 
villagers would sometimes prefer to borrow from co-operative 
societies, although the societies1 rates of interest might 
be on paper considerably higher than the rate charged by 
Government. Similar arguments, the Committee thought, 
applied to long term loans under the Land Improvements Loans 
Act.^ Campbell, if he read the Maclagan Committee's Report, 
must have felt that his beliefs were at last being justified.
It was not, however, until the prospect of a con­
siderable amount of freedom from Government of India sur­
veillance began to open up in 1919 that Ewbank felt able to 
give the matter any concentrated thought. In March of that
1. Rept., 1923» p.11.
2. Maclagan dttee. Rept,, p.176, Recommendation No.201.
3* Ibid., p.ll7.
4. Ibid., p.176, Recommendation No.202.
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year he informed Government that he believed co-operative 
society members should have the option of taking takkavi 
either from their society or from Revenue Department officers. 
He thought that no loans should be given under such a system 
for more than five years*'*’ There was, however, no thought of 
merging takkavi in the general funds of co-operative socie­
ties; it was plain that each society would have to maintain 
separate accounts for general co-operative society funds and 
takkavi funds, and that some organization would have to be 
responsible for making elaborate checks before takkavi loans 
were granted,
Rothfeld did not entirely agree with Ewbank1s pro­
posals, He thought that few land improvements aould be made 
within five years* Yet it was land improvements ?r at her than 
short term loans, which could never be made by ao-operative 
methods alone. ‘The only solution1, in his opinion, was
•State aid1. He quoted the examples of Prance, Italy and 
2
Hungary. Rothfeld belonged to the school of thought which 
believed that advances under the Agriculturists1 Loans Act 
did more harm than good. Short term ‘doles*, he told the 
Agricultural Commission, merely ‘touched the fringe of the 
problem’, and, in fact, retarded the growth of the co-opera­
tive movement. Except in a few backward areas, he would
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.2373 of 3 March 1919, encl.Bom.R.D,
Order No.3552 of 4 April 1919.
2. Rothfeld to Chief Sec.,No.4304 of 5 May 1920. (Poona, 
T.A.G.4.)
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limit the distribution of short term Government loans to 
famine years.^ And, if a co-operative society existed in a 
village, there should be no alternative to applying to the 
society for a takkavi loan of any description. To some 
extent Rothfeld managed to persuade Chunilal Mehta and Gov­
ernment of the justice of his cause. In the rules which 
were framed in 1922, the emphasis was placed on loans for 
land improvement. In villages where there were co-operative 
societies, advances under the Land Improvements Loans Act 
would in future be made only through the agency of such 
societies* Government would place an annual allotment of 
three lakhs at the disposal of the Bombay Central Co-opera­
tive Bank, which would issue a loan on receipt of a certifi­
cate from the Registrar that the loan would be utilized for 
a valid purpose. Individual members of societies had to 
apply to their societies for takkavi; the societies in turn
had to apply through their district banks to the Bombay
2Central Co-operative Bank. The procedure had not been 
properly tested when Rothfeld gave up his position as 
Registrar.
Almost inevitably, another Registrar meant yet 
another round of examination and reorganization of the
i
upper reaches of the finance of the movement. That they had
1. See especially Rothfeld, Evidence, R.C. on Agric.* Mins« 
of Ev., Vol.II, pt.i, p.171.
2. See l3om. Prov .Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept.* Vol.I, p.85»
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gradually "been getting into a condition rightly criticized 
by the Manager of the Provincial Bank in strong terms can 
hardly be denied1, Rothfeld wrote in his first Administra­
tion Report♦ But, said Rothfeld, Ewbank 'very correctly1 
had not wished to tie his successor to any decision taken 
just before the change took place* He had left the corres­
pondence for Rothfeld to deal with together with •valuable 1 
notes.^ None of Vaikunth Mehtafs actual letters on the 
subject, or of Ewbankfs and Rothfeld's notes, appear to have 
survived. But it may be taken that the substance, at least, 
of Mehtafs submissions is contained in two editorial contri­
butions which appeared in The Bombay Co-operative Quarterly
2
in December 1919 and June 1920.
The exact nature of the relations which should
exist between the Central Bank in Bombay and the district
banks, the first article began, remained undefined. The
district banks were showing themselves to be unable to meet
the requirements of the societies in their charge. 'The
aonsensus of opinion, especially among rural co-operators,
is that the results are in no degree commensurate with the
energy spent on developing the new organizations* In some
Rept., 1920, p.3. The fProvincial Bank* referred to was,
of course, the Bombay Central Co-operative Bank.
2. ‘Co-operative Finance in the Bombay Presidency’, in B.C.Q.
December 1919, pp.155-161; 'Provincial Co-operative 
Finance1, in B.C.Q., June 1920, pp.16-25. Shri R.M.Talpade 
the present editor of the B.C.Q. has assured the author 
that the first is by Shri Mehta; the second is little 
more than an elaboration of the first article.
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of the districts which have local hanks in their midst, com­
plaints are rife that adequate capital is not collected, that 
much time is taken in sanctioning loans, that demands are 
put off for insufficient grounds, that no effort is made hy 
the hanks to entertain a field staff and that the management 
cannot ascertain the needs and difficulties of societies.... 
The delays of the original arrangements have only heen 
slightly reduced1 .^* The suggestion was put forward that co­
operative hanks should he organized on a taluka rather than
2on a district basis. In cases where men and capital were 
not available in taluka towns, 1branches of the provincial 
or district hank should he started, the former only in areas 
outside the jurisdiction of existing local banks*.
Rothfeld spent most of February and March 1920 
discussing these questions. He concluded that none of the 
district hanks was in a position to finance all the" societies 
in its district itself. They did not have the capital, and 
they were following too much Ewbank*s injunction to the Poona 
Banks to he ’economical about staff*.^ But at the same time 
Rothfeld felt that District Banks should be *the main unit 
of finance1, therefore, ‘they must he strengthened and their 
share capital rapidly increased*. Until the district hanks 
aould finance all the societies in their districts the 
Central Bank in Bombay would continue to do direct business .
1. B.C.Q.9June 1920, pp.17-18.
2. B.C.Q.,December 1919. p.157.
3. ThidV p.158.
4. See above, Chapter VI.
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with societies in areas not covered by district banks*
Legal steps were taken to have the name fBombay Central Co­
operative Bank1 changed to the more accurate Bombay Pro­
vincial Co-operative Bank1 - though these were not brought 
to a conclusion until 1 9 2 3 The 'likelihood of erecting 
efficient Taluka Banks in present conditions1, Rothfeld wrote,
'seemed almost hopeless to all who knew the actual condi-
2tions of those small towns*1
In spite of Rothfeld's desire to foster the activit­
ies of the district central banks, many of the significant 
developments at this time took place under the aegis of the 
Provincial Bank.
There was one particular facet of the old Nira 
Canal takkavi scheme which the Bank rapidly recognized as 
virtually essential in any scheme for the large scale fin­
ancing of cash crops. This was the intimate connection be­
tween the provision of credit and the organization of supply 
and marketing, a connection provided by the Bank's branch 
and 'shop* at Baramati. 'Indigenous banking1, stated one of 
the Bank's Annual Reports, 'has from times /jslcJ1 immemorial 
been conducted in India on a basis where the banker acts 
also as a trader and commission agent and agriculturists
1. Bank's evidence, Bom.Prov.Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., 
Vol.IV, p.429.
2. Rept., 1920, p.4.
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understand this system.
Some lessons had been learnt on the Nira Canal -
though perhaps not enough. Prom 1917 the Bank felt justified
in beginning to set up more branches with shops, on the
Baramati model, to serve the recently organized societies in
the newly irrigated sugar-cane areas along the Godavari and
Pravara Canals in Ahmadnagar District and in the South of
Satara District. A branch was opened at Kopargaon in Jan- 
2uary 1917* A branch at Islampur followed in 1920 and others 
at Belapur and Nira in 1923*
The goal which the Bank had in mind was that of 
financing primary societies directly only in areas served by 
a branch.^ The limitation of the Bank's activities to a few 
wealthy areas made it possible to create a well-paid and 
well-trained staff to undertake the duties, which, in the 
original Nira Canal scheme, had been undertaken by the 
Special Mamlatdar. The Bank had now, apparently, built up * 
enough of a reputation to be able to do without the official 
prestige which was normally attached to that personage*
After a branch had been working for a year or two the Bank 
normally associated with it an 'Advisory Committee1, which 
consisted of nominees of the Bank and elected representa­
tives of the societies. The Advisory Committee's task was
1. Fifteenth Annual Report of the Bombay Provincial Co-oper­
ative Bank, (for the year 1925-26). (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
2. !Por this branch see v.L.Mehta to Rothfeld No.R.11/660 
of 17 March 1922. (Poona, file cited.)
3* See Map in Bank's Annual Rent, for 1925-26.
4. Ibid.,p.7.
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primarily to redress grievances - but it was definitely 
only advisory. Here, then, were the possible beginnings of 
a new system of finance, by-passing the district central 
banks, based on trained guidance from above, and acknowledg­
ing the democratic principles of Co-operation only to a 
limited extent.
The chief reason for this expansion of the Bank's 
activities was, of course, the opening up of new irrigation 
areas. Yet there was also a very definite feeling that boom 
times had come to stay and that rapid development was worth­
while financially. 'The year was remarkable for the pros­
perity of the trade and the exceptional prices realised for 
the jaggery1, read the audit memorandum of the Bankfs 
branch at Baramati for the year 1920-21. 'Naturally a re­
markable decrease in the overdue arrears is also visible.
The same have come down from Rs.1,19,080-4-9 to Rs.35,427- 
1 3 - 8 . Malji came from Gujarat to look at the Nira Canal 
societies. The aondition of the societies, he reported,
was 'more or less enviable when compared with credit societ-
2ies in other parts of the country.1 Many began to think 
that the troubles of the Nira Canal societies in the pre­
ceding decade had been caused simply by low prices.
Yet in the tracts newly financed by the Bank the 
old problem of arrears soon arose. As in the Nira Canal
1. Audit memo, Baramati Branch, B.P.C.B.,year ending 
31 March 1921. (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
2. Malji to Madan, Ag.Regr., 1 February 1922. (Poona, P.S.8.)
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area, the societies had been started amongst cultivators who 
knew little about sugar-cane cultivation. The members of the 
societies under the branch at Kopargaon had very recently 
been eking out a living in one of the worst famine zones of 
the Deccan, They were particularly backward, and the Bank 
insisted on having as many representatives on the Advisory 
Committee as the societies elected.^ Though arrears contin­
ued to mount, it was realized that 'in a new area the suspen­
sion of credit may occasionally prove more injurious in its
effect than useful, and therefore cannot always be very rig-
2orously applied.1
Fortunately, perhaps, the sum lent by the Bank 
through the Kopargaon branch does not appear to have been 
very considerable when compared with the amount lent through 
the Baramati branch. At Baramati during 1925-26 
Rs.19,79,400 was lent to twenty eight societies, but only 
Rs.4,27,200 was lent to twenty five societies under the 
Kopargaon branch.
To add to the Bank's problems in the irrigated 
areas, sugar prices, ao easily assumed in 1920 and 1921 to 
be for ever rising, began to decline sharply towards the end
1. See V.L.Mehta to Rothfeld No.R.12/377 of 9 October 1922. 
(Poona, B.P.C.B.) Also V.L.Mehta to Asst.Regr., C.D.,
24 January 1921, (B.S.C.B., Regr.) The figures given in 
this letter for the total amount of arrears in the Goda­
vari and Pravara Canals area have faded beyond recognition.
2. V.L.Mehta to Rothfeld No.R.10/675 of 11 February 1921. 
(Poona, B.P.C.B.)
3. See Map in Bank's Annual Rept. for 1925-26.
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of the 1922-23 season* The Bank's new shop at Belapur in
the Ahmadnagar District was particularly Badly affected* The
few traders who had been attracted to the town already had
the upper hand, and they now rejected as broken as many
lumps of gul as they possibly could. Vaikunth Mehta, however,
had to agree that probably a good deal of the gul was not in
first-class condition, produced as it was by agriculturists
who were growing sugar-cane on a large scale for the first
timo.^ At Islampur much of the stock of gul had not been
sold by the middle of June, by which time the monsoon, which
2
would cause the gul to deteriorate, had already set in*
The Bank was not prepared to lose money on a large 
scale and, in fact, did not 5 the dividend paid during the 
years 1921 to 1923 was per cent.^ There was, however, one 
area in which the Bank, as a measure of philanthropy, was 
prepared to lose money, though only on a comparatively small 
scale. ^ This was the Bhil area of Panch Mahals.
The Bhil, Symington wrote in his classic report on 
the aboriginal and hill tribes of the Bombay Presidency, 
'begins the cultivating season in debt and without ready 
money, and consequently he has to borrow to meet the cost of
1. V.L.Mehta to Rothfeld, /no number or date given, but a D/0 
letter on the same subject is dated 17 September 1923^/ 
(Poona, B.P.C.B.)
2. V.L.Mehta to Rothfeld No.13/176 of 13 June 1923. (Poona, 
file cited.)
3. Bank's Prospectus* 1923. (B.S.C.B., Regr.)
4. Bank's Annual Rept, for 1925-26, p.16.
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cultivation, to feed himself and his family for part of the 
year, and to get drunk occasionally. The sowcar is accom­
modating at this time of the year. You only have to ask in 
order to get Rs.5 for cloth, Rs,40 for bullocks, or Rs.2 for 
liquor. True, you may have to work on the sowcar*s premises 
for a day or two without pay, but the chances are, you will 
then get an extra rupee to get drunk with before going 
through the formality of affixing your thumb on the necessary 
promissory note; the contents of which are mercifully not 
revealed or pleasantly explained away. Cash is thus readily 
available in small doles to meet all the Bhil's immediate 
necessities, which are very few. The sowcar will also ad­
vance money for land revenue; and frequently, especially 
in Rawapur taluka, actually pays the Bhilfs assessment him­
self at the taluka o f f i c e . A t  harvest time, Symington 
reported, all the cash crops, and often much of the food 
crops, were taken by the saukar, ‘One thing is certain...
the Bhil Khatedar never sells his crop, but hands it over
2bodily in part payment of an inextinguishable debt1. If the 
Bhil owed money to two or more saukars his crop was 'pounced 
upon1 by a saukarfs agent - often a Pathan - as soon as it 
was ripe.*^
Pour men were largely responsible for the extension 
of co-operative activity to the Bhil areas. There was
1. D. Symington, Report on the Aboriginal and Hill Tribes





Vaikunth Mehta of the Provincial Bank, who sincerely desired 
it to engage in some really self-sacrificing work. There was 
Rothfeld, who had been an Assistant Collector in the area 
and hence knew its needs. There was D.A.Shah, the newly 
appointed Assistant Registrar for Gujarat, a gifted and de­
voted man, who, but for his health, would have been a member 
of the Indian Civil Service,’*' Finally, there was A.V.Thakkar, 
•Thakkar Bapa*, the engineer who had become a social worker, 
the Gandhian in the Servants of India Society, the father of
the Bhil Seva Mandal and, indeed, of Hindu concern for the 
2aboriginals.
Prom the beginning, it was realized that an attack 
on the problem of the Bhils could not begin simply with one 
or two credit societies* Credit, purchase and sale facili­
ties had to be supplied from the beginning. Such work could 
not possibly be done by the Bhils on their own. It was here 
that the Bank stepped in with its offer to open a branch at 
Dohad, To provide sufficient custom, fifty or sixty societ­
ies had to be organized all at once. 'You cannot start one 
society at a time and then add to it as time goes on1, said 
Shah, when describing the work some years later.^
1. Shah was a Bombay University Prizeman, and Ewbank consid­
ered himself very fortunate to have obtained his services 
as Auditor in 1918. See Bom,R.D.Order No.10364 of 21 Oct­
ober 1918, Por his appointment as Asst.Regr., See Bom.R.D. 
Order No.1770 of 6 July 1921. Shah acted as Regr. and as a 
Collr. in the forties.
2. Por Thakkar, see Gujarat Research Society, Shri Thakkar 
Bapa Commemoration Volume, particularly the chapter by 
G.V.Mavlankar; see also Thakkar, The Problem of Aborigines 
in India.
3. Shah* Prov.Co-op. Conf.Procs., 1929* p#46.
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Both the Bank and Government were fairly generous 
in applying supervisory staff, including a Special Mamlatdar. 
They soon found that staff even for the routine work would 
have to be supplied too. In spite of careful training, 
the Bhil group secretaries aould not handle the work. So 
three caste Hindus had to be employed as clerks at Dohad*
'The class of men who could do writing work well', wrote 
Shah truthfully, 'would not be able to do the field work,
2
spend nights at Bhil villages and mix freely with the Bhils. ' 
The Bank's 'branch' system was carried to its logic-
i
al, frankly paternal',-' conclusion amongst the Bhils. Like 
the saukar, the Special Mamlatdar and the Manager of the 
Bank's branch had to 'practically... take charge of the whole 
life of the Bhils*.^ Arrangements had to be made to enable 
the branch to pay the assessments on behalf of the members 
of the societies. If the Bhils were allowed to pay it dir­
ect, alaimed Rothfeld, they would be trobbed on their way by
5the Savkars or their Pathan Bullies. Perhaps, however, 
the Bank employed people whose task was not altogether unlike 
that of the 'Pathan Bullies' against whom Rothfeld delighted 
in crusading. Even the Bank found that the Bhils had to be 
'goaded' into making repayments. It employed 'menial
1. Shah to Madan, Regr., No.A.G.C. of 12 October 1923#
(B.S.C.B.,Regr.)
2. Shah to Madan N0.A.D.M./4 of 7-8 June 1924. (B.S.C.B.,
Asst* Regr., Surat.)
3. Rept., 1927, p.19.
4. Itept., 192*8, p.21.
5. fio'thfeld to Collr. Panch Mahals No. A. G.C./109 of 21 April 
1923. (B.S.C.B., Regr.)
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servants1 who went ahead of the Bank's Inspector and who
stayed behind to see that orders were carried out."3"
The co-operative society had in fact completely
taken the place of the saukar, the only difference being that
its terms of business were strictly fair. Perhaps the term
'co-operative1 aould hardly be used to describe the system.
But Symington, who saw it in action in the late thirties,
believed it should be the model for the backward areas of
the rest of the Presidency. 'The co-operative movement', he
wrote, 'can never succeed in backward tracts unless it is so
2
aiosely controlled as to cease to be truly ao-operative.1
Whatever the case in Panch Mahals, there was cer­
tainly one area in Gujarat at this time where the state of 
Co-operation was a delight to the co-operative purist. This 
was Olpad taluka of Surat district, amongst the Kadva 
patidars.
In 1919 there was a heavy slump in the price of 
cotton. Some cultivators in a few villages centred around 
Sonsek joined together, pooled their seed cotton, had it 
ginned, and sold it in loose bales on the market. They found 
that they thus obtained a better price for it than when they 
sold it individually. When the prices went up some of the 
villages dropped out of the pooling system. But Sonsek
1. Shah to Madan No. A.D.M./4 of 7-8 June 1924. (B.S.C.B., 
Asst. Regr., Surat.)
2. Symington, op.cit., p*51.
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persisted, under the leadership of Purshottamdas Patel, the 
patidar with South African experience who had already built
up the credit movement in the Olpad taluka.^ 'Prom the
2
beginning1, P.A.Shah has written, 'Sonsek Pioneers stood 
on their own legs. They did not even partially depend on 
the services of an officer loaned from the Co-operative 
Department or the central bank of the district, nor did they 
ask for any subsidy from either. Their whole staff was 
drawn from the agricultural classes, and some of them even 
carried on agricultural operations during the monsoon and 
attended to the societies1 work during the off-season and 
other spare time. They had the sympathy of the Co-operative 
Department and of the central bank. But they had to face the 
opposition and ridicule of powerful vested cotton trade 
interests and the unconcealed antipathy of an important 
Department of government.The cotton sale society which 
the thirteen Sonesk men set up in 1919 was registered in 
1921. By 1924 it had a membership of 300, and there were 
several other sale societies nearby.^
1. See above, Chapter V.
2. He is comparing them with the 'Rochdale Pioneers.'
3. D.A.Shah, 'Let us remember our own pioneers in time', in 
B.C.Q., March 1946, pp.159-160. The author has questioned 
Shri Shah on the exact nature of this 'unconcealed antipa 
thy'; he has been asked not to reveal at the present mo­
ment the details he has been given. Perhaps it will suf­
fice to say that the Department concerned was not the Rev 
enue Department, and that the antipathy was not brought 
about by the fact that the cotton sale societies had many 
Congress supporters in them.
4. Shah, 'Co-operative Cotton Sale in Gujerat1, in Prov. 
Co-op. Conf. Procs., 1924» Appx. p.lviii.
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It was very important that the cotton grown hy the
members, of these societies should all he of the one strain, 
so that no sorting had to take place. It was some years 
before this particular problem was settled. When it was 
settled, however, the patidars were ready to tackle the next 
problem - the hostility of the owners of the ginning and 
pressing factories. In 1926 they organized their first 
ginning and pressing society, Finally, in 1930, the various 
aotton societies which had sprung up in Surat District or­
ganized themselves as the ‘Southern Gujarat Co-operative 
Cotton Sale and Ginning Societies* Union. * A headquarters 
was set up in Surat with a highly paid management in touch 
with day-to-day fluctuations and with large buyers,^ "
1. It is^  interesting to follow the diagram of the various 
ahannels through which cotton oould pass through from the 
grower to the mill-buyer, which is given in the Bom.
Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., Vol.I, p. 101. the 
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What was the secret of the success of the cotton
societies of Gujarat? Finance supplied “by the Surat District
Central Bank'*' and marketing contacts provided by the Bombay
2Provincial Co-operative Bank played their part. Then, too, 
the societies were willing to pay for highly skilled man­
agement - even though that management came from amongst the 
patidars themselves. Another most important factor appears 
to have been caste solidarity and loyalty, and, in partic­
ular, the leadership within the caste of Purshottamdas Patel. 
The original Sonsek men stuck by their society, even though, 
in the early years the prices realized by it were occasion­
ally slightly lower than could have been obtained by indiv- 
idual sale. The Kadva patidars were, of course, reasonably 
well educated and fairly well off by the standards of the 
rest of the Presidenay, though many of them worked in their 
own fields. They could afford to suffer slight losses in 
the cause of a future success which they could calculate 
with a fair degree of accuracy. It was this same prosperous 
stolidarity amongst the patidars which Congress was able to 
make use of with such effect. But the most important reason 
for the success of the co-operative cotton societies in Guj­
arat was simply that Co-operation in this case was not some­
thing foreign to the cultivator, given by Government. In­
stead, Co-operation supplied a definite felt need; Co-oper­
1. See P.T.Parikh, A Brief History of the Co-operative Move­
ment in the Surat District, p.o5.
2. See Provincial Bank's Annual Rept., for 1925-26, p.13. 
(Poona, B.P.C.B.;
3. Information from Shri D. A. Shah.
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ation, in fact, came almost naturally in the circumstances.
In an article published in Kesari in 1920, the 
perspicacious R.M. Sane gave his views on the progress of 
the movement in areas where, on the whole, it had not arisen 
spontaneously. The issue of Kesari in which Sane wrote his 
article^ * happened to be that in which the death of Tilak 
was announced and tributes paid to him; hence it was a wide­
ly read issue. In some oo-operative circles Sane's article
2was considered to be ‘sensational1*
On the basis of the statistics of the numbers of 
new societies, Sane wrote, the movement appeared to be pro­
gressing. The accounts of societies often showed, on the 
surface, a profit. But when one went into the villages one 
found a different situation. A loan from a society had to 
be repaid within a fixed time. That being so, most members, 
Sane claimed, borrowed from money-lenders to pay their debts 
to the society. Two months later they would borrow from the 
snciety to pay the money-lender. But, said Sane, the peasant 
would pay as much interest on that two months1 borrowings as 
he would pay to the society in a year.
Sane did not profess to be completely pessimistic 
about the prospects of oo-operative societies, however. Very 
occasionally, he had come across villages which had genuinely 
benefited from a co-operative society. Such villages showed
1. Kesari, 3 August 1920.
2. Uee B.C.Q.* September 1920, p«106.
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what could he done. Por one third of the farmers of India it 
was not worth while doing anything. But for the remaining 
two thirds something ouould he done. If the ryots themselves 
did not understand what was good for them, because they were 
illiterate, then the educated must help* Sane used the analo­
gy of a doctor. If the doctor recommended a medicine, hut 
the patient would not take it, the patient's relatives and 
friends had to consider it their duty to persuade - even to 
force - the patient to take the medicine. The same attitude 
was necessary so far as co-operative societies were concerned. 
The old paternalistic attitude, similar to that of 
Chunilal Mehta, was manifesting itself.
Sane appeared to some to lose faith in co-operative 
societies soon after this article appeared,**" This was not a 
completely aorrect impression. When he was appointed a rep­
resentative of the societies on the Board of the Provincial 
Bank he took his duties very seriously, as the minutes of 
the Board's meetings show, frequently making the long 
ney to Bombay from Barsi, His extremely lucid and impartial 
mind enabled him to see the Bank's point of view and to suc­
cessfully defend it against the blustering attacks of other
2mofussil men, such as G.K.Chitale. But he was already an 
old man by Indian atandards.
Sane died in 1925# There was to be little room for
1. See Devadhar, Prov.Co-op. Conf.Procs., 1925, p.5. See 
also V.S,Bhide~ 'Memories and Recollections of an Old- 
Stager', in B.C.Q., April 1954, p.10.
2, See Prov.Co-op. Conf.Procs., 1921, p.47,
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| leaders of M s  type in the new India that was growing up.
I
What basis in fact had Sane's picture of the co­
operative society member as one caught up in a vicious 
circle ofL borrowing here and paying there? The Bombay Co­
operative Quarterly, though it joined with Sane in calling 
for an economic enquiry into these charges,"*” aommented that 
such an enquiry probably would not reveal anything not al­
ready known to 'close students' of the movement. However, 
it felt that the days were certainly past when it was 'un­
desirable to uproot the tender plant again and again and
2examine whether its growth was healthy.*
Rothfeld's examination of the plant tended to verify 
Sane's charges. 'Taking the Presidency as a whole he 
wrote in his Report for 1923, 'it is believed, that the annual 
expenditure in money, mainly borrowed, for current cultiva­
tion amounts to about Rs.25 to Rs.30 crores.' Rothfeld did 
not give any calculations to show how he arrived at this 
figure;^ the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 
basing their calculations to some extent on 'reliable1 data 
from the Department of Agriculture, came to the conclusion
1. B.C.Q., September 1920, p.75*
2. Ibid., p.106.
3* I.e. including Sind,
4. In 1922 he had estimated the total requirements at Rs.25 
crores, again giving no calculation: see Rothfeld, 'Note 
on Indian Rural Pinances Remarks on the Note by Mr.Simcox. 
The 'Mr. Simcox* referred to is A.H.A. Simcox, Collr,
Nasik - an opponent of the idea of co-operative societies. 
(Poona, T.A.0.6.)
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that the total cash requirements of the Presidency as a
- 1
whole in 1930 came to about Rs.32-2 crores. Rothfeld knew 
that the total number of agriculturists in the Presidency 
was about two million. Of these, 208,000, or nearly eleven 
per cent., were members of credit societies. Even if only 
twenty crores were required by the agriculturists annually, 
the co-operative society members, supposing them to represent 
a fair cross-section of cultivators, would require two crores, 
In fact, however, many co-operative society members came from 
irrigated areas and other areas requiring large amounts of 
capital. Therefore they needed at least two and a half 
crores annually. The total amount lent to individuals by 
credit societies with unlimited liability in 1922-23 was 
Rs.1,15,03,380.^ Rothfeld thus calculated that the cultiva­
tors who were members of co-operative societies were obtain­
ing from the societies only a little over two fifths of what 
they required for current agricultural operations. They were 
still far from abandoning the saukar.*^
Yet Rothfeld did not conclude that the solution in 
all areas was simply to provide more money for the co-oper­
ative movement. Even in 1921 he had ‘strong doubts' about 
co-operative societies ever succeeding in the Deccan.^ He
1.Bom. Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., Vol.I.p.76.




felt, in fact, that in many cases where the cultivator's 
business was unprofitable the only solution was for him to 
Stell his land and go and work im a factory in Bombay.^ 
Rothfeld knew that this idea would be unpopular. But, he 
told the Provincial Conference of 1922, 'as far as I am con- 
cerned I consider the most serious enemies of the movement 
- far more serious than any joint stock banks - are Phil­
anthropy and Sentimentality, There is. far too much of a 
tendency to deplore the state of poor cultivators, of unecon­
omical cultivators, and in consequence there is a risk of
giving them money which has been earned, hard-earned, by
2another man who is really economical.' Rothfeld*s final 
thoughts on the matter while he held the position of Regist­
rar were these: 'I think that in the Deccan co-operative 
credit should not be the main instrument of oo-operation 
but that greater reliance should be paid /sicJ  upon the 
consolidation of holdings, the spread of joint cultivation, 
and of the extension of co-operative sale and ao-operative 
purchase of agricultural requisites.
Rothfeld's conclusions about the consolidation of 
holdings and the spread of joint cultivation were also those 
of Mann, the Director of Agriculture. Mann told the Royal
1, Rothfeld to D.A. Vichare, M.L.C,, No,Misc, of 17-20 Jan­
uary 1921. (Poona, T.A.Gr.3.) See also Prov, Co-op,Conf. 
Procs,. 1922, p.53,
2, Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., 3-922, p*27.
3, ferCr- on- Apyic, -Mins. , —p-r6-9->
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Commission on Agriculture that it was his. policy to try to 
organize the whole rural community on co-operative lines.^ 
There were two distinct policies involved. One was 
simply co-operative consolidation; the other was co-operative 
farming with, on occasion, some surrender of interests in 
land.
Keatinge, as Director of Agriculture, had been 
greatly concerned about the fragmentation of holdings. In 
1916 he had brought forward a draft of a bill, which was to 
be purely permissive, giving right-holders of an 'economic 
holding1 the power to register it in the name of one of them. 
What was an feaonomic holding’ was to be defined by the Col­
lector. Once the registration had been effected, partition
2or transfer to more than one person would be prohibited.
According to Mann, Keatinge 'met with almost united, 
opposition from almost every side,'J But by the twenties 
the Punjab system of societies for the voluntary oo-operative
4
consolidation of holdings was mee.ting with some success.
By 'consolidation' was meant simply the exchange of the con­
siderable number of scattered fragments often held by one 
cultivator for a compact bloods or a few compact blocks, Mann
1. R„C. on Agric., Mins, of Ev. Vol.II, pt.i. p.69*
2. Keatinge to Ch. Sec. No.1(5457 of 11 November 1916.
(Printed 'for official use,1 Poona, Government Resolutions 
file.) See also Keatinge, Agricultural Progress in Western 
India, pp.63-88, 195-253*
3. Mann, Prov. Co-op.Conf. Procs.. 1922, p.97*
4. See Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, 
pp. 240 et seq .T see also" R.'C. on Agric. Rept., pp. 138- 
140.
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felt very strongly that government efforts in this direction
in Bombay would still he regarded with suspicion. But, he
told the 1922 Provincial Co-operative Conference, !if mutual
consent is to he obtained by anybody that body is the Co-
1
operative movement.1 In the voting at the Conference, Mann 
appeared to win the approval of the fold Co-operators1 
present for his idea of making experiments, although judging
from the fact that M.R. Tarkunde suddenly withdrew an amend-
2ment to the motion, at the behest of Sane, there was prob­
ably, in fact, a good deal of division in the non-official 
ranks.
Rothfeld had fvery little faith in the voluntary 
method in this Presidency. He believed that it was 1 al­
most impossible to draw any inference from what has been 
achieved in the Punjab1. There was fan extraordinary want 
of cohesion1 in the villages of. Bombay. In the Punjab, he 
said, there were ^ery strong united communities although we 
have got such races as Sikhs and Mussalmans. Here we are all 
faced with divisions of interest from the Legislative Council 
... down to the Village Panahayats.1 ^ But at the same time, 
Rothfeld believed that any interference with the Hindu 
system of inheritance would be politically unwise. He agreed 
with Mann that fragmentation, as it actually existed in the






villages, should be dealt with first; legislation should not
at present he directed against future subdivision as a result
1
of inheritance*
Societies for 1 joint cultivation1 were a much more 
radical proposal* These societies would be for those who 
agreed to pool all their labour, their implements, and, for 
a time, their interest in land. At the 1921 Provincial Co­
operative Conference most of the leading delegates were po­
litely non-committal about such societies, although accord­
ing to the record of the Conference it funanimously1 passed
a Resolution recommending that experiments in joint cultiva-
2
tion be made.
At the 1922 Conference, Mann reported in detail on 
the progress of his experiments. They had been made in two 
villages, Bhambora in Ahmadnagar District and Arjunsonda in 
Sholapur. The Bhambora society was based on the lease of 
land for ten years to a co-operative society with unlimited 
liability. The second experiment was based on the lease of 
land to what was, in effect, a limited aompany. It was the 
first experiment on which Mann dwelt at the Conference. The 
village chosen was one which had been deeply affected by 
famine. 'The credit of the people had gone....80 per cent, 
of their bullocks had died and the land was rapidly passing 
out of cultivation. ' Mann claimed that the only alternative
1. Ibid., p.102. Cf, Rothfeldfs evidence, R.C. on Agric., 
Mins, of Ev., Vol.II, pt*i* p.168.
2. Prov.Co-opT Conf, Procs., 1921, pp.55-57.
267
to the cultivators* abandoning their lands was to have such
a society.'1' He was ready to admit that the task of organizing
such a society was made easier because the villagers* credit
had disappeared.
The society*s bye-laws were fairly rigorous. No
member could withdraw from the society if the land which he
had brought in was essential to the continuation of the work
of the society. Besides the Managing Committee there was a
'Committee of Control', consisting of two outsiders appointed
by the Registrar.
The main difficulty was the suspicion of the people.
They thought that the society might be a preliminary to
taking away their land altogether. The only way round this
problem was to enlist the help of local leaders; 'No amount
of preaching by outsiders, 'Mann told the Conference, 'no
amount of assurance by anyone else, but the men they knew
2well, would convince them.'
In the first year the cultivators were allowed to
work the land previously held by them; the society provided
X. Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs.. 1922, p.109*
2. Ibid., p.110. Mann was hardly an 'outsider' himself now; 
'When I first worked among the potato growers of the Poona 
district, they listened but would do nothing. Only when 
I had been able to check potato moth, after guaranteeing 
them against financial loss if they used my method, was I 
able to get a hearing with regard to other matters. Now
I can get men willing to test anything I recommend. '
(R.C. on Agric., Mins, of Ev., Vol.II, pt.i, p.6.)
The same methods were adopted by Mann's students. 
(Information from^N.V.Kanitkar.)
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bullocks, ploughs and seeds out of funds totalling Rs.15,000
lent by the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank and the
Ahnadnagar Pajnine Fund, The produce was divided into three
parts. One part, subject to the payment of land revenue,
was given to the owners. Another part was given to those
who actually cultivated the land, and the third part went to
the society for its provision of the means of cultivation. In
the first year the society appeared to be making a good
profit. Mann claimed that the cultivators had obtained,
through the working of the society, cheaper credit than they
could have expected before, bullocks and seeds without having
to incur further debt, and better terms for the sale of
produce than the saukars would have given. ^
Rothfeld was enthusiastic, and wanted to go even
further. A Sub-committee of the Conference had recommended
that 'the whole question of economic cultivation would be
much simplified if co-operative farming could be extensively
2undertaken without interfering with actual ownership.1 
Rothfeld was willing to agree to experiments along these 
lines. 'But I do not want it to be understood by this acqui­
escence1 he added, 'that I, in any way, mean to express any 
personal preference for such methods of joint cultivation 
with actual ownership. I strongly believe in the possibility 
of Co-operative Farming Societies of lands not owned by




Here, then was Rothfeld the socialist, due, in fact, 
to retire in a week's time. Such an utterance contrasted 
rather strangely with the caution of Rothfeld, the member of 
the Indian Civil Service, who at the same Conference spoke 
against interfering with the Hindu law of inheritance. The 
conflict between the two aspects of the man was always 
apparent.
How are we to sum up the administration of Rothfeld 
the Indian Civil Servant? *
The terse comment of the Bombay Co-operative 
Quarterly when Rothfeld retired from the position of Regis­
trar and from the I.C.S. is perhaps the most revealing of 
all. His 'vigorous personality1, the paper commented, had
left an impression on every field, 'with the possible
2exception of agricultural credit,'
The most damaging figures are those of overdue s.
In 1920-21 they olimbed from 8i to 18 lakhs.^ In 1921-22 
they rose to 19i lakhs - thirteen per cent, of the working 
capital of the movement.^ At the end of March 1923 they 
amounted to 31 lakhs, or over eighteen per cent, of the 
working capital. Rothfeld aiaimecL that these figures were 
'snmewhat aonfusing. In the first place as considerable
1. Ibid., p.102,
2. B.C.Q., December 1923f p.236.
3* Sept., 1921. p.8.
4. Rept.,1922, p.9.
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efforts were made to recover the current demand punctually 
and to recover outstandings as well, the working capital was 
rapidly reduced by the recoveries during the last month 
in the financial year. Hence the overdues which bulk larger 
as percentages at the end of the year than if they were com­
pared to the maximum capital in the winter. 1 Even so, the 
figures were 'alarming'.'*'
Rothfeld had, in fact, issued a circular stating
that overdues should be reduced by at least a half by the
2
end of March 1923* But there was much that circulars - 
which Calvert correctly saw as issuing from the Registrar's 
office in an ever-increasing stream - would not do. One of 
the offending areas was that irrigated by the new Godavari 
and Pravara Canals. 'It is respectfully suggested that this 
tract may also be visited by R. 1 /the Registrar^, wrote 
Rothfeld's Personal Assistant by the side of a copy of a 
letter from Vaikunth Mehta to the Assistant Registrar, which 
was very obviously on the subject of overdues in that area. 
'Justification?1 Rothfeld wrote in his imperious hand 
underneath.*^
Admittedly Rothfeld did not have the staff he wished 
for. There are oomplaints about 'retrenchement' even in his
1. Rept., 1923» p.9.
2. Rothfeld, Circular No. S.R.A.D.M. - 39 of 1922, printed 
in B.C.Q., March 1923? p.315.
3. V.L.Mehta to Asst Regr., C.D., No. R.10-B.C.C.B. of 
24 January 1921. (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
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Report for 1922.^ " Nevertheless he had a considerable number 
of men under him. The sanctioned strength of the superior 
staff of the Co-operative Department on 31 March 1923 was 
seven Assistant Registrars, two ’Special Auditors’, thirty- 
seven Auditors and ten paid ’Organizers’. Of these, the
appointments of one Assistant Registrar and two Organizers
2
were held ’in abeyance* through lack of funds*
Rothfeld indicated that the Banks must undertake 
some of the supervision work while this staff shortage per­
sisted.-^  At the same time, he believed that the staff of the 
Institute should be greatly increased if it was to engage 
in serious supervision work. Por this, however, the funds 
of the Institute would need to be ’nearly doubled. ! This 
implied a rise in the government grant to the Institute.^ " 
Rothfeld undoubtedly realized what was happening 
to the movement. Comparatively few societies were organized 
during his last year as Registrar. Consolidation was re­
quired, he wrote - ’the internal state of the movement made
5
this necessary.’
Yet simply to realize what was happening was not
enough* Rothfeld was a brilliant man. In a modern ’Planning
1* Rept.. 1922t p.l. Por the effect of Bombay’s financial 
troubles on the movement after the Reforms scheme came 
into operation, see below, Chapter VIII.
2. Rept., 19239 p.l*
3. RothfeId, Circular No.A.D,M./34 of 1923, 'Programme of 
Work for the Year 1923,' (B.S.C.B., Regr.)
4. Rept., 1923, p.33*
5. Ibid., p.6.
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Commission1 he would no doubt be a triumphant success. Yet 
the co-operative movement in the Bombay Presidency in the 
early twenties still needed the stolid, more conventional 
qualities of the average Indian Civil Servant, as well as 
ideas and an insistent pen* The co-operative movement still 
needed someone who was felt by members of societies in 
remote corners of the Presidency to be a real person, 
someone to turn to in times of trouble and also someone 
liable to descend at any time, someone, in fact, to be 
feared. If Ewbank laid too much emphasis on 'the humble 




R E A L I T Y  
(1924 - 1930)
When Rothfeld left the Department it appeared to
many people that there was 'hardly anything that could he
suggested or attempted for years to come.1’*' Though the
number of rural societies in Bombay and their membership
increased by more than half between 1924 and 1930, and their
2working capital more than doubled, there were no really 
important changes in the structure of the movement. The Pro­
vincial Bank, the District Banks, the Supervising Unions, 
the village societies - all remained. The Registrar, the 
Institute and the honorary organizers played, with some ad­
justments, more or less their accustomed roles. Yet it was 
during this, period that the real weaknesses of the co-oper­
ative movement became fully apparent.
Three men held the post of Registrar during these 
seven years - two Indians and one Englishman. Janardan 
Madan was Registrar from 1923 to 1926; G.F.S. Collins^ during 
some of 1926 and much of 1927, and V.S. Bhide^ for the
1. D.A. Shah, Obituary Notice of Sir Janardan Madan, B.C.Q., 
April 1957, p.261.
2. The number of rural societies in the Bombay Presidency in 
1924 was 30505 in 1930 it was 4779* Membership increased 
from 2,20,616 to 3,43,642; working capital of the rural 
societies from Rs.1,97,61,913 to Rs.4,10,06,469- Rept., 
1924,pp.72-75 and Rept.,1930? pp.124-127.
3. Godfrey Fernando Strafford Collinss Asst. Collr., Bom., 
1912; Ag.Regr., 1926; Sec.,Home Dept.,1929; Private Sec. 
to Govr.,1934; Commr.,Sind,1935 5 Sec.,R.D.,19371 Adviser 
to Govr.,1942; K.C.I.E., 1945.
4. Vithal Shivaram Bhidet AsstvCollr., Burma, 1915; Asst. 
Collr., Bom. ,1919°, Regr.,1927 I Sec.,R.D. ,1939? Commr. ,1942.
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remainder of the period,
Madan had been carefully groomed for the position.
He had already had a good fourteen years service as a Civ­
ilian, including three as senior Assistant Registrar. Like 
Rothfeld, he had been sent on a trip to England and Europe 
to study co-operation before taking over as Registrar.’1’
Madan1s position as Registrar has been described as 'both
2very difficult and very comfortable.1 His position was 
aomfortable in that many major deoisions had been made 
before he took charge, difficult in that he could not 
attract attention to himself, in the way that Rothfeld did, 
simply by making major decisions. Madan had to make his 
mark by hard, painstaking work on the details of administra­
tion. Perhaps he was assisted by the fact that he was an 
Indian. JI can go and see him at his house, I can join him 
at tea and talk to him at any time without reserve', said 
G.K. Devadhar.*^  On the other hand, Madan was capable of 
writing curt, often aommanding notes to non-officials.
Madan went on to a distinguished career after he 
left the position of Registrar. But his successor, Collins, 
who held the post for just over a year, rapidly became con­
vinced that the movement had been allowed to deteriorate 
and that vigorous measures were required. His opinions 
were perhaps not so much a reflection on Madan as on
1. See Bom, G-.R.R.D. No. 6728 of 17 March 1923.
2. Shah, op.cit., p.261.
3. Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs,y 1925* p.113.
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Rothfeld, however: he could note in his 1927 Report that in 
the area around Poona 'a large part of the arrears* dated 
bade six or seven years. It is possible to detect in his 
writings a certain British relish for the exposure of corr­
uption and incompetence in India5 in his administration he 
was inclined to hack mercilessly at a limb before he had had 
time to discover whether or not it was completely made up of 
dead wood. Nevertheless, he, more than anyone else, was res­
ponsible for pinpointing the undoubted faults of the move­
ment.
V.S.Bhide was thoroughly Indian at heart| most of 
his friends, for instance, came from Poona Brahman circles.
Yet, perhaps partly because he came after Collins, he too
2
pursued a fairly ruthless policy. But Bhide*s policy was 
neither arbitrary nor inelastic. It definitely left room 
for development.
One factor which Bhide*s policy did not and could 
not allow for was the final setting in, after the Wall Street 
aollapse, of the disastrous economic depression. Economic 
conditions in the Presidency had been most unfavourable for 
some years; that prices could decline still further was al­
most unbelievable. Sugar, prices had fallen in 1922-23, and
1. Rept., 1927* p.16.
2. Shri Bhide-is still one of the co-operative movement*s 
most penetrating critics; he has been described to the 
author as a *cynic*, though this is scarcely a just des­
cription.
276
had kept on falling. Cotton prices had fallen after 1925- 
26. The small farmer who had an economic holding hut who 
cultivated it himself did not suffer as much at first as the 
farmer who employed labours wages did not fall as rapidly 
as export prices. But by 1929 all who were connected with 
the land were deeply involved.***
Throughout the period the Co-operative Department was
dogged by sheer lack of funds. This state of affairs was not
fundamentally the result of the depressed economic conditions
of the Presidency. Rather, it was inherent in the system
of finance which was introduced with the Reforms, Under the
scheme drawn up by the Financial Relations Committee of the
Government of India (the fMestcn Committee*) during 1919 and 
2
1920, the provinces* main source of income was to be the 
Land Revenue. The central government was given control of 
Income Tax and Customs duties. Bombay*s chief source of 
revenue was thus inherently inexpansive - or rather, it 
could not be expanded without running the risk of provoking 
a Bardoli. The Bombay Government was perfectly correct in 
claiming that the Presidency had been better off before the 
Reforms. Deficit budgets were necessary in 1921 and 1922,
1. See Choksey, Economic Life in the Bombay Deccan,
(1818-1939). p.156.
2. For the Meston Settlement and Bombay, see Memorandum sub- 
mitted by the G. of B., Indian Statutory Commission Evi­
dence , Vol.VII, 5.562 et seq,., Statutory Commission Rept., 
P.P.1929-30 (356o); xi,l; Recommendations,P.P.1929-30 
(3569); xi, 453? T.M.Joshi, Bombay Finance, (1921-1946). 
pp.21-39i 74-112; P.Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance 
in India, pp.346-3,48.
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and from 1925 until 1928, when the Bombay contribution to 
central government funds was remitted.■*“
Under the Reforms scheme the Legislative Council 
had the right to reject a demand for a grant for a trans­
ferred, department, and unless expenditure was required 
simply in order to keep the department in being, the Gov-
p
ernor had no right to interfere. With Retrenchment1 an 
absolute necessity, it is not very surprising that the Legis­
lative Council sometimes decided to reject the demands for 
the Co-operative Department. The Council did the same to 
the demands of the Education and the Sanitary Departments. In 
spite of the fact that Bhide could claim that 1Almost all 
the members of the Legislative Council... are in one way or 
another connected with the Movement*  ^- it was usually only 
a very tenuous^  aonneation - the benefits^ provided by the 
older established 1nation-building* departments were probably 
just as obvious to the average Council member as those pro­
vided by the Co-operative Department, if not more so. One 
thing was certain; oo-operators now had to work through their 
representatives in the Legislative Council if they wanted 
the movement to have more government money. But they were 
not sure that they did want the movement to have more money, 
if that money was to be spent on more offiaial staff.
The 1926 Annual Report, largely written by Madan,
1. Joshi, op.cit., pp.74-75*
2. Statutory Commission Rept., p.143*
3* Rept., 1928, p*65*
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atated that although there had heen noticeable progress in 
every field the cost of the establishment had actually dim­
inished. Before Madan left for his service with the Royal 
Commission on Agriculture he wrote to Government saying that 
it was only fair to his successor to request an increase in 
the superior staff. In the ordinary aourse, he said, he 
would have written to Government earlier. fThe fact is that 
at present the Registrar is over-worked.Madan had indeed 
been working extremely hard - too hard, perhaps, to be able 
to take stock of trends properly. Collins renewed the suit, 
and eventually obtained, the sanction of the Secretariat for
the appointment of a Deputy Registrar on Rs.700 per month and
2another Assistant Registrar. But the Legislative Council 
persistently refused to sanction a grant for the post of 
Deputy Registrar."^
In hia Report for 1928 Bhide produced a table giving 
Government expenditure per nonber of the societies in Bombay 
and in the other provinces for the year 1926-27. Bombay was 
far behind the Punjab and the Central Provinces.^ Staff were
1. Madan to Govt., No.S.R. ADM.-123 of 14 June 1926, encl. 
Bom. G.R.R.D. No.6768/24 of 10 October 1927.
2. Collins to Govt., No.S.R.ADM.-123 of 21 February 1927 
encl. Bom.G.R.cited.
Repts., 1928, 1929* 1930, all at ;
Rs. a. P
Madras 14 2
Bengal 1 0 0
Bombay 1 0 7
Punjab 1 11 9





required in the Central Provinces to repair a structure which 
had almost collapsed in the early twenties* But the figures 
for the Punjab, where there were no abnormal conditions, 
clearly show where the emphasis in fact lay in that province.1 
Bhide was probably largely justified in speaking, after re­
tiring, of 'The Punjab School of Co-operation, with its em-
p
phasis on official direction and initiative1.
'The Punjab School1 had its representative on the 
Royal Commission on Agriculture in Hubert Calvert. It is 
very wlikely that he was responsible, possibly with Madan,^ 
one of the Secretaries of the Commission, for much of the 
section on ao-operation in the final Report. 'If co-opera­
tion fails,1 the Commission claimed, 1 there will fail the 
best hope of rural I n d i a . B u t  the members of the Commis­
sion felt it necessary to recommend, 'for the immediate 
future, a continuance of official guidance and, to some 
extent, of official control'. They believed that 'every 
effort' should be made to build up 'a highly educated and
1. Much of the money in the Punjab went on the employment of 
a large number of. government 'Inspectors'. Auditors were 
employed, by the non-official Punjab Co-operative Union, 
and largely paid by fees from societies; in practice they 
were under the government Inspectors. See Bhide to Govt. 
No.ADM. -135 of. 29 August 1921. encl. Bom.G.R.R.D.
No. 3818/24- of 22 Pebruary 1928. The Punjab's finances 
were not in such a parlous state as Bombay's largely, it 
would appear, because of the high receipts from irrigation 
dues. See Calvert, The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab.
P • 4*15 •
2. Bhide, Obituary Notice of Sir Janardan Madan, B.C.Q.,
April 1957, p.252.
3. See Bhide, loc.cit.
4. R.C. on Agric. Rept., p.450.
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well trained staff of officials* in all provinces.*** Bhide 
used this recommendation as a text in his efforts to obtain 
more staff. The Agriculture Commission, he wrote in 1928, 
had given their 1authoritative opinion,..and asb a result of 
the detailed discussions that will take place with reference 
to their recommendations it is to be hopedL that a comprehen­
sive programme of State assistance to the Movement will be 
drawn up and a substantial portion of the State assistance
will take shape of an increase to the existing staff
2of the Department. 1 But Bhide fs hopes, whiGh for a time 
were possibly genuinely high, were soon dashed. 'As things 
are, with the Co-operative Department's budget as it is,1 
growled Rothfeld from retirement, fit is hypocrisy for Gov­
ernment, the Registrar, or anyone else to speak of his super­
vising societies. The plain fact is that he cannot do it 
with the staff allowed him. With a considerably smaller 
number of societies and about half the working capital five 
years ago I made it tolerably clear that I could no longer 
go on accepting any appreciable responsibility as Registrar 
for the guidance or at any rate the supervision of societies. 
If I were Registrar now, I should absolutely refuse to accept 
any at all, until the Legislature cared to pay for an ade- 
quate staff; take it or leave it!'
1. Ibid., p.451.
2. Rept.. 1928, p.64.
3. Otto Rothfield^Ee had changed the spelling of his name 7, 
'Societies and their Supervision', in B.C.Q., June 1929, 
p. 5.
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Bhide eventually showed signs of adopting a policy 
somewhat along these lines. During 1930 Assistant Regist­
rars were instructed virtually to cease registering new 
1
societies. In the same year Bhide had an interview with the 
Governor at which he stressed the need for additional staff 
in the higher grades. But there was no thought of asking
2the Governor to intervene in Legislative Council affairs.
If more staff could not he obtained the existing 
staff could at least be used to the best advantage, Madan, 
in particular, set high standards for his staff. The touring 
of Assistant Registrars was often Spasmodic, without any
■3
regular plan1, he complained in one of his 1925 circulars. 
More circulars to the Assistant Registrars followed on 
delayed replies to letters, incomplete diaries, and slack­
ness generally.
Auditors, too, were the subject of some of Madan's 
caustic little notes. 'I find that Auditors usually spend
several days at headquarters every month doing "office work.1
4
Usually there is very little office work for them1. An­
other circular reminded the Auditors that it was essential 
that the societies be audited in the village. 'It is very
1. Rept., 3-930* p.15.
2. See “Bhide to Asst. Private Sec. to Govr. , D/0 of 12 Feb­
ruary 1930. (Poona, loose.)
3. Madan to all Asst. Regrs,, Circular No.ADM. - 83 of 
6-10 November 1925. (Poona, Sub-circulars.)
4. Madan to all Asst. Regrs. and Auditors. Circular No.ADM.
- 83 of 21-25 November 1924. (Poona, file cited.)
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necessary and desirable that the Auditor should sleep in the 
village and thus have an opportunity of meeting the members 
of the societies in the evening.*1 Probably taking his cue 
from Madan, one rather loquacious Assistant Registrar told 
his Auditors to *make the most of the immense opportunities
2
you get of acquainting yourselves with the village conditions. 
But auditing was dull work, and for a townsman, away from 
home and family, the villages were dull places; no doubt 
many auditors regarded such efforts to inspire enthusiasm 
as somewhat naive.
Madan was the first Registrar to suggest that with 
the increasing proximity of societies the ratio of one 
auditor to a hundred societies was perhaps somewhat high. He 
also thought that the time had come when some of the older 
agricultural societies which had large amounts of capital 
might be called upon to pay at least part of the cost of 
their audit. It was left to Bhide to develop these suggest­
ions. A new alass of * Sub-auditors* should be brought into 
being, Bhide believed; there need be no increase in the 
number of comparatively highly paid auditors - men whom 
Campbell, Ewbank and Rothfeld had felt to be so necessary.
And although Ewbank, now back in Bombay after several years
1. Madan to all Asst* Regrs. and Auditors, Circular No,ABM.
- 83 of 8 May 1925. (Poona, file cited.)
2. Asst. Regr,, C.D., to Auditors, C.B., No.CLR. - 2 of 
28 March 1924. (Poona, file cited.)
3. Madan to Govt., No.EST. - 146 of 31 August 1925, encl.
Bom.G,R.R.D. No.4830/24 of 12 October 1925.
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with the Government of India, advised against such a move, 
Bhide recommended that fees he charged from well established 
agricultural societies, in proportion to the amount of work­
ing capital, sufficient to cover a considerable part of the 
cost of the audit. Bhide was certain, however, that audit 
should continue to be conducted by government officials. *In 
a Province which more than others has adopted the policy of 
conducting the movement by non-official agency, it is the 
ultimate, and in fact the only, form of control and. super­
vision which the Registrar has over the societies.
Bhide's suggestions on the subject of the grading of 
auditing staff do not seem to have been made reluctantly. He 
appears to have been convinced that, with the increasing num­
bers of university graduates becoming available, it would 
be possible to obtain lower paid men who couldi accomplish 
the work satisfactorily. Needless to say, Government were 
quick to accept Bhidefs recommendations. They also accepted, 
his scheme for the charging of audit fees. But the final 
clause of the Government Resolution on the subject no doubt 
caused a good, many bitter thoughts: 1 Government are unable
to accept the suggestion that a part of the income realised 
from the audit fees should be earmarked for use in the form
2
of a Government contribution to the co-operative movement. 1
1. Bhide to Govt., No.ADM. - 135 of 29 August 1927 encl. 
Bom. G.R.R.D. No.3818/24 of 22 February 1928..
2. Bom. G.R. cited.
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Official control over the movement had hitherto been 
exercised by means of the wide discretionary powers vested in 
the Registrar under the all-India Acts of 1904 and 1912,
'Take away or reduce the discretionary powers of the Regist­
rar1, Ewbank had said, 'and it at once becomes necessary to 
substitute statutory control for his general powers and to 
extend the Co-operative Societies Act by at least 100 more 
sections,Rothfeld, however, with a mind that was always 
yearning for precise definition, had not been daunted by 
this warning. The provisions of the 1912 Act, he believed,
were 'rather vague,1 or, as they were 'often called by some
2
confusion of thought, simple.* He decided that with the 
coming of the Reforms a new, provincial Act was required.
To attempt to define by means of legislation what 
had hitherto been chiefly defined by rules promulgated under 
the Act, and by pure convention, was to invite strong 
criticism from non-officials, both within and without the 
movement. Possibly Madan did not wish to proceed with the 
bill which Rothfeld appears to have drafted in 1922;^ 
certainly it did not reach the Legislative Council until 
July 1924. It was immediately condemned by The Bombay 
Chronicle for falling to take notice of 'the changed
1. Ewbank to Govt. No.6318 of 22 May 1919, encl. Bom. R.D. 
Order No.14140 of 3 December 1919.
2. Rothfeld, Note, 'Co-operative Jurisprudence', 1 September 
1923. (B.S.C.B., Regr.)
3. See Prov. Co-op.Conf. Procs,, 1922, p.26. The author 
has not 'been permitted to see any files on the subject 
of the 1925 Act,
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Ipolitical outlook* in the Presidency. The "bill was referred 
to a Select aommittee, which reported in October. Much to 
the satisfaction of the Chronicle, this Committee recommend­
ed that any rules framed under the proposed new Aat should 
he supplied to the Legislative Council, which would he called 
upon to express its approval hy means of a Resolution, App­
arently the officials on the Select Committee gave way to
2the non-offioials on this point.
The hill was referred to another Select Committee, 
and finally subjected to three days of minute examination 
hy the legally minded members of the Legislative Council in 
July 1925. L.B. Bhopatkar. the Chairman of the Poona 
Central Co-operative Bank, took the lead in this examination. 
The non-officials wished to construct a complete system of 
hoards of. appeal, so that official decisions could he con-*
•i
tested at all levels. But, as The Bombay Co-operative
Quarterly wrote, 'In a council constituted as the present
one is, Mr, Bhopatkar aould not secure much support for his
view that the framework of the law should undergo radical
transformation, and hardly any amendments were moved with
the definite object of associating the popular element with
4
the administration of the law.1
1. Bombay Chronicle, 10 July 1924.
2. See Bomhay Chronicle, 10 October 1924.
3. For the Report of the Second Select Committee, see Bom. 
Legislative Council Procs., Vol.XV, Appx.C. For the Bill, 
see Procs., Vol.XV, 23-25 July 1925.
4. B.C.Q.9 September 1925, p.114.
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When all was done, Madan could report that 'The Bill 
as finally passed differs very little from the one originally
drafted hy Mr. Rothfeld,The net effect of the Act was
defined hy Rothfeld when he was questioned hy the Royal Com­
mission on Agriculture, 'Has not Bombay gone further than
any other Province in India in its legislative control over 
societies?1 Calvert asked him. 'I suppose so1, Rothfeld 
replied. But he immediately qualified his answer hy saying: 
'we have more definitely stated in our legislation the 
points where we consider that control hy the Registrar must
continue than any other Province has done, hut we confine
2ourselves strictly to these,'
Perhaps the most immediate effect of the new Act was 
a vast increase in the work of arbitration in the matter of 
the recovery of societies' dues. The 1925 Act provided for 
the appointment of three arbitrators instead of one if one 
of the parties so desired. The decision as to the number 
of arbitrators had previously been the Registrar's, Almost 
always, defaulters now opted for three arbitrators as part 
of their delaying tactics, knowing that it would be diffi­
cult to find three quickly* The number of honorary workers 
willing and fit to act as arbitrators, Collins claimed, was 
decreasing rapidly, and almost all the cases had to be
1, Rept., 1925, p.37. The author has not been permitted to 
see any files on the subject of the 1925 Act.
2. R.Q. on Agric,, Mins, of Ev., Vol.II, pt.i, pp.174-175.
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assigned to government auditors. This meant a considerable
increase in their work, and in the work of their immediate
superiors, the Assistant Registrars.
The new Act also contained, perhaps as a compensatory
t**€.
measure, provision for the immediate reference toARevenue 
Department of cases in which decisions had been reached.
There was now no need for an application to be made to the 
Civil Court before the work of recovery could begin. This 
was a policy that was beginning to approach the 1 summary 
recovery1 which Campbell had yearned for in the early days. 
But as the depression deepened, Revenue Department officials
were genuinely unable to handle all the cases - there were
)e 
3
12,133 in 1929-^ Additional staff therefore had to b pro­
vided, at the societies1 and the defaulters' expense.
At such a time as the passing of the Act the role 
of Ahonorary organizes and the Institute naturally came 
into question.
In the earlier part of his career as Registrar 
Madan spoke in conventional terms about 'the policy consist­
ently followed by Government to de-officialise the movement 
as far as possible.Nevertheless he noted in his 1924
1. Rent., 1927« p.45.
2. Rent., 1929, p.60.
3. Rent., 19537 p.79.
4. Madan to Govt., No.EST.-127 of 18 September 1924 encl. 
Bom. G.R.R.D. No.2062/24 of 18 November 1924.
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Report that there wa3 'probably not as much disposition to
do honorary active work as there was at the commencement of
the movement, as there are other interests which are found
to he more absorbing*It was fairly obvious what 1 other
interests1 were meant* In 1925, however, Madan claimed that
'some of the people who were till now engrossed in political
affairs are beginning to take an active interest in the Move- 
2
ment*. Though he criticized the Institute for not making 
enough efforts to enrol members,^ he was still inclined to 
think that honorary organizers performed a valuable service, 
especially considering the fact that their travel allowances 
had had to be cut again* 'It would be wrong to minimise, as 
is sometimes done in certain quarters, the importance of the 
work that they are capable of doing', he added.^ By 1926 he 
was ready to admit that it was possible that honorary organi­
zers might at some future date be 'an anachronism.' It was 
necessary to find some means of keeping up their enthusiasm 
over a number of years. 'The logical policy is to strengthen 
non-official organizations like the institute and the Super­
vising Unions, and gradually to absorb in them the individ-
5
ual workers.
With Collins there came a decided reaction against
X.
2.








5. Rept., 1926, p.3.
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the Institute. 'The decrease of Honorary Organizers must 
depend on the increase of Supervising Unions and not on the 
strengthening of the Institute. The latter hy its constitu­
tion has no legal authority, and therefore no power of super­
vision over the Societies which have joined it, and it is not 
a Union of Societies. '**■ Collins, in fact, appears to have 
heen profoundly suspicious of some of the townsmen who were 
members of the Institute.
As if to aonfirm the policy of Collins, the Report
of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, which appeared in
1928, stated boldly that 'To the failure to recognise the
limitations inherent in the system of utilising honorary
workers must be largely attributed the very serious defects
2in the movement1.
It cannot be said that Bhide had any strong desire to 
work through non-offioial agency, although at first he was 
inclined to think that if more officials were not available, 
the appointment of more honorary organizers was the best 
method available of securing a modicum of supervision. Bhide 
consulted Ewbank on the question of the future of the Insti­
tute. Ewbank, to quote.Bhide, was 'emphatically of opinion 
that the Institute cannot undertake supervision, a,nd he goes 
so far as not to be in favour of District branches of the
1. Rept., 1-927\ P*3*
2. B.C.' on Agric. Rept., p.451.
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Institute, although he agrees that Divisional branches were 
necessary. He adds that it might be possible at some future 
stage to replace the Institute by a Provincial Union as a 
giant and final federation of Supervising Unions, and it 
could then be entrusted with supervision, and possibly even 
audit.1 Bhide accepted Ewbank*s opinion.^
The grand edifice which Rothfeld had envisaged would 
now never be built. Rothfeld, writing from Spain to R.M. 
Talpade, the Instituted senior officer, fulminated against 
the direction the movement was takings fWe have a very power­
ful and multiform enemy to fight; and we must throw our
2
challenge down boldly.1 The letter was published. Rothfeld's 
attempts at intervention in the movement after he retired 
were doubtless intensely irritating to some people.
At the end of the decade, opinion, both official and 
non-official, was definitely swinging against the honorary 
organizers. A Karnatak correspondent of The Bombay Chronicle 
complained that 'Holiday lectures by those who think them­
selves superior beings' were of no use in taking 'the 
message of ao-operation to the doors of the ryot.The 
Karnatak was one of the centres of anti-Brahman feeling. 
Anti-Brahman feeling remained high in the Deccan, too. 'How
1. Bhide to Govt., Ho.ADM.- 135 of 29 August 1927, encl.
Bom. G.R.R.D. No.3818/24 of 22 February 1928.
2. RothfiSld /nothfeld_/ to Talpade, 19 January 1930, 
published m  B.C.Q.» March 1930, pp.214-215.
3. A Co-operatorJ KTo-operation in the Karnatak', in Bombay 
Chronicle t 2 April 1929#
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if I want to stand for a /jsloJJ membership they would not 
take me1, complained G.K. Chitale, a retired Brahman hono­
rary organizer,1 In 1929 there came the now almost inevit­
able government demand that the number of Brahman honorary 
organizers should be reduced. We have definite. % evidence 
on this occasion. It would appear, in fact, that Government 
rejected the first list of district honorary organizers that 
Bhide submitted in response to their demands. In his final 
list *only a few Brahmin names* appeared, ‘particularly of 
those who have up to this time distinguished themselves 
by their work and have proved very useful to the movement.
It would be a great loss to lose their services and their 
names have accordingly been included. 1 *1 am not making any
remarks regarding Taluka Honorary Organisers*, Bhide con­
tinued, *as the powers of appointing and removing them have 
been delegated to me.* Nevertheless, in the revised list of
assistant honorary organizers for the Central Division
2there were twenty Marathas and only four Brahmans,
In his 1930 Report Bhide stated that he now believed 
that in some parts of the Presidency, at least, the money 
spent on travel allowances for honorary organizers could 
probably be better spent in other ways. The co-operative 
movement was now not attracting as honorary workers men of
1. Chitale, Evidence, Bom.Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., 
Vol.II, p.403.
2. Bhide to Govt., No.EST. - 74 of 20 September 1929, encl. 
Bom. G.R.R.D. No.517-A of 7 October 1929*
3. Rent., 1930t p.4.
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the same calibre and status as were drawn into it in the 
early days. He pointed to the fact that the Institute was now 
recruiting very few members, and those they did recruit did 
not take the same interest in the work as the older members. 
‘The cry for more and more deoffiaialization of the Movement 
is raised every now and then, but very few people are now 
coming forward to accept responsibility for the efficient 
conduct of the various types of institutions. Honorary 
agency is of course the very foundation of the Movement and 
is welcomed everywhere, but we certainly do not want hono­
rary agency of a type which undertakes an important piece 
of work today, does it half-heartedly for some time and moves 
on to something else leaving the institutions concerned to 
take care of themselves as best they can.
Bhide was having to write this of a movement which 
at one time had held the interest of men such as Sane and 
Devadhar, Khandubhai Desai and Ambashankar Malji.
Both Collins and Bhide planned to give to the super­
vising unions the work that had been done by the honorary 
organizers. But the success achieved by the supervising 
unions was, in the somewhat ironic words of a Committee
which examined their work in 1933, ‘commensurate with the
2
resources available.1 The pivot of the union organization 
was the paid supervisor. It had been hoped, in 1924, that
1. Ibid., p.81.
2. Report of the Bombay Co-operative Supervision Committee. 
1933, p.7.
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the supervising unions would he self-supporting after three 
years, but many failed to achieve this aim. The pay pro­
posed for a supervisor at the beginning was Rs.40 to Rs.60 a 
2
month. Actually, most unions seem to have paid a sum in the 
region of Rs.35 to Rs.40. The result in 1933, a depression 
year, when positions were particularly difficult to obtain, 
was that out of the 122 supervisors in the Presidency only 
fourteen had received any university education. Even of 
those, nine had passed none of the co-operative diploma 
examinations which the Institute had been conducting. The 
number of supervisors who had passed the Matriculation ex­
amination was forty seven, 1 of whom only 28 have passed the 
test prescribed for appointment to [&J supervisor’s post 
and three are lent by the Co-operative Department.
Qualified men were sometimes available, however, 
though their services were not utilized. According to strict 
co-operative theory, Bhide wrote in his Report for 1930, the 
selection of supervisors ought to be left to the supervising 
union itself. Yet to give the supervising union these powers 
was to make ’opportunities for sheer jobbery on an extensive 
scale.Bhide had been quite definite for some years that 
’Representatives of the rural societies on the Union Board
1. Madan to V.L.Mehta, /official, but part of letter contain­
ing number is rat-eatenJT1, 26-31 January 1925# (B.S.C.B.,
Re gr.)
2. Madan to Govt., EST. - 127 of 18 September 1924, encl. 
Bom.G.R.R.D. No.2062/24 of 18 November 1924.
3. Supervision Cttee. Rept.t p.17.
4. Rept.,1930# P.43.
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of Management are hardly likely to make a proper choice.1** 
When it came to village life Bhide was a man of no illusions. 
He decided to set up 'District Supervision Boards' to review 
the work of the supervisors. These consisted of the Assist­
ant Registrar of the Division, a representative of the Insti­
tute and a representative of the financing institution. But 
in spite of these Boards there were instances in 1930 of 
'Unions insisting upon the appointment of incompetent and
untrained persons mainly for local, personal and factious 
2reason.'
Bhide had a plan under which primary societies would 
compulsorily contribute to a provincial supervision fund at 
a flat rate of one half per cent, of their working capital.
He also hoped for the creation of a provincial cadre of 
supervisors. But there were protests from the wealthy dis­
tricts at the idea of their stipporting co-operative work in
A
the poorer districts. As a compromise, it was agreed that 
funds should be pooled within each district.
The problem of supervision remained in 1930. But at 
least the nature of the problem was clear. Madan, who chair­
ed the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee in 1929, 
and whose opinions had probably changed a little in the three
1. Rept., 1928, p.37.
2* Rept., 1930, loc.cit.
3- Bhide's speech, Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs.. 1929. p.61.
See also A.U.Malji's speech, ibid., p.52.
4. Ibid., pp.55~59.
5. Ibid., pp.61 ff.
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years since he had been Registrar, put the problem succinct­
ly into words.: 'The whole point is this. The Movement is 
based on democratic principles,,.. But our people in the 
villages are not yet literate enough or competent enough to 
work a democratic institution and especially so when it deals 
with large amounts of money; and the society goes bad because 
the generality of members are not able to control the actions 
of the men at the top. If the members themselves are unable 
to control it, there must be some one else.,.who would be 
able to control it when necessity arises; and if that is 
necessary...what kind of control Should it be?1’*'
There was, of course, one kind of control which 
under certain conditions could have been extremely effect­
ive. This was control by the financing institution. Roth­
feld, in one of his commentaries from afar, underlined the 
point that he had made at the end of his career as Registrar
- that, in the absence of other agencies, the district banks
2
should take an increasing part in supervision activities.
But his was very much a lone voice. Why was there this re­
luctance in the co-operative movement to adopt the type of 
control which was both normal and reasonably effective in 
the everyday commercial world?
X. Madan, questioning Bhide, Bom.Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee., 
Evidence, Vol.II, p.259*
2. Rothfield, /Rothfeld_JT, 'Societies and their Supervision1, 
in B.C.Q., June 1929, p.4.
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The chief reason had been given by Ewbanki the towns­
men who ran the banks were out of touch with the rural soc­
ieties. The district banks, furthermore, simply did not 
wish to pay for the staff which would keep them in touch with 
the societies. Only the Provincial Bank had an adequate, 
properly trained and well paid staff. 'Many of the District 
Banks', Collins complained in 1927, 'are paying dividends 
of 8, 9 and 10 per cent, while their outdoor staff is neg­
lected. The district banks were able to do this simply 
because much of the money which they obtained as deposits 
was never used for making loans to societies. Instead, it 
was reinvested in the Provincial Bank in Bombay. In 1924 the 
Karnatak Central Bank, by far the largest district bank and 
by far the worst offender, put approximately thirty nine 
lakhs on deposit with the Provincial Bank and gave out as 
loans to societies twenty six lakhs. Its expenditure on 
'Establishment and Contingencies' was a mere Rs.14,796, (The 
Poona District Bank, with roughly two lakhs on loan to soc­
ieties, paid Rs.17,893 for its staff.)^  In 1927 the
1. Rent., 1927» p.35.
2. bept., 1924, pp.100-101. The figures given under 'loans 
to Provincial and Central Banks' in this table cover®, in 
the case of district banks, only loans to the Provincial 
Bank? loans to other district (central) banks were not 
permitted. See Madan, Note, 'Investment of surpluses of 
District Central Banks', 24 March 1924. (B.S.C.B., Regr,) 
Although it was apparently contemplated, both in this 
note and in Circular No.B.C.B. - 21 of 14 April 1924, 
that district banks should be permitted to make direct 
deposits in commercial banks, judging from the tables in 
the Annual Reports, such deposits were rarely made.
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Karnatak Central Bank*s deposits with the Provincial Bank
reached the extremely high figure of Rs.l,01,90,630$ it
gave loans amounting to Rs.14,96,831 and its staff expenses
came to Rs.22,342.^ The Provincial Bank, in turn, sometimes
had to deposit such funds with trading "banks because it did
not always have a sufficient outlet for investment in the
co-operative sphere. The amount of interest which these
deposits earned was often little more than that which the
Provincial Bank paid the district banks.
The situation first caused real concern in 1924, At
the beginning of that year the Provincial Bank had about
43^ lakhs on loan to co-operative banks and societies,
nearly sixteen lakhs invested in government securities and
2thirty six lakhs on fixed deposit with commercial banks*
The Bank*s investments in the co-operative movement were 
only a little over what they had been three years before.^
*It is an absurd position*, Vaikunth Mehta wrote to Madan,
*for a Bank like ours to drain away money from the mofussil
A
for being deposited in commercial banks.1 Certainly, it 
was hardly for this purpose that the Bank had been set up.
At the same time, it was not good policy to refuse deposits; 
they were *the result of the confidence built up after years
HQpt., 1927» pp.114-115.
2. V.L.Mehta, Note for Board of B.P.C.B., 15 January 1924. 
(B.S.C.B., Regr.)
3. Mehta to Madan, D/0 of 4 March 1924.(B.S.C.B., file cited.)
4. Mehta to Madan, D/0 of 15 January 1924. (B.S.C.B., file
cited.)
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of steady work on the part of this Bank and Central Banks,f^  
Actually, the increase in deposits was also the 
result of a gradual decrease in the interest rate on govern­
ment Borrowings, The co-operative "banks had now Be gun to
2attract the larger investor. Deposits continued to flow in
during the later twenties, as they had done at the time of
the 1918-19 famine, largely Because of the decrease of in-
vestment opportunities caused By the contraction of trade.
This very fact, of course, is an indication of the strong
and increasing connections of the district Banks with the
trading and money-lending classes. These organizations were
in peril of Becoming completely unco-operative, as some
cotton sale societies in the Karnatak Becames fThe merchant
members Become the enemies of the society when its Business
4
Begins to extend and they find their own Business curtailed. 1 
In spite of the general lowering of interest rates 
with the onset of the depression district central Banks and 
rural societies persisted in paying high rates of interest 
on fixed deposits. In some cases, Collins wrote, they still 
paid fthe same rates of interest as they had Been paying 
during the War or immediately after the War when the rate of 
interest on Government securities was over 6 per cent.
1. Mehta, Note for Board cited.
2. See Audit Memo, of B.P.C.B. for 1924-2S’. (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
3. Rept., 1927» p.6,
4* tBid., p.24.
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Rural Managing Committee members are afraid of losing their 
deposits if they lower the rates of interest, and the direct­
ors of Central and urban banks are proud and gratified to 
see the large funds pouring into their banks. The law of 
supply and demand is not fully understood.It was certain­
ly an extraordinary situation.
Some district banks, of course, worked closely with 
the Department. When Collins sent out a circular in which 
he went so far as to fdirectf an interest rate on deposits
p
of no more than 6i per cent., these banks fell into line.
But some did not. 'One sometimes feels', Bhide wrote,
'that the principle of internal autonomy has been allowed 
to proceed too far and it would have been much better if a 
certain measure of departmental control had been retained 
over Central Banks.» Under Clause 12 in the Agreement with 
the Secretary of State the Provincial Bank's loans had to 
be sanctioned by the Registrar. But the Registrar had no 
such control over the loans of the district central banks. 
Where the distriat banks were dependent to some extent on 
the Provincial Bank for finance the existence of this clause 
enabled the Registrar to bring some indirect pressure to 
bear on them.^ But the offending banks were usually the
1* Rept., 1927» pp.6-7.
2. Collins, Circular No.A.G.C.42 of 18 June 1927. (Poona, 
Circulars, 1916-1930.)
3. Bhide to Govt., No.359/2 of 22 December 1928. (Poona, 
B.P.C.B.)
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wealthier ones, which had no need of funds from the Pro­
vincial Bank*
Such difficulties with the district hanks led Collins 
to reverse Rothfeld's policy of developing these organiza­
tions. Instead, he encouraged the Provincial Bank to open 
up more branches, chiefly in wealthy but largely unirrigated 
districts such as West Khandesh - a district which the Pro­
vincial Bank financed directly.
Madan had been keen on the conversion of branches 
of the Provincial Bank, with their 'Advisory Committees1, 
into independent 'Purchase and Sale Unions'. The Canal 
areas might be a special case, but he was definitely opposed 
to the Provincial Bank exercising in unirrigated areas the 
same sort of control as it had in the canal areas. 'Nothing 
must be done which would in any way sap the independence 
and sense of responsibility of these societies.* This was 
the authentic voice of the enthusiast for co-operation. But 
Collins appears to have had little time for such democratic 
notions. In fact, when the Pravara Canal societies demanded 
a fully independent Purchase and Sale Union and the Bank
proposed to meet them half way, Collins rejected the idea 
2outright.
It was 'the belief of the Department', Collins 
wrote, that the work done by the branches of the Provincial
1. Madan to V.L. Mehta, No.359/2 of 30 November 1925.
(Poona, B.P.C.B.)
2. Collins to A.C.Desai, Asst, Regr., Bombay City, No.359/2 
of 11 April 1927. (Poona, file cited.)
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Bank in 'facilitating the operations of primary societies, 
in providing more adequate and prompt finance, in develop­
ing up-country "banking and in setting to other central hanks 
the example of maintaining direct touch with affiliated 
societies, is perhaps the greatest force in the present 
progress of the movement,1 Bhide thought similarly? 'The 
proof of the pudding is in the eating,' he told the Bank­
ing Enquiry Committee, 'and the eating has been very good so 
2
far,1 There was, however, one vital factor which inhibited, 
the indefinite expansion of the Provincial Bank's system,
A large well trained staff cost a great deal of money. By 
its agreement with the Secretary of State, the Bank was 
forbidden to make loans at more than eight per cent. Pour 
per cent, interest had to be paid to debenture holders. 
Shareholders normally had to be paid a dividend of around 
7*1 per cent. ; depositors normally expected six per cent.
By comparison, the expenses of maintaining the Bank's 
staff - about 2-g to three per cent, on loans made - were 
extremely high, Lalubhai Samaldas virtually admitted this 
in reply to the rigorous questioning of the indigenous 
bankers' representative on the Banking Enquiry Committee.
But, he said, 'we are doing business which other banks do 
not do. As the Chairman of the Co-operative Bank, I like
Kept., 1927» pp.31-32.
2. Bhide, Evidence, Bom.Prov. Banking Enquiry Kept., Vol.II, 
p. 267.
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the bank to spend money so that it may he in direct touch
i
with the agriculturists. 1
If Rothfeld's policy on district hanks was openly 
reversed hy his successors, his policy on other more unusual, 
and possibly more important, subjects was quietly forgotten, 
particularly during the regimes of Collins and Bhide. To a 
large extent, of course, this neglect was understandable.
As Rothfeld's basic administration was shown to be somewhat 
unsound his more unorthodox ideas were naturally put out of 
mind. There were financial and staffing problems too, and 
the existing forms of co-operation were creating problems 
enough. One suspects, alsor that, at the level of the Sec­
retariat, the task of maintaining, in the face of an in­
creasingly bitter nationalism, what A.D. Oorwala has called
2
'the security state', was taking up the time of most of 
the best minds.
Rothfeld's distinction between existing fragmenta­
tion of holdings and future subdivision had been rather a 
fine one; it was perhaps partly for this reason that the 
bill on the subject of consolidation which Rothfeld had been 
chiefly responsible for framing, and which apparently was 
still circulating in 1926,^ was eventually dropped. Another
1. lalubhai Samaldas, questioned by H.V.Desai, Bom.Prov. 
Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., Vol.II, p.26.
2. A. I). Corwala, The Role of the Administrator % Past, Present 
and Future, pp.4-5•
3. SotHferdT, Evidence, R.C. on Agric., Mins, of Ev., Vol.II, 
pt.i, p.168.
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reason, perhaps, was the departure from Bombay politics of 
the hill's chief protagonist in the Legislative Council, the 
Liberal Chunilal Mehta,
Co-operative farming fared no better than co-opera­
tive consolidation. Madan's first Report, that for 1924, 
spoke of 'bad management1 in the two joint cultivation
societies at Bhambora and Arjunsonda.1 In the following
2year the Bhambora society was cancelled. It is unfortunate 
that no records relating to these failures appear to have 
survived. Harold Mann, in his wide-ranging final report as 
Director of Agriculture, written in 1927, spoke of his con­
viction that in the task of 'rural reconstruction* 'it is 
not one man or one department which is concerned'. Rural 
reconstruction involved, amongst other things, 'the con­
solidation of holdings', 'the communal or co-operative 
holding of implements', and 'the organization of purchase 
of supplies and sale of produce'.*^  But Mann no longer spoke
of the ultimate form of co-operation, co-operative farming.
Collins had little sympathy for co-operative farming. Joint 
farming societies, he wrote in his departmental report for 
1927, submitted at about the same time as Mann's, were 'not
likely to succeed in the present state of education and co-
4
operative development.*
1* Rept,, 19249 p.17.
2* Rept., 19257 P»15-
3. Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture in the 
Bombay Presidency, 1926-27, p.21.
4. Bept//,1^,277 pTffi-------
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Collins was fundamentally sympathetic towards < 
Rothfeld's policy of distributing takkavi through societies; 
'As regards the merits of the system there can he no doubt* 
But the fact was that the delays inherent in Rothfeld's 
system had, Collins said, 'disheartened people in some areas, 
and there are some societies and even district banks and 
Collectors who will favour a return £bo the old system^ 
unless a speedier method of operation can be devised*1 App­
lications had to go not only to the society itself and its 
central bank, but also 'to local officers of the Co-opera­
tive or Agricultural Departments, often to the Deputy Dir­
ector of Agriculture and invariably to the Assistant Regis­
trar and the Registrar of Co-operative Societies.1 None of 
these officers had the time for the work. Yet the banks, 
receiving only nominal remuneration for handling the dis­
tribution of takkavi, could not fairly be expected to under­
take the work of dealing with applications. At least the 
revenue authorities had their own 'on the spot' agency - 
'ill-equipped though it may be.' Of the Rs.3,50,000 allotted 
by Government annually from 1923-24 for Land Improvement 
Loans through co-operative societies, no more than Rs.
2,09,570 was ever taken up in one year; in 1928-29 only
2
Rs.50,097 was taken up*
1. Ibid*
2. Bom. Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept., Vol.I, p.86.
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With co-operatives so obviously not a suitable
ahannel for the distribution of long term government loans
it was not surprising that the approach of Government to a
scheme for co-operative land mortgage banks was said by some
1
to be fextremely half hearted1*
The question of the supply of long term credit by 
private organizations had been shelved since the Provincial 
Bank’s failure to get most of its debentures taken up* 
Rothfeld had considered that the supply of long term credit 
was essentially a function of the State. But Madan was 
brought to a re-consideration of the subject by the growth 
of the large surplus of funds which could not be used with­
in the co-operative movement, fI think the kind of society 
which will absorb and usefully absorb a large amount of 
capital is the Land Mortgage Bank1, he wrote to Vaikunth
Mehta in 1924. He was fgoing through some literature on the
2subject1, but did not yet have ’any detailed plans,1
During the next two years Madan worked on his scheme. 
He eventually realized, as others had realized before him, 
that it was impossible to finance long term loans for pur;- 
poses of debt redemption by means of short term capital.
By 1926 he had come to the conclusion that fit would be
1. B.P.Madon, Chairman’s speech at Annual General Meeting 
of B.P.C.B,, 1927. (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
See also Madon’s speech at 1928 Annual General Meeting, 
.^A.in Bombay Chronicle, 20 June 1928.
2^ A*Madan to v.L.MeEta, D/0 of 18 January 1924. (B.S.C.B., 
Regr.)
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desirable to have separate institutions for doing this long 
term business, and that it would not be proper to entrust 
this work to existing organizations^at the top where...I 
propose that the Provincial Bank should undertake the work 
of floating debentures and make itself financially respon­
sible for their repayment.
The Provincial Bank saw here the opportunity of get­
ting rid of its old, unsold debentures. It was impossible, 
however, to place them on the market except at a large dis­
count. The Bank began looking to Government for help. At 
first they obtained no response, but eventually, probably 
to the surprise of many, the Government of Bombay decided to
take up two lakhs of the debentures, at a discount which
2
fwould not involve Government in any loss. * The Land Mort­
gage Department of the Provincial Bank came into existence 
in August 1929, and three co-operative Jand mortgage banks 
were set up, at Broach, Dharwar, and Pachora in Khandesh. 
Each bank was given the services of a government Land Valua­
tion Officer.
The setting up of these banks came at a time when 
the full effects of the depression were being felt. Their 
business was therefore very limited. By 1933 there had been 
only 181 borrowers from all three banks, and overdues were
1. Madan to Govt., No.A.G.C. - 151 of 18 May 1926, encl.
Bom. G.R.R.D. No. 6576/24 of 26 September 1927.
2, Report of the Bombay Land Mortgage Committee, 1934, p*2.
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forty per cent, of the demand. The Land Mortgage Department
of the Provincial Bank had suffered a paper loss of Rs,15,000.
Constitutional defects had heen discovered in the land
mortgage hanks, too. Only borrowers or intending borrowers
were eligible for membership; consequently, in unfavourable
years the Boards of these banks did not bring much pressure
on the borrowers to secure repayment.
It was perhaps fortunate that the activities of
the early land mortgage banks were so limited, and that
lessons were learnt without too much money being lost. The
Bombay Committee which investigated the problem of Land
Mortgage in 1933-34 spoke of 'simmering discontent1 in the
rural areas, caused by the effects of the depression,
'Political parties', the Committee claimed, 'anxious to take
advantage of the situation, have the provision of Land
Mortgage Credit with State assistance as the main plank of
2
their programme'. The Committee probably exaggerated when 
it said that Land Mortgage Credit was the 'main plank1 of 
political programmes at this time. Nevertheless, the stim­
ulus provided by political discontent, and by the lessons 
learnt in the working of the early banks, did lead event­
ually to the formation of successful co-operative land 
mortgage banks. This was a considerable achievement. Even 




mortgage banks amongst economically backward people*.'1* Such 
banks, it is worth remembering, have a history which goes 
back, by a somewhat devious route, at least as far as 
Wedderburn.
The need to find some outlet for surplus funds had 
first prompted Madan to broach the subject of co-operative 
land mortgage banks. It was the same need which brought 
about Madan*s decision to begin to expand the credit move­
ment again. For about a year he had continued the policy of 
consolidation which had been followed by Rothfeld in the 
last months of his regime. But during 1925 and 1926 he began 
to accept a fairly large number of new registrations. In 
1926 the number of agricultural societies went up from 3*377
to 3,868, an increase of 491* as against 327 and 181 in the
2
previous two years. Madan took care, however, to encourage 
the formation of new societies only in prosperous districts 
like East and West Khandesh, Very few new societies were 
registered in the famine districts of the Deccan. When the 
extension of the Nira Canal into Sholapur District was con­
templated in 1924 Madan wrote to Vaikunth Mehta emphasizing 
his wish that the Bank and the Institute should organize
1. Sheila Gorst, Co-operative Organization in Tropical 
Countries; A study of co-operative development In non­
self-governing territories under United Kingdom Admin-*
1 stration, (llffiSTT'p* 25 0«
2. Rept., 1^26, p.7.
3. Ibid., p.6.
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societies and carry out propaganda at least two years "before 
the water became available.^ He was determined to avoid a 
repetition of the troubles of the societies on the part of 
the Nira Canal which had already been opened.
It cannot be said that Madan was negligent in his 
attitude to arrears. As soon as he became Registrar he gave 
orders to all auditors and district banks to submit to him 
a monthly account of the progress they were making in reduc­
ing unauthorized arrears. The statistics of unauthorized 
arrears - arrears which had not been authorized as ’exten­
sions* by the committees of the societies - came down from 
20 per cent, of the amount due for repayment in 1922-23 to
19*6 per cent, in 1923-24, 17.8 per cent, in 1924-25, and
2
14 per cent, in 1925-26. To some extent, at least, these 
figures must be a reflection of Madan* s energetic touring, 
his attention to detail, and his ceaseless exhortation.
Yet Collins, when he became Registrar, felt it nec­
essary to look very critically at the state of arrears and 
the state of the movement generally. His report for 1927 
is in some ways similar to Haigh’s report for 1915. It is 
essentially the work of an able and efficient outsider, with 
no long-standing attachments to the co-operative movement, 
who knew that his appointment was merely a temporary one, 
but who was determined to make his mark in all that he did.
1. Madan to Mehta, No.SRMVl079 of 6-10 April 1924. (B. S.C.B., 
Regr.)
2. Undated Note on Arrears, 1932?_/. (Poona, loose.)
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According to Collins's 1927 Report, co-operation 
might appear to he flourishing in East and West Khandesh, 
hut in hoth districts there was !a noticeable desire on the 
part of the members to run before they can walk.1 Arrears 
were very heavy in East Khandesh, and, Collins claimed, pay­
ments had been deliberately withheld1 by co-operative 
society members. The Karanatak was still 'the main centre 
of co-operative activity1, But in Dharwar, 'enthusiasm has 
waned, the leading members have discovered that Government 
control is not as extensive as they imagined, and there is 
often open defiance and violation of bye-laws. Added to 
which has been the introduction of party strife which has 
been spreading all over the Karnatic.
Collins concentrated his attention on the Deccan. 
There, he thought, apart from South Satara, the movement was 
'in a sorry state'. In Poona District, including the Nira 
Canal area, the proportion of the amount due for collection 
which was made up of unauthorized arrears in July 1927 was 
eighty one per cent., according to Collins's calculations.
In the area close to Poona city it was becoming obvious that 
many of the defaulting members had 'no intention of paying 
of their own accord.... Pleaders are employed to resist the 
liquidator.'s orders, every means is employed to dispose of 
the lands and crops before they can be attached, and there 
is a general combination to prevent bidding when they are
Rapt., 1927» pp.9“10.
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put up to auction,. f^" That it had become necessary to put 
up for auction the crops and lands of co-operative society 
members was a sad reflection on the state of the movement.
Yet ignominious liquidations were to a considerable extent 
the result of over-generous financing in the earlier years, 
and lack of supervision - both official and non-official - 
in more recent times. Many of the societies about Poona 
city, such as the one-time showpiece, Hadapsar society, had 
been financed chiefly through the labours of the Servants of 
India Society, and G-.K. Devadhar in particular. By the 
twenties Devadhar had too many enthusiasms to be really 
effective in all things.
Collins believed that the position in the canal
areas was oven more serious than in the dry areas of the
Deccan. The immediate cause of the problem there, he
admitted, was the fall in the price of gul; fbut the real
and lasting cause is the lack of responsibility and a disin-
2
clination to repay which is common to other Deccan Societies,1 
As prices fell the members began to *wriggle out of* bringing 
their gul to the Bankfs shop, and, during the 1926-27 season, 
sepoys had to be employed to watch them at harvest time so 
that they would honour their agreement to bring all their 





ryots vaguely felt that there were too many Brahmans con­
nected with the Bank's shop. A prominent cultivator in the 
Godavari Canal area explained to a Special Mamlatdar that he 
had not sent his carts of gul to the Bank's shop because of 
'exceptional circumstances*. *1 take it*, the Special Mam­
latdar wrote, 'that these carts were sent only to patronize
a shop opened by an influential Mahratta on this side.1
However, under the influence of the local supervising union, 
the Special Mamlatdar claimed, with an air of confidence, 
'things will come to a normal level next year*. Unfortunate 
ly, the chairman of the supervising union happened to be the 
offender himself,^
Collins began to despair of co-operatives ever suc­
ceeding in the canal areas. In such circumstances it was not 
unnatural to examine the alternatives to co-operation. By 
August 1927 he had reached the conclusion that 'the correct 
system of finance for Canal areas is one of land banks in 
each area for the big cultivators.' When such banks had been 
formed 'it would be possible to have co-operative societies
for the ordinary cultivators if the circumstances showed
2
there was a demand for them,* The wheel had almost come 
full circle. Agricultural banks had been rejected in favour 
of co-operative societies; now co-operative societies were 
being rejected in favour of a form of agricultural bank.
1, RoW.Potnis, Special Mamlatdar, Belapur, to VIL,Mehta,
No.399 of 1 July 1926. (Poona, B.P.C.B.)
2. Collins to B.F.Madon, Chairman, B.P.C.B., No.240 of 
10 August 1927. (B.S.C.B., Regr.)
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Collins fairly obviously had not considered all the corres­
pondence of fifteen and twenty years before on the financing 
of the canal areas. His conclusions were a somewhat ironic 
commentary on an almost insoluble problem.
To some extent Bhide continued Collins*s general 
policy. Registration of societies in the Deccan ceased al­
together in 1928.^ A policy of 1weeding out1 the bad members 
in all societies was followed. The aim was to have societies 
with memberships no larger than fifty, fA scale of about
10 per cent, of the population of the village might be a
2safe standard for the present1, Bhide thought. There was 
obviously to be no attempt to cater for the whole village 
in existing circumstances. Those who simply would not pay 
their dues, regardless of the character of the season, *must 
clearly be taught a lesson and be made to feel the full 
rigour of the coercive processes.1 Societies were every­
where being Encouraged freely to refer bad cases to arbi­
tration. Bhide was fnot at all sorry* that as a result
of his policy the all round rate of increase in 1928-29
4
showed a considerable fall.
Yet the policy of liquidation and of *weeding out* 
had a negative, tragic air about it. This is exemplified in 
Bhide*s comments on the societies around Poona originally
1. Rept., 1928, p.8,
2. Ibid., p.12.
3. Ibid., p.61.
4. Rept,, 1929i p.8.
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sponsored by the Servants of India Society; 'A number of 
pensioners and other middle-class folk in Poona City invested 
the greater part of their savings in these societies by way 
of deposits.,.. In my first year as Registrar, some of these 
disillusioned, needy depositors used to come to me regularly 
and make enquiries as to when they were to get back their 
money. My replies could only be dim and discouraging.
Congress were naturally not slow to take advantage
of the discontent caused by arbitration and liquidation
proceedings. Gandhi had lost all interest in the government
sponsored co-operative movement: fI am engaged in running
the greatest co-operative society that the world has ever
seen.After the floods in North Gujarat in 1927 Vallab-
hbhai Patel and Narhari Parikh showed signs of commencing
an agitation against government policy on co-operatives in
that area. To enforce the recovery of arrears after such a
calamity was, they felt, completely unjust. Narhari Parikh
sent a letter to The National Herald on the subject.*^
But Shah, the capable Assistant Registrar in Surat, and
Vaikunth Mehta, visited Patel and apparently managed to
4
smooth matters over. It was not so easy to smooth over 
agitation about co-operative societies in Bardoli taluka,
1. Bhide, 'Memories and Reflections of an Old-Stager', in 
B.C.Q., April 1954, pp.8-9.
2. Bombay Co-operative News, April 1925, p.24. The Bombay 
Co-operative News was an ephemeral monthly published by 
the Institute.
3. The author has been unable to see a file of this paper.
4. See Shah to Mehta, D/0 of 3 October 1927, and Mehta's 
draft reply, (B.S.C.B., Asst. Regr*, Surat.)
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the scene of Congress's most concentrated efforts. 'Govern­
ment have devised makeshifts in the shape of Co-operative 
Credit Societies', wrote a Congress worker in the poorer,
£. It**- rudts]
southern part of that taluka. 'They may at "best offer them *
money at moderate interest and tempt them to run into more
debt. They cannot give them any relief. If it can at all be
given, it can be given by the Charka and by taking away the
temptation of Drink.
Co-operation in the Matar taluka of Kaira District
came under Congress fire at the end of the decade. The Matar
taluka was poorly drained, and inhabited more by backward
Dharalas than by patidars. It was therefore hardly a typical
Gujarat taluka. In 1918 it had been the subject of an
investigation by a Servants of India Society group led by
G.K.Devadhar. This committee appears to have spent only a
few days making their 'survey', but this was long enough
for them to recommend concentrated co-operative activity in 
2the area. Their recommendations, unfortunately, were 
heeded. By 1928 the unauthorized arrears in the taluka 
amounted to li lakhs - seventy per cent, of the amount de­
manded.^ The Assistant Registrar for Gujarat thought that 
the situation called for the 'early cancellation' of many
1. Extract from Young India, 24 March 1927? originally pub­
lished in Gujarati in Navajivan, quoted Mahadev Desai,
Gandhiji in Indian Villages, p.349*
2. G r .Ko DevadharA.T.Thakkar and N.M.Joshi, Report of an 
Inquiry into the Agricultural Situation in Matar Taluka 
in the District of Kaira, 19l3T~V.15.
3. G.H.Desai, Personal Asst, to Regr., Note, 4 May 1928.
(Poona, Matar Taluka.)
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societies, ’Any attempt in that direction will, however, he
utilised by the critics of the movement to hold it up to
1
the public eye as a measure of oppression# * Action was 
postponed until 1929, When it was taken, co-operatives, as 
prophesied, were immediately condemned as oppressive, 
Vallabhbhai Patel, Narhari Parikh and Mahadev Desai were 
members of a committee led by J.C. Kumarappa which ’invest­
igated' economic conditions in Matar taluka. Co-operation
was condemned for its 'lack of principle', its 'want of
2human touch', its 'lack of expedition'. The powers of the 
honorary organizer as arbitrator were criticized because 
they were 'beyond the protection of the Civil Court, Two 
'addresses', obviously Congress-inspired, were quoted. One 
had been presented to Wilson, the Governor of Bombay, when 
he had visited the taluka. 'The co-operative society move­
ment, ' it read, 'which stands for a great principle and 
holds out a promise of making this world a much better place
for all to live in, has proved itself, to us at least, a
4
veritable curse of the Gods.' An address presented when 
Irwin, the Viceroy, paid a visit included this passages 
'The co-operative movement has on the whole proved a bane 
to this taluka and instead of diminishing our indebtedness
1, S. G-. Almoula, Asst, Regr,, Surat, No,A.G.C. of 15 April 
1928, below No,51 of 29 February 1928 from Reserve 
Auditor, Matar. (Poona, file cited.)
2, J. C. Kumarappa, (Director), A Survey of Matar Taluka 




has contributed to it in great measure.'***
If the co-operative movement was not to produce more 
and more bitterness,and possibly die a painful death, some 
constructive thinking had to be done.
One of those who played a significant part in con­
structive developments at the end of the twenties, particu­
larly during Bhide's regime, was Gunvantrai Desai, the Reg­
istrar's Personal Assistant. Towards the end of Collins's 
period a series of letters passed between Desai and Vaikunth 
Mehta on the problem of the maintenance of 'fluid resource1 
in primary societies. At the time of the examination of the
Maclagan Committee's recommendations Ewbank and Mehta had
2not felt this to be a serious problem. Mehta had now been 
forced to ahange his ideas. 'If central and urban banks re­
ceiving deposits, which may not be more than Rs.40,000, are 
compelled to provide fluid resources at their own expense,' 
he wrote to Desai, »I fail to see why agricultural primary 
societies holding much larger deposits should escape all 
liability in the matter. 1 The financing agencies and the 
Registrar should assess the fluid resource provision necess­
ary for each society and the financing agencies should be 
paid a commission by the societies for guaranteeing to pro- 
vide cover up to the limit fixed,. Desai, however, felt
1. Ibidpp^lOl. It would be interesting to discover Mahadev 
Desai's real opinions on the co-operative movement at this 
time; those connected with the Navajivan Trust today can 
throw little light on the subject, however.
2. See above, Chapter VI.
3. V.L.Mehta to Gunvantrai Desai, D/0 of 10 May 1927• 
(B.S.C.B.,Regr.) An earlier official letter, No.R.17/140 
of 29 April 1927, does not appear to have survived.
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that difficulties over the repayment of deposits had arisen 
not because societies had made no provision for fluid re­
source, but simply because the societies had borrowed beyond 
their capacity to repay. 'This is really what happened in 
societies in Sholapur and round about Poona. We have to pro­
vide against such contingencies.' According to Desai this 
could only be done by 'fixing maximum and normal credits in 
every case, and prohibiting all borrowings in excess of this 
amount either from Central Banks or private depositors in­
cluding even members' deposits.'***
Mehta and Desai were agreed on the necessity for
maximum and normal credits. The idea went back as far as the
2 3Maclagan Committee, and the resulting guaranteeing unions.J
But with the failure of the guaranteeing unions, the system 
of maximum and normal credits continued in operation, in a 
revised form, only in the societies directly financed by the 
Provincial Bank. Under the Provincial Bank's system, the 
general meeting of the society each year fixed in advance the 
extent of credit which it was prepared to give each individ­
ual member. The Bank would then examine the resulting 'normal 
credit statement', and, in the light of its own information, 
decide on the maximum credit which it was prepared to give 
the society. The system was introduced, Vaikunth Mehta wrote,
1. Desai to Mehta, D/0 of 5 May 1927. (B.S.C.B., file cited.)
2. See Maclagan Cttee. Rept., pp.38, 62.
3. See above. Chapter VI.
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'not only to provide prompt and adequate finance, but also 
to see that all such finance as is provided is given under 
proper safeguards and after due inquiry* It is not an un­
common experience to find the office bearers appropriating 
large portions of a society's funds themselves'.1 But 
there was a loophole for societies in the system as it ex­
isted, Any amount of money could be obtained by local 
deposits which the financing agency and the Registrar had 
no control over, as in the Poona area. Hence Desai»s in­
sistence in 1927 that all types of borrowings beyond the 
societies' 'maximum credits' should be prohibited.
It was the system of maximum and normal credits 
which Bhide, presumably acting on Desai's advice, proposed 
to make the basis of a reorganized co-operative movement. 
This system, Bhide hoped, would eliminate complaints about 
both under-financing and over-financing, 'I am afraid prim­
ary societies and banks at present follow no systematic
1
policy,Bhide wrote, 'and are inclined alternatively to stop 
finance altogether (almost as a result of panic) and grant 
it too freely as soon as the outlook appears promising..„. 
The preparation of reliable normal credit statements and 
accurate forecast statements are most essential steps and 
every attempt is being made to extend their application. It 
is only when societies clearly understand and act on these 
principles that we shall get a really reliable set of data
1. Mehta to Madan, D/0 of 20 November 1924. (BtS,C»B. file 
cited.)
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which, may form the basis of valid conclusions. At present 
unfortunately the societies and ba&ks follow a more or less 
arbitrary policy and the figures of overdues etc, give any­
thing but an accurate picture of the real state of things 
especially on an unsuitable date like the end of the finan­
cial year.
It was so easy to be misled by statistics. Bhide
rapidly realized that one of the chief effects of Collins's
stern policy on arrears was that sums of money which had
hitherto been classed as 'authorized extensions' were simply
transferred to another column - 'unauthorized arrears.' The
result had been that the figures of unauthorized arrears in
1926-27 had leapt suddenly from fourteen per cent, to twenty
2nine per cent, of the amount due for repayment. So while 
Bhide continued to be 'not at all sorry1, in the style of 
the ultra-efficient Civilian, about the increase in arbitra­
tion and liquidation proceedings, at the same time, somewhat 
more quietly, he bagan to take a more reasoned attitude to 
the problem of arrears.
In a telling passage in his 1928 Report Bhide pointed 
out that co-operative society arrears could not be seen in 
isolation. In the Central Division, (roughly, the Deccan), 
Land Revenue and Takkavi collections, as well as co-opera­
1. Rept., 1928, p.17.
2. UndaieJTfote on Arrears, * 193 2?_J^ . (Poona, loose,)
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tive society collections, were considerably reduced. During 
1926-27, fin spite of the existence of the best possible Gov­
ernment agency for collection work, Government only collected 
86.5 per cent, of the Land Revenue and 87 per cent, of the 
Tagavi Demand1. Furthermore, 'the Land Revenue Demand can 
roughly be satisfied by disposing of about 20 per cent, or 
less of the gross produce of the year, while for the liquida­
tion of the societies' dues anything between 70 per cent, to 
80 per cent, of the balance remaining after paying Land 
Revenue may have to be disposed of.1 It was hardly a matter 
of surprise, therefore, that the cultivator did not show 
'excessive eagerness' to pay the co-operative society's dues 
fully, especially in a bad year, and especially when official 
supervision was in places almost 'non-existent.fl
In his 1929 Report Bhide showed that out of 4,317 
agricultural credit societies as many as 1,647 had no over­
due arrears whatsoever. There were 490 societies with un­
authorized arrears of less than ten per cent, of the demand, 
which Bhide considered to be 'almost negligible'. This was 
not an unfair statements the percentage of unauthorized
arrears during the latter years of Ewbank's period, for in-
2
stance, had varied between seven and eight per cent. Thus 
in 1929 there were 2,317 societies - almost half the total 
number - in which arrears were not at all serious. Further­
more the bad societies were concentrated in a few districts,
1. Rept., 1928, p.18.
2. Undated Note on Arrears cited.
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which were either famine districts or regions where, as in 
the Canal areas, 'widespread calamity' had overtaken the cul­
tivators. But even here the position was being gradually im­
proved. ^ After a visit to the Canal areas in December 1928 
Bhide put forward detailed proposals for future activity.
The terms on which fresh finance would be made available 
were slightly liberalized, and the Bank's Senior Inspector
was given more freedom to act without continual reference to
2
the Registrar in person. In some way or another, Bhide 
realized - even if co-operative societies were perhaps not 
the best way of financing the larger cultivators, even if 
some of the cultivators should not be growing sugarcane at 
all - in some way or another, the credit cycle had to be 
set going again.
•The main structure of the co-operative movement is 
quite sound', Bhide claimed in his Report for 1929. Bhide 
was correct in his assertion. There had been no large scale 
failure and there was not going to be one. The way was 
slowly being prepared, in fact, for a new advance as soon 
as money and staff became available. But Bhide was sure that 
it would be an advance primarily under the auspices of the 
State.
Pew thought in 1929 that the economic depression 
which had set in about 1922-23 in some industries would
1. Rept.t 1929, pp.18-19,
2. ftep-fcl! 1929. p.41.
3. Ibid., p.19.
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deepen still further. But it did, so that all cultivators -
not only the growers of sugar cane and cotton - suffered on
1
the average a forty to fifty per cent, drop in returns. It 
appeared to some that all the Government of Bombay could do 
in such circumstances was to stand aside and allow 1 ordinary 
economic forces1 to take their course. 'Without going into 
details', Vaikunth Mehta said bitterly in 1942, 'I shall 
make bold to assert that, apart from India, there was 
scarcely any progressive country in the world, with a pre­
dominant rural economy, which did not go to the aid of the 
agricultural community by adopting measures for the lighten­
ing of the burden of debt....Protective measures through 
legislative enactments were, no doubt, taken in some prov­
inces; but the bulk of these came late, with the advent of 
provincial autonomy in 1937**•• In no part of India was any 
financial aid given in time to enable organized responsible 
credit agencies such as co-operative societies to facilitate 
the process of the scaling down of debts, the reduction of 
interest or the conversion of short term into long term 
liabilities.'2
Vaikunth Mehta had perhaps obtained too favourable 
an impression of the world outside India. The approach of 
many governments in the primary producing countries of the 
world - Australia and New Zealand for example - to the 
problems created by the depression, can be called, at least
1. V.L.Mehta, A Plea for Planning in Co-operation, p.2,
2. Ibid.
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in these post-Keynesian days, '■unoriginal1 and 'uninspiring*. 
Few governments had ever been required to tackle a con­
tinuing economic crisis of such magnitude.
With a reduced official staff and a very limited 
field of operations the co-operative movement managed to 
remain in existence in Bombay, in its essentials, during 
the thirties. The number of societies suffered a slight 
drop between 1930 and 1937. But when, after war-time 
affluence had made it possible to see the depression in 
perspective, when, in 1946, Vaikunth Mehta himself became 
Minister of Finance in a Congress Government of Bombay, it 
was found that the lessons of the *dyarchical*, unprosper- 
ous twenties and thirties, had been learnt well. In 
particular, by 1946, the State, while insisting on extensive 
control of the co-operative movement as a matter of course, 
was now prepared to combine with this control a considerable 
measure of financial assistance.
C O N C L U S I O N
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At first sight, the historian of India in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would appear to he 
dealing with events which occurred within the boundaries of 
what might he called the statistical era. Yet the statis­
tics, we have seen, are apt to he very misleading* Co-oper­
ative societies may increase in number hut not in quality; 
membership similarly. The figures of loans given may 
increase, hut arrears may increase more rapidly. The total 
working capital of the movement may increase on paper, hut 
the same funds may he included twice or even thrice in the 
addition. Again, much of an apparent increase in total 
working capital may he made up of funds which are not uti­
lized in the movement. Various estimates of the total in­
debtedness of the Presidency may he made, hut the material 
on which these estimates are made is never given in detail. 
We do not even have any extensive and reliable statistics 
on the subject of the transfer of land from agriculturists 
to non-agriculturists. Yet it was on the assumption that 
large-scale transfers of this nature were taking place, and 
had to he stopped, that the co-operative movement was 
founded.
Some of the most vital questions must remain un­
answered because the survey of the economic effects of the 
co-operative movement which Sane and others demanded in the
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twenties was never undertaken. We cannot tell with any degree 
of accuracy, for instance, what classes patronised co-opera­
tive societies the most. All one has to go on is some 
occasional talk about 'the man with the economic holding1, 
a man who seems to have been neither very big nor very small, 
who probably employed some seasonal labour but who frequently 
worked in the fields himself, a man, perhaps, who produced 
more for the market than he did for himself. We do not 
really know what classes ultimately benefited from the co­
operative movement - the Marxist claim is that a co-opera­
tive movement in a non-socialist economy 'largely and object­
ively' serves the interest of 'capitalist elements'.^  Cer­
tainly in Bombay in the twenties many of the shareholders in 
district central banks came from the very capitalist classes 
which Rothfeld, at least, believed that the co-operative 
movement was designed to eliminate.
To attempt to answer the admittedly important 
question of whether or not co-operative societies did in fact 
effectively compete with the saukar is also to enter the 
realms of speculation. It certainly appears that credit 
societies could not successfully compete with the money­
lenders in parts of Gujarat, notably Kaira District, where 
the rates were as low as six per cent. But the Surat cotton 
sale societies normally found that it paid to compete with
1. See, e.g., Mihailo Vuckovic, A Century of Yugoslav Co­
operation, Belgrade, 1956, p.T3~-
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•the type of money-lender who was also a trader. In other 
parts of the Presidency the saukars1 interest rates were 
higher than they were in Gujarat. On paper, the societies1 
rates - in 1929, 9i to 12-J- per cento1- were lower than those 
of the saukars, as these were calculated by the Bombay Bank­
ing Enquiry Committee. This Committee claimed that fthe most 
usual rates charged by sowcars1 were 18 per cent, in the
famine tracts of the Deccan and the Karnatak, and 24 per
2cent, in the aboriginal tracts. The Committee !s Report 
offers no clue as to how they arrived at their conclusions. 
But, as Campbell realized in the early days of the movement, 
the money-lender rarely expected to get back his principal. 
His rates were therefore not as high as they appeared to be 
at first sight. Another factor which has to be taken into 
account when considering the real cost of co-operative loans 
is the cost of government supervision. If this had been 
charged- to societies the interest rate on loans in 1928-29 
would have risen by at least one per centp if Bhide had 
had his way the real costs would have risen even more. On 
the other hand, the saukar had the government courts at his 
disposal. On a priori grounds, of course, it would seem 
unlikely that many co-operative societies could thrive for 
very long beside a saukar who offered better value. The
1. Lalubhai Samaldas, Evidence, Bom.Prov. Banking Enquiry 
Rept., Vol. II, p.24.
2. Ibid., Vol.I, p.55.
3. Government spent Rs.6,03,479 on the movement in 1928-29, 
(Rept.,1929,p.5.) The total amount given in loans to indi­
viduals by agricultural and non-agricultural societies ex­
cluding central banks, was Rs.4.81.59.999.(Rent..1929.
pp.108,124.)
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Indian peasant may often be illiterate, but he is not com­
pletely naive as a man of business. But the main objection 
to this whole line of argument is that the co-operative 
society so often provided not an alternative to dealings 
with the saukar, but merely an addition to them.
Significant conclusions, then,cannot be extracted 
from the statistics. But even if reliable statistics were 
available it is doubtful whether one would seek one's main 
conclusions in such realms. The most important feature of 
the co-operative movement in Bombay was the perpetual con­
troversy between officials and non-officials over the con­
trol of the movement. Co-operation was given to the ryots 
of India, and of Bombay in particular, not because they 
asked for it but because the 'Guardians', to use Philip 
Mason's phrase, thought it would be good for them. In the 
institution of the official Registrar, actively fostering 
societies, there was, whether the Guardians liked it or not, 
the nucleus of a whole apparatus of State control. Yet, 
partly because of lack of money, and partly because of a 
genuine desire to use the co-operative movement for fostering 
what were considered to be the virtues of 'self-help' and of 
democracy, the aim of the State in the first twenty years 
of the movement's existence was always, professedly, to pre­
pare the movement for eventual self-control. One must say 
'professedly' because even in the early days the British 
administrator sometimes had his doubts as to whether the
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movement could ever control itself with efficiency and 
without a large increase in corruption.
Nevertheless, in the early years in Bombay, the non­
official side of the movement was emphasized to a far greater 
extent than in most other provinces. The honorary organizers 
undoubtedly helped to break down the natural suspicion which 
the Indian masses felt towards a new scheme of government; 
they built up new relationships with each other and with 
their British rulers. Dr. Tinker has suggested that the 
'Colonial1 period in Indian history 'will be seen, eventually, 
as a partnership; its keynote not British achievement or 
Indian nationalism but a partnership between Indians and 
British'.1 The story of the co-operative movement in Bombay 
in the years before about 1918 appears at first sight to 
bear out this theory. And yet, partly because of the increase 
in caste animosities and in political activity in the twen­
ties the non-official side of the movement eventually be­
came a rather innocuous appendage, for which Collins and 
Bhide, as representatives of Government, had little time.
Of course, it is easy to be slightly cynical about
the honorary workers. It should not be forgotten that India
is not the only country where, after a time, voluntary
workers have been liable to become bored with their task.
For this reason, if for no other, the tendency in many
spheres of activity, in the West as well as in India, has
1. Hugh Tinker, '1857 and 1957s The Mutiny and Modern India', 
in International Affairs, January 1958, p.59.
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been towards the replacement of voluntary workers, useful at 
first but fundamentally unreliable, by full time paid staff.
The honorary workers in Bombay, particularly the 
members of the Institute, felt that the apparent rejection 
of their services in the later twenties meant that the co­
operative movement was no longer as democratic as it had been. 
To some extent they were right. Yet, insofar as the British 
aimed at fostering democracy in and through the co-operative 
movement they aimed at fostering it not so much amongst the 
urban middle class as amongst the agriculturists of the vil- 
lages. The co-operative movement must be seen,Aas one side 
of the British attempt to revive what they imagined to be 
the village community of the past. Charles Gonne in 1883 
believed that it was possible to speak of 'traditions of 
village co-operation1. Frederick Nicholson claimed that co­
operative societies 'not merely popularized but democratized 
credit,' Dupernex quoted Metcalfe on the 'little Republics' 
of the Delhi territory. Campbell, most emphatically, be­
lieved that he was 're-introducing the "Panch" system'.
Ewbank enthused over 'the little leaders of the labouring 
classes', thrown up by *the humble village panchayat', around 
which he could build a system of guaranteeing unions.
Now the village communities of the Delhi area may 
at one time have been 'little Republics'. But, as the Col­
lector of Ahmadnagar pointed out in 1901 and Lalubhai Samal- 
das pointed out in 1902, conditions in the Deccan and in
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Gujarat were vastly different from the conditions Dupernex 
knew or claimed to know. The fact that report after report 
coming from the Office of the Registrar of Co-operative Soc­
ieties in Poona had to complain of societies which were any­
thing but the body of intimates it had been hoped they would 
be, gives these early warnings some point.
But again we must beware of thinking that conditions 
in India, and in Bombay in particular, were unique. A perusal 
of some of the reports of the Registrar of Friendly Societies 
in Victorian England will soon convince one that they were 
not. And difficulties very similar to those of Bombay have 
been experienced in other under-developed countries which 
have tried to copy the Indian experiment in co-operation.
Very recently, a commentator on the African scene, Mrs. Els- 
peth Huxley - who is admittedly somewhat conservative in her 
judgments - has written; 'it is the policy of the Government 
/of Kenya_7 to foster co-operatives as training grounds of 
democracy; an honourable policy, but only a confirmed opti­
mist would see much future for them, at least as maintainers
of quality, were the ultimate direction of an outside author-
2ity removed.' The early Bombay policy on co-operatives, 
too, was most definitely 'an honourable policy', but it was 
to a large extent an unworkable one.^
1. See, e.g., the Reports of J.M.Ludlow, the 'Christian 
Socialist* Registrar of Friendly Societies in Great 
Britain from 1874 to 1891*
2. Elspeth Huxley, A New Earth; An Experiment in Colonialism, 
London, I960, p.135.
3. Cf. the modern Indian attempt to foster democracy through 
a combination of 'panchayats* and co-operative societies.
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Co-operation in the twenties was certainly democratic 
when it grew up virtually of its own accord, as in the case 
of the Surat cotton sale societies. But in most of the re­
mainder of the Presidency it had to be realized that the co­
operative movement could not be used to attain non-economic 
ends. Co-operatives had to be seen for what they were, bus­
iness organizations, no less and no more. Once it had been 
admitted that in the interests of business efficiency some 
form of control had to come from outside the village co­
operative, and once the claims of the Institute and the hon­
orary organizers had been rejected, there was virtually no 
organization left to exercise the necessary control except 
the State.
The only potential non-official rival of the State 
was the Provincial Bank. But it showed few signs of wishing 
to exercise control over the movement. On the whole its dir­
ectors, such as Chunilal Mehta and Lalubhai Samaldas, were 
too closely connected with Government, and too moderate in 
all their attitudes, to wish-to make any sustained challenge. 
The Provincial Bank,; symbolized the genuine concern for the 
peasant's welfare of a group of wealthy but liberal-minded 
men of the City of Bombay. To some extent, of course, its 
success depended on the measure of philanthropy in their 
efforts. Its success also depended greatly on the ability 
and sheer integrity of Vaikuryth Mehta, its Managing Director. 
When all is said it is clear that it was Vaikunth Mehta, and
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not any single Registrar, who was the most important figure 
in the co-operative movement in Bombay during our period.
Many of the virtues of the Provincial Bank's system, then, 
were perhaps not inherent in it. Even so, it does appear 
that in the twenties the Provincial Bank, with its efficient 
and well paid staff, with its branches in close contact with 
dependent societies and exercising strict control over them, 
and its system of maximum and normal credits, was genuinely 
proving its worth, particularly in those of the wealthier 
unirrigated districts which it financed. Above all, the work­
ing of the Provincial Bank was showing very clearly that the 
supply of credit was best linked to facilities for marketing 
and for the supply of agricultural requisites.
It might be said that in the twenties the activities 
of the Provincial Bank were becoming somewhat less 'co-opera­
tive* and increasingly like those of an 'agricultural bank'. 
Agricultural banks had generally been considered to be an 
alternative to co-operation. There appeared to be no place 
in a system of agricultural banks for local thrift and local 
management, in theory the two essentials of co-operation.
Now local thrift and local management were not emphasized in 
the Provincial Bank's operations. But they by no means dis­
appeared. A system which was half way between co-operation 
and agricultural banks was thus being evolved. The tensions 
which had for so long existed between the two forms of org­
anization were apparently being resolved in practice.
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The failure of the Egyptian Agricultural Bank did 
not in itself demonstrate the fundamental unsuitability of 
agricultural banks for the supply of rural credit, particu­
larly long term credit, and credit of all types for extreme­
ly backward people. The Egyptian failure showed merely the 
absolute necessity of keeping lender and borrower in the 
closest possible relationship. Provided a well-managed bank 
was prepared to pay a large, qualified, and thoroughly honest 
staff to maintain this close relationship, the supply of 
credit through such an institution was - and is in cer­
tain circumstances perfectly feasible. Collins probably 
realized this when he called for the setting up of 'land
I
banks' for the large cultivators in the -oamo areas. But, as
tte.
the high cost ofAworkingAthe Provincial Bank showed (and 
that Bank did not in theory reach down as far as the individ­
ual cultivator) the maintenance of such a staff was at times 
hardly an economic proposition. It could rarely be an econom­
ic proposition in the field of short term credit if there 
were not some voluntary activity at local level. It is for 
this reason that, if careful calculations had been made, it 
might have been found that under some conditions co-opera­
tives were more economic than agricultural banks.
1. See B.O.Binns, Agricultural Economy in Burma (1948) 
especially Appx.B, Extract from a memorandum by Mr. L. 
Dawson, of the pre-war Dawson's Bank in Burmas see also 
Binns, Agricultural Credit for Small Farmers (l952) 
passim.
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But it is doubtful whether either co-operatives or 
agricultural banks could have made a genuine success of agri­
cultural finance in the conditions of the Deccan of the first 
thirty years of this century. The fundamental fact about 
the Deccan is the extreme unreliability of its rainfall. This 
basic uncertainty gives rise to the attitude towards borrowed 
money which Collins called irresponsible*, but which the 
more charitable Campbell found to be to a large extent merely 
part of the accepted way of things for centuries. For centur­
ies both debtor and creditor had worked on the principle 
•that the debtor will get as much and repay as little as 
possible.1 This attitude was carried over into co-operative 
societies, in■ unlrglgarted areas. It could be eradicated in 
the canal areas only by years of co-operative and agricult­
ural education, and, not least, by continued prosperity. In 
the unirrigated areas such an attitude will possibly never 
be eradicated. As Bothfeld and Mann insisted, co-operation 
on its own will never cure the Deccan of its troubles. They 
need to be tackled from many sides. Consolidation of holdings 
and perhaps some form of joint ownership of land may play 
their part. The construction of more minor irrigation works 
and simple wells may help. But it will probably be found, as 
Rothfeld believed it would be, that one of the chief elements 
of a solution will be industrialization in the towns, and 
the consequent abandonment of farming as an occupation by a 
large proportion of the inhabitants of the Deccan.
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y
^Tbbreviations used in footnotes are placed in square
brackets. j
I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
At the Office of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 
Bombay State, iPoona. /ftoona. /
A word is necessary on the material kept here. All 
papers in the Co-operative Department in Bombay are given 
a olassification 'A1, 'B', *C' or *D'. rA' class papers 
are permanently preserved. fB l indicates that the papers 
should be preserved for thirty years, *C1 class papers 
are kept for five years and *D' class papers are normally 
destroyed after a year. Policy papers which, before 
World War II, usually reached the •Proceedings1 of Govern­
ment, are normally classed as *A'. I have not had access 
to the Proceedings, though I have seen in Poona loose 
printed copies of most of the non-confidential Resolu­
tions and Orders of Government on co-operative matters 
for my period, together with their enclosures. Prom a 
departmental point of view aome systematic destruction 
of the exceptionally bulky records on each of the several 
thousand societies in Bombay is undoubtedly necessary.
But from the historian*s point of view it is often just 
those papers which have been destroyed - audit memoranda, 
for instance - which would have been of most interest to 
him. Fortunately, the 'A-B-C-D system* does not seem to 
have acme fully into operation until about 1920 - the 
time of Rothfeld*s streamlining activities. Fortunately, 
too, the Co-operative Department has for some years been 
blessed with Record Keepers who have realized the value 
of some of the earliest documents in their possession.
So the period prior to 1920 is better represented in the 
surviving records than the following decade.
Only the more important files consulted are listed 
here. A brief explanation is given of their contents.
'Government Resolutions* on Co-operation. Unless it is 
otherwise specified in footnotes, all references to Gov­
ernment Resolutions and Government Orders, and their 
enclosures, are from this file.
•Spare Copies* of Government Resolutions.
*Establishment of C.C.S. in India*. The Beginnings.
*D.A.8* and 'D.A.24-'* Files relating to Co-operation 
originally kept by the Director of Agriculture.
•Permanent EST.* Permanent Establishment.
'A.D.M. S.0.7'. Standing Orders.
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'Original Circulars, I', 'Original Circulars, II', 
'Circulars, 1916-1930'. Originals of Circulars issued by 
the Registrar, and correspondence relating to them, 
'Miscellaneous XVIII, Orders on Audit and Inspection', 
'Rira Canal and Central Bank', /N.C. & C.B._/ The Bombay 
Central Co-operative Bank and Its work.
'Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank'. /B.P.C.B. J The 
post-1920 continuation of the previous file. 
'Decentralisation*. Documents relating to the Decentral­
isation Commission,1907-1909.
'Subordination of Regr. to D,A. * (i.e. Director of 
Agriculture).
'Committee on Co-operation'. Documents relating to the 
Maclagan Committee, 1915.
'Poona Central Co-operative Bank - A. ' ^oona C.C.B. - kJJ 
Permanent file on this Bank.
'Bombay Provincial Co-operative Institute - III'.. The 
establishment and early years of the Institute.
'T.A.G.31, 'T.A.G.4', 'T.A.G.7'. Takkavi and Co-operation. 
'36, IX', 'P.S.81. Miscellaneous.
'Matar Taluka'.
'Proceedings of the Co-operative Round Table Conference, 
19331.
B. At the Bombay Secretariat Records Office.
Revenue Department Volumes. /R.D. Vols. 7 
Vol.80 of 1908.
Vol.60 of 19li. (Compilation No*303).
Vol.428 of 1914.
C. At the Bombay State Co-operative Bank, Bombay. ^S.S.C.B.^
'Registrar*. ^Hegr. 7 Continuous file of correspondence 
with the Registrar from 1920.
'Asst. Regr, Surat*, Correspondence with the Assistant 
Registrar for Gujarat.
D. At the National Archives of India, New Delhi. ^f.A.I, J
Revenue and Agriculture Department (Land Revenue) Loose 
Original 'A* Proceedings, November 1914, Pile No.312 
of 1914.
E. Prom the Punjab Records Office, Patiala. /Patiala.J
Typescript of the Minutes of Evidence, Committee on 
Co-operation in India, 1914-1915*
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F. At the India Office Library and Records Department, 
Commonwealth Relations Office, London.
The Private Papers of Lord George Hamilton* Correspon­
dence with Lord Curzon, Vol.XX. /Hamilton Papers.jf 
The Indian Papers of James Caird. 'Home Miscellaneous 
Series, Vol.796. /(Jaird Papers.^
Revenue Letters from the Governor-General of India in 
Council to the Secretary of State for India, 1895-1909. 
/Viceroy to Sec, of State, Rev. Letters from India, j  
Revenue Letters from the Secretary of State for India to 
the Governor-General of India in Council, 1895*1909. 
/Sec. of State to Viceroy, Rev. Letters to India.jf
G. At the Bodleian Library. Oxford.
The Private Papers of Lord MacDonnell, especially those 
relating to the Famine Commission, 1901, MSS. Eng, hist, 
a.11-12, c.356.
H. At the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in 
Foreign Parts Archive"s, London. /S.3?.'C.r /
Missionary Reports Received, 1898-1909, especially the 
Reports of Canon C.S.Rivington.
I. At the Horace Plunkett Foundation London. 
The Private Papers of Sir Horace Plunkett.
II. PRINTED OFFICIAL SOURCES
Parliamentary Papers % _7 _ ,
Report by James Caird, Esq.. C.B.; with Correspondence . 
1880 12732; | liii, HT, ■
Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1878-79» pt.iii, 
XFamine Histories), 1881 (3086); Ixxi, pi.i, 1.
Copy of Correspondence respecting Agricultural Banks in
Tnaia.' imTTyftTi TxiirF43T      '
Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of 
Egypt and the Progress of Reforms. 1895. 1896 (7978)$ 
xcvii, 989.
Reports hy His Majesty*s Agent and Consul General on- 
Egypt and the Soudan, I9O3 and'y§09, l904 (1951); cxi*203. 
1910 (5121)5 cxii, 347.
Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901* and Papers 
Relating Thereto. 1962 (876)I lxx, 545.
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Report of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation in 
India. 190b (4360); xliv, 1, Minutes of Evidence, Bombay, 
I9O8 (4367); xlvi, 1.
Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India,
192B (3I32); viii, 1, Bombay Evidence; Minutes of Evidence, 
Vol.II, pts. i&ii, 1927 (Non-parl.), /N.fl. on Agric. / 
Report of the Indian Statutory., Commission, Vol.I, Survey. ‘ 
I929-3Q (3568); xi, 1/ Vol.II, Recommendations, 1929-30 
(3569); xi, 443. Bombay Submissions: Evidence. Vol.VII. 
1929-30 (Non-parl.).
Hansard*s Parliamentary Debates, 1887, 1900, 1901, 1903.
-Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor- 
General of India assembled for itie purpose of making Laws 
and Regulations, 1879. 1903-04.
Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Bombay, assem­
bled for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations^  1901.
Bombay Legislative Council Proceedings, 1922-1930.
Report of the Committee on the Riots in Poona and Ahmednagar, 
X575i with Appendices. G. of B,.. 1876.
Report of the Commission appointed to Enquire into the Deccan 
Agriculturists1 Relief Act (1891-92). G. of I., 1892.
Selections from the Records of the Government of India,
/S. fi., G. of T r y -  ti ome Departme nt, NoTc ccxli ii t Pape rs 
Relating to the Deccan Agriculturists1 ftelief Act during 
the Years 1875-94.
Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, 
gT. of I., 1895. ~
Selections from Papers on Indebtedness: and Land Transfer.
G, of I., 1895.
Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government,
New Series; /S.k., G. of B,, N.S. /
No.257. Papers relating to the Revision Settlement Report 
on the Three Village's of' the Barsi Taluka of the Sholapur 
cToIle ct orate"5^  01 B., 1892.
No.278. Character of Land Tenures and Survey Settlement in 
the Bombay Presidency, (j, of. S., revised edn., 1908.
No.520, papers relating to the Second Revision Survey Settle- 
ment of.the Bhimthadi Taluka of the Poona Collectorate.
(ST.' of B., 1915
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Nicholson, P. A. Report regarding the Possibility of Intro­
ducing Land and Agricultural Banks into the Madras Presi­
dency 7 Government ol? Madras, Vol.I,, 1895. reprinted 1915 5 
Vol.II, 1897.
Report of the Select Committee on the Establishment of Co- 
operative Societies in India. G. of I., 1901*
Annual Report relating to the Establishment of Co-operative 
Credit Societies in the"Bombay Presidency during the year 
ending 3lst March 1905V and the following yearsV under 
varying t itle s, Vo l930. G. of B., 1905-1930. /Rept., 19— . 7
Proceedings of the Co-operative Conference held in Bombay, 
December lj?-ld, lQod, and semi-annually, under varying titles, 
■fc’o”~1920. G.'of BY, I908rl920, Prom 1921 to 1929 such Reports 
were published by the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Insti­
tute. /Prov. Co-op. Conf. Procs., 19— . 7
Proceedings of the Conference of Registrars of Co-operative 
Societies held on 25th September 1906 and the following days, 
and semi-annuaily'to 1928, G. of I., 1905-1928. /Regrs 7*
Conf. Procs., 19— . 7
Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Credit Societies 
In the Punjab for the year ending'jIst March 1 9 0 6 and 'under 
varying titles, :for l9o7, 1913> 1927. GovtT of the Punjab#
Report on the Working of Co-operative Credit Societies in 
the Lower Provinces for the year 1904-1905; Report on the 
Wor£ing of Co-operative CreditSocieties in Bengal for tbe 
year 1906-1907/and for 1915-1917. Govt, of Bengal.
Land Revenue Administration Reports, Bombay, pt.ii. /5om.
XV Rev. Admin. Repts. / 1904-05 to 1917-18. G. of B.
Sahasrabudhe, B.B., Interim Report for the Pirst Crop Year 
1908-1909 of the Nira Canal Tagai Loans'' Coherne, Poona 
district. G. of B., 1909*
Badve, R.B., Report on the Working of the Nira Canal Societ- 
ies up to the close of tiie Co-operative Year 1913-1914.
Trro^KTTgrr
Government of India, Revenue and Agriculture Department 
(Land Revenue). Resolution No,12-287-1 of 17 June 1914, 
on the Progress of Co-operation. (Published in pamphlet form.)
Report of the Committee on Co-operation in India. G, of I., 
T9I5VVMaclagan Cttee. Rept./
Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918.
Vol. I. Gf of I., 1918.
Report of the Indian Central Cotton Committee, 1919* 
a. of i.| 19197 ~
Report of the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 
1929-307 Vol.I, Report? Vols. II-IV, Evidence. G. of I.,
1930* /Bom. Prov. Banking Enquiry Cttee. Rept,7
Report of the Land Mortgage Committee. G. of B., 1934.
Report of the Co-operatives Supervision Committee, 1933*
G. of B., /?1934J
Mehta, V.L., and Bhansali, M.D., Report on the Reorganization 
of the Co-operative Movement in Bombay. G« of , 193V*
Symington, D., Report on the Aboriginal and Hill Tribes of 
the Partially Excluded Areas in the Province of Bombay*
G. of B., 1939.
Bombay Government Gazette.
III. OTHER WORKS
A few relevant hooks and periodicals do not appear 
to he available in England. The names of the Indian Lib­
raries in which these have been consulted are given in 
square brackets.
A. Books.
Altekar, A.S., A History of Village Communities in
Western India. Bombay, 1927.
Ambedkar, B.R., Ranade, Gandhi and Jinnah: Address deliv­
ered on the 101st Birthday delehration 
of Mahadev Govind Ranade. Bombay," 1943*
Ambekar, G.R., The ^ Crops of the Bombay Presidency, 
pt.ii. Dept."of Agriculture, Bombay, 
Bulletin No.146. Poona, 1928.
Anstey, Vera, The Economic Development of India,
4th edn., London, 1952.
Baden-Powell,B.H.,The Land Systems of British India,
3 vols., 6xford, 1892.
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Binns, B.O,, Agricultural Credit for Small Farmers.
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Deccan College Sociology Department; Shri Y.B. G-aitonde, 
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Sociology, University of Bombay; Dr. P.M.Joshi, Director 
of Archives, Bombay State; Dr.. S.V.Kogekar, Principal of 
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College Sociology Department; Mrs. Josephine McNeill, Irish 
Ambassador to Switzerland and the widow of James McNeill;
The Venerable S.A. Mara, Hubli, who gave me valuable inform­
ation about Canon C.S.Rivington; Dr. David Pocock, of the 
Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford; Shri K.D.Puranik 
Curator of Libraries, Bombay State; Shri J.C.Ryan, Chief 
Agricultural Credit Officer, Reserve Bank of India; Shri 
Sovani, Deputy Librarian of the Servants of India Society; 
Dr. Daniel Thorner, Bombay; Dr. Hugh Tinker, of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies; and Dr. Stanley Wolpert 
of the Department of History, University of California, who, 
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Superintendent, Gujarat Co-operative School, Surat.
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A B B R E V I A T I O N S
The following abbreviations have been used in the 
footnotes; on the whole they are the same as those used in 
Bombay Government correspondence. Abbreviations used when 


















G. of B. Government of Bombay.





L. Rev * Land Revenue.
N.D. Northern Division.
Offg. Officiating.








U. Sec. Under Secretary.
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A spiritual community made up of a teacher and 
his disciples.
A small millet.
A Hindu trader who is generally also a money 
lender.




A small spinning wheel.
The name of a tract in Gujarat.
A wooden bedstead covered with netted string 
or webbing.
A tenement.















Sitting or fasting at the door of a house to 
compel payment of a debt,
A loin cloth worn by men.
Unrefined sugar, jaggery.
A bill of exchange; a written order made by one 
person on another for payment on demand or after 
a specified time of a specified sum of money to 
a person named therein.
Rent-free land.























(The assignment of the revenues of) an estate.





The name of a wild tribe, some of whom, in 
Gujarat, have settled on the plains and become 
cultivators.
A hereditary village accountant.
A cultivator.
One hundred thousand.
Sect prominent in the Karnatak, worshipping 
Siva in his phallic (lingam) form, and dating 
back to a reform movement of the twelfth century,
A merchant.
In certain areas, (e.g. Panch Mahals), one with 
the police authority of a Mamlatdar.
Revenue officer in charge of the subdivision of 
a district called a taluka, normally 100 to 200 
villages.
An association.
Large cultivating and warrior caste of the Deccan. 
A person from Marwar; a money-lender.
The holder of rent-free land.
The country as opposed to the town.
Panch, panchayat. Literally a committee of five; used to
Sescribe an association of any number of persons, 
instituted for objects of an administrative 
or judicial nature.
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Patel .v (patil). V illage he adman. 
Pathan.
Patidar.
A member of the most important Muslim tribe of 
the North-West Frontier,
A cultivating caste in Gujarat, (Literally a 
hereditary cultivator,)
Pattewala, Peon, (messenger with a badge or belt.) 
Peon. From Portuguese peao; (mod.) messenger.





Revenue settlement between Government and 
peasant without intermediaries.
An assembly.
A sub-caste of Brahmans,
A man of consequence; a title given to such a 
person by GoveriSne nt.











Indigenous, made in the country 
Self rule.
Takkavi (tagal, taccavi, takavl). An advance of money from 
Government ,to an agriculturist for purposes 
of cultivation,
Talati, A village accountant.
Taluka. A local revenue division of a district,
Tamasha. An entertainment, a festivity.
Vaisya. The third caste of Hindus whose means of sub­
sistence, according to Manu, were agriculture, 







An area in a village normally inhabite d by one 
particular caste.
A service inam.
Watandar A holder of watan land.
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